he had always held upon parliamentary reform, or to assign his reasons, and justify himself for not altering it, as the right hon. gentleman had thought fit to do. He had never before imagined that the presumption of guilt lay against consistency, and that whoever presumed to think as he had always thought must immediately be put on his defence. If the opinions which the right hon. gentleman formerly professed, if the propositions which he had endeavoured to persuade parliament to adopt, were so very erroneous, and pregnant with such alarming consequences as he had now depicted, it was but natural to suppose, that he would have read his recantation with compunction, and expressed humiliation instead of triumph in recapitulating the enormous mischiefs to which his former errors might have exposed his country. He assumed that the right hon. gentleman had completely changed his sentiments on parliamentary reform, for he had expressly said so, with the poor reserve, that the time might yet come when he should think it as expedient as he had done before. The arguments he had used would apply equally to all times; and it would have been more candid to have said so explicitly, than to have held out a hope which without a second change of opinion as entire as the first, could never be realised. In his arguments against the present motion the right hon. gentleman had had recourse to the mistake, that the object of the present motion was universal suffrage; against this, which made no part of the motion, more than half his speech was employed, and every iota of that part borrowed from what had been urged against himself ten years ago, by those who opposed his first motion for a reform in the representation. Here the right hon. gentleman was only a plagiary; not a common plagiary, indeed, but such a plagiary as Virgil, for instance, who improved and adorned whatever he borrowed. He was obliged to admit that his hon. friend who made the motion disclaimed universal suffrage for his object; but then, he said, look at the petitions! only one of which, however, contained this doctrine. Was he ready to say, that, when he brought forward his motion in 1782, none of the petitions then before the House contained the very same doctrine? But in addition to the evidence of the petitions, his hon. friend had on some other occasions, met certain persons at a tavern, known advo

cates for universal suffrage, which was almost proof positive that his hon. friend was so too! But how did this sort of inference operate against the right hon. gentleman himself? When he brought forward his plans of reform, he was acting at all points with the duke of Richmond, the great apostle of universal suffrage; and it was no very unreasonable supposition, that his first motion on the subject of reform might have been concerted with his grace at Richmond-house. If, then, men's intentions were to be canvassed by supposed privity to the designs of others, the privity of the right hon. gentleman to the duke of Richmond's system of universal suffrage could not be denied, and he must be pronounced guilty by his own rule.

The right hon. gentleman's next objection was to the mode-the very same mode which he himself had adopted. On more mature consideration he had altered his mode; but here he must intercede for the right hon. gentleman's juvenile judgment, and in particular request that he would not insist on dragging through the dirt all those who had supported him in his first motion. What reason he had for changing a motion, which he lost only by twenty votes, was perhaps better known to himself than to others; but he had no right to say, that a motion of the same kind was more dangerous now than his own was in 1782. Mr. Fox said, that he, who had supported all his motions for reform, thought the first the least objectionable. The mode of proceeding lately insisted upon, that a member who proposed the redress of any grievance must move a specific remedy before the House could take the grievance into consideration, was directly contrary to the most approved parliamentary practice. the member who moved for a committee might go into it with a specific statement, which he might see reason to alter, unless indeed the right hon. gentleman had got an exclusive patent for altering opinions; or the committee, supposing the grievance to be proved, might suggest a plan of their own, subject, like every other, to future modification or rejection by the House, when it appeared in the form of a bill. Such was the most convenient and the most ordinary mode of proceeding in all matters of great importance. Now, what was the right hon. gentleman's specific plan? He owed an apology to all those who voted for it, and to him (Mr.

Fox) among the rest, and who, although they approved of a parliamentary reform, did not approve of his particular plan, but trusted, that when the general question, was carried, they should be able to frame the plan in a less exceptionable manner. These were the precise conditions on which he then called for the support of all who wished well to parliamentary reform; and now he pretended to say, that, by supporting it, they pledged themselves, not to the general question but to the particular plan. The general rule was, for all who agreed as to the existence of a grievance, and the necessity of a remedy, to concur as far as they could, and then to debate the particulars at a more advanced stage. This was a sufficient answer ad hominem to the right hon. gentleman, and to all the arguments against the mode. All those who wished well to the general subject ought to concur in support of the present motion, and if that were carried, the specific plan would come properly under discussion in a future stage.

Another objection was, to the time. When the right hon. gentleman made his motion, he alleged, as the reason for it, that there were no adequate means of supporting a good minister, or of repressing a bad one, without a reform in the representation; that to the inadequacy of the system had the misfortune of the American war been owing; and that it was necessary to provide against the nation's falling into a similar calamity. What had since happened to make the calamity less to be dreaded or the precaution less expedient? Under the administration of the marquis of Rockingham, an administration of which he approved, the right hon. gentleman first proposed reform, and that, too, in a time of war. Under another administration, of which he did not approve, he again proposed it, and in time of peace. On neither of these occasions did the right hon. gentleman consider the character of the ministry as at all affecting the expediency of his motion, nor had he ever argued on it in that way. A third administration succeeded, of which he certainly did not entertain a bad opinion, for he was at the head of it himself; still he maintained, or said he maintained, all the doctrines he had held before on the necessity of reform. His reason could not be that he distrusted the virtue of the then House of Commons, for it was a favourite House of Commons, +

on all occasions much extolled by him. Such a favourite indeed, that his plan of reform was not to commence till after the dissolution of that parliament. Thus, under all possible circumstances of time, in time of war, in time of peace, under an administration which had his confidence, under an administration that had it not, and when he himself was minister, had the right hon. gentleman agitated the question of reform. What was there now to make it improper for another to do that which it had been proper for him to do in every variety of time and circumstances? The prosperity of the country was no argument against reform, for it was not urged as a necessary measure to restore prosperity, but to give security to the prosperity which we enjoyed. That security, by the right hon. gentleman's own admission, no change of ministers, nothing else could give; for he had moved it when minister himself, and he did not surely distrust his own adminis tration. When his hon. friend gave notice of his motion last year-a part of his argument which had been very unfairly treated- he said, that a time of national prosperity and peace, as the minister had described that to be, must be considered as favourable for reviving the question of reform. Since then, this unfortunate and mad war had been entered into, and his hon. friend said, "You who objected to my motion last year, as improper in the season of prosperity and peace, cannot now make the same objection in the season of war and much public distress." This, which he adduced merely as an argumentum ad hominem, to prove the inconsistency of his opponents, was attempted to be made a charge of inconsistency against himself. What objection could the right hon. gentleman raise to reviving the question of reform in a House of Commons which he had found so favourable to him on every other subject? He would hardly venture to say, that the House of Commons had been so universally complaisant to him, that he was sure they would never support a bad minister. Had they often joined him in opposing ministers whom he thought bad, he might indeed say that they would never suffer misconduct in a minister; but on nine years experience of support to his own administration, it would be rather too much to make the same inference. There could be no objection to the motion being made now,

into use. France, after doing great honour to herself by shaking off her old intolerable despotism, had since been governed by counsels generally unwise, and often wicked. But, what had this to do with our reform? It had been said, that French principles, though not more detestable than the principles of Russia, were more dangerous and more to be guarded against, because more fascinating. Would any man now say that French principles were fascinating? What, then, had we to fear from what no man in his senses would wish to copy?

except that it was made by his hon. friend instead of the right hon. gentleman. In the pride of his new wisdom, his present self felt such contempt for his former self, that he could not look back on his former conduct and opinions without a sort of insulting derision. As lord Foppington said in the play, "I begin to think that when I was a commoner, I was a very nauseous fellow;" so the right hon. gentleman began to think, that when he was a reformer, he must have been a very foolish fellow he might, nevertheless, have retained some degree of candour for his hon. friend, who had not yet received the new lights with which he was so marvellously illuminated. If the right hon. gentleman had rested his objections on the change of circumstances produced by the events in France, his argument would have been rational, or at least consistent. But he appealed to the recollection of the right hon. gentleman, whether he had not in 1785 argued as earnestly against universal representation, and painted the dangers of it in colours as strong as he had done now? The events in France, therefore, had produced no aggravation of the danger in his view of the subject, but rather made it less, inasmuch as the example of its effects in France had brought it into utter discredit in the mind of every thinking man; and what he had not considered as an objection to his own motion in 1785, he had no right to insist upon as an objection to the motion of his hon. friend now.

He had always disliked universal representation as much as the right hon. gentleman; but that dislike was no reason for charging it with more mischief than was fairly imputable to it. It had not been the cause, as the right hon. gentleman alleged, of all the evils in France. The first, or constituent assembly, was not elected on this plan, but on old usages and old abuses; yet that assembly had done some of the most unjustifiable things done in France: it had despoiled the clergy without regard to situation or character, and destroyed the nobility. The second, or legislative assembly, was not chosen by individual suffrage; for when the constitution was framed, wild as the French were, they had laid many restrictions on individual suffrage, and made the distinction between active and inactive citizens. It was, therefore, unjust to charge on it what was done by assemblies elected before it was brought [VOL. XXX.]

An hon. friend of his (Mr. Windham) had last night, in a very eloquent, but very whimsical speech, endeavoured to prove that the majority was generally wrong. But when he came to answer some objections of his own suggesting, he found himself reduced to say, that when he differed from the majority, he would consider himself as equally independent of the decision of that majority as one independent county member of the decision of another-which was just to say, that he would put an end to society; for where every individual was independent of the will of the rest, no society could exist. It was singular for him to defend the decision of the majority, who had found it so often against him; and he was in hopes that his right hon. friend would have shown him some easy way of solving the difficulty. His hon. friend said, that a wise man would look first to the reason of the thing to be decided, then to force, or his power of carrying that decision into effect, but never to the majority. would say, look first and look last to the reason of the thing, without considering whether the majority was likely to be for or against you, and least of all to force. Mr. Fox admitted that the majority might sometimes oppress the minority and that the minority might be justified in resisting such oppression, even by force: but as a general rule, though not without exception, the majority in every community must decide for the whole, because in human affairs there was no umpire but human reason. The presumption was also that the majority would be right: for if five men were to decide by a majority, it was probable that the three would be right and the two wrong, of which, if they were to decide by force, there wouldbe no probability at all. What was the criterion of truth but the general sense of mankind? Even in mathematics, we pro[3 N]

He

ceeded from certain axioms, of the truth of which we had no other proof but that all mankind agreed in believing them. If, then, what all men agreed on was admitted to be true, there was a strong presump tion, that what many, or the majority, agreed on, was true likewise. Even reverence for antiquity resolved itself into this; for what was it but consulting the decision of the majority, not of one or two generations, but of many, by the concurrence of which we justly thought that we arrived at greater certainty? His objection to universal suffrage was not distrust of the decision of the majority, but because there was no practical mode of collecting such suffrage, and that by attempting it, what from the operation of hope on some, fear on others, and all the sinister means of influence that would so certainly be exerted, fewer individual opinions would be collected than by an appeal to a limited number. Therefore, holding fast to the right of the majority to decide, and to the natural rights of man, as taught by the French, but much abused by their practice, he would resist universal suffrage.

Without attempting to follow his hon. friend, when he proposed to soar into the skies, or dive into the deep, to encounter his metaphysical adversaries, because in such heights and depths the operations of the actors were too remote from view to be observed with much benefit, he would rest on practice, to which he was more attached, as being better understood. And if, by a peculiar interposition of divine power, all the wisest men of every age and of every country could be collected into one assembly, he did not believe that their united wisdom would be capable of forming even a tolerable constitution. In this opinion he thought he was supported by the unvarying evidence of history and observation. Another opinion he held, no matter whether erroneous or not, for he stated it only as an illustration, namely, that the most skilful architect could not build, in the first instance, so commodious a habitation as one that had been originally intended for some other use, and had been gradually improved by successive alterations suggested by various inhabi tants for its present purpose. If, then, so simple a structure as a commodious habitation was so difficult in theory, how much more difficult the structure of a government? One apparent exception might be mentioned, the constitution of

His hon. friend had said, on a former occasion, that if the constitution of the House of Commons were that the county of Middlesex alone elected the representatives for the whole kingdom, he would not consent to alter that mode of representation, while he knew from experience that it had produced such benefits as we had long enjoyed. Now, suppose, for the sake of argument, that the county of Cornwall, somewhat less likely to be a virtual representative of the whole kingdom, than Middlesex, were, instead of sending forty-four members to parliament, to send the whole five hundred and fifty-eight, such a House of Commons might, for a time, be a proper check on the executive power, and watch over the interest of the whole kingdom with as much care as those of Cornwall; but, with such a House of Commons, no argument would persuade him to remain satisfied, because there was no security that it would continue to do so. The question now to be examined was, did the House of Commons, as at present constituted, answer the purposes which it was intended to answer; and had the people any security that it would continue to do so? To both branches of the question he answered decidedly in the negative.

Before he proceeded to offer the reasons on which he thus answered, it was necessary to say a few words on the circumstances which, in his opinion, would justify a change. Many things short of actual suffering would justify not only a change, but even resistance. When the dispute began with America, it was not