the believers in magic brag of experience never so much, it may be but a fallible experience; they reasonably desire to know whether these gentlemen that stand for magic can answer the objections which they propose, to prove that the practice of magic, according to the system laid down, is inconsistent with reason, before they will yield their assent. Let the stories be never so numerous, appear never so credible, these unbelieving gentlemen desire to be tried by reason, and aver, till that reason is given, they will not be convinced by the number of stories, because, though numerous, they are stories still, neither will they believe them because they appear credible; because seeming so is not being so, and appearances, though never so fair, when they contradict reason, are not to be swallowed down with an implicit faith as so many realities. And thus far, no doubt, the gentlemen who are on the unbelieving side, are very much in the right on it. The learned gentlemen, on the other hand, who are persuaded of this mighty mysterious power being lodged in the hands of magicians, answer, that they will take upon them to refute the most subtle objections brought by the learned unbelievers, and to reconcile the practicability of magical mysteries, by the capacity of men who study that art to right rules and laws of reasoning, and to show that some stories, though never so prodigious, which are told of magicians, demand the belief of wise men on two accounts; because, as experience backs reason on the one hand, reason backs experience on the other, and so the issue of the whole argument (whether there are magicians

or not) is thrown upon both experience and reason. These arguments on each side I shall draw up fairly, pro and con, for I do not pretend to be the inventor of them myself, they belong to other authors many years ago; be it enough for me to boast of, if I can draw them up in a better and closer form together than they have yet appeared in: in that I take upon myself a very great task; I erect myself as it were into a kind of a judge; I will sum up the evidences on both sides, and I shall, wherever I see occasion, intimate which side of the argument bears the most weight with me; but when I have enforced my opinion as far as I think needful, my readers, like a jury, are still at liberty to bring in their verdict just as they themselves shall see fit; and this naturally leads me where I promised to come to in the fifth part of this discourse, to the several objections against the power of art magic and refutation of those objections.

THE FIRST OBJECTIONS BEING AGAINST THE EXISTENCE OF SPIRITS, AND THE REFUTATIONS THEREOF.

The first objection, which they who reject magic make use of, is, denying that there are any such things as spirits, about which, since those who de-. fend the art say it entirely exerciseth itself, the objectors contend, that if they can make out that there are no such beings as spirits, all pretensions to the art must be entirely groundless, and for the future exploded.

To make this part out, that there are no spirits,

the first man they produce on their side is undoubtedly one of very great credit and authority, inasmuch as he has justly borne for many centuries the title of a prince of philosophers. They say that Aristotle, in his book "De Mundo," reasons thus against the existence of spirits, viz., That since God can do all things of Himself, He doth not stand in need of ministering angels and demons; a multitude of servants showing the weakness of a prince.

The gentlemen who defend the science make this reply: they allow the credit and authority of Aristotle as much as the objectors; but as the objectors themselves deny all the authorities for the spirits, and desire that reason may be the only ground they go upon, so the refuters, on their parts, desire that Aristotle's ipse dixit may not be absolutely passed upon them for argument, but that his words may be brought to the same touchstone of reason, and proved if they are standard. If this argument, say they, will hold good, Aristotle should not suppose intelligences moving the celestial spheres, for God sufficeth to move all without ministering spirits; nor would there be need of a sun in the world, for God can enlighten all things by Himself, and so all second causes would be taken away; therefore there are angels and ministering spirits in the world, for the majesty of God, not for His want of them, and for order, not for His omnipotency. And here, if the objectors return and say, Who told you that there are spirits? Is not yours a precarious hypothesis? may not we have leave to recriminate in this place, Pray who told Aristotle that there were in

telligences that moved the celestial spheres ? Is not this hypothesis as precarious as any man may pretend that of spirits to be? and we believe there are few philosophers at present who agree with Aristotle in that opinion; and we dare pronounce this to be ours, that Aristotle took his intelligences from the Hebrews, who went according to the same whimsical though pretty notion, which first gave rise to the fiction of the nine Muses; but more than all this, it is a very great doubt among learned men, whether this book "De Mundo," be Aristotle's or no.

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The next thing the objectors bring against the existence of spirits, is, that it is nonsense for men to say that there are such beings of which it is impossible for a man to have any notion, and they insist upon it that it is impossible for any man to form an idea of a spiritual substance. As to this part, the defendants rejoin, that they think our late most judicious Mr. Locke, in his elaborate and finished Essay on Human Understanding," has fairly made out, that men have as clear a notion of a spiritual substance as they have of any corporeal substance, matter, or body; and that there is as much reason for admitting the existence of the one as of the other; for that if they admit the latter, it is but humour in them to deny the former. It is in book the second, chapter 29, where he reasons thus: "If a man will examine himself, concerning his notion of pure substance in general, he will find he has no other idea of it, but only a supposition of he knows not what support of such quality which are capable of producing simple ideas in us, which qualities are commonly called ac

cidents. Thus if we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal substance, as horse, stone, &c., though the idea we have of either of them be but the complication or collection of those several simple ideas, or sensible qualities, which we use to find united in the thing called horse or stone; yet because we cannot conceive how they should subsist alone, not one in another, we suppose them to exist in and be supported by some common subject, which support we denote by the name of substance, though it be certain we have no clear or distinct idea of that thing we suppose a support. The same happens concerning the operations of our mind, viz., thinking, reasoning, and fearing, &c., which we concluding not to subsist of themselves, and not apprehending how they can belong to body, we are apt to think these the actions of some substance which we call spirit. Whereby it is evident, that having no other notion of matter, but something wherein those many sensible qualities, which affect our senses, do subsist by supposing a substance wherein thinking, knowing, doubting, and a power of moving, &c., do subsist, we have as clear a notion of the nature or substance of spirit, as we have of body; the one being supposed to be, without knowing what is the substratum to those simple ideas which we have, from without, and the other supposed, with a like ignorance of what it is, to be the substratum of the operations which we experiment in ourselves within. T is plain then, that the idea of corporeal substance in matter, is as remote from our conceptions and apprehensions as that of spiritual substance; and therefore from our not hav