The exemption in the Louisiana constitution of property from inheritance taxes which has borne its just proportion of taxes is restricted to the particular property inherited; and if taxes thereon have not been paid by the former owner, it matters not that the decedent has paid all the taxes assessed against him on other property which he sold and invested the proceeds in the property inherited. "The exemption is neither personal nor transmissible." "1 State and municipal bonds, though exempt from taxation, do not fall within the above exception, nor do shares of stock not taxed, though the corporation in which they are held may have been taxed on its property.12 The exemption of property from the payment of the tax follows the proceeds used to discharge a legacy. An inheritance tax is due on a legacy not paid from the proceeds of exempt property, but it is not due on a legacy necessarily paid from the proceeds of exempt property.18 § 132. Retrospective Operation of Statute.—The rights and obligations of all parties relative to the payment of an inheritance tax are ordinarily determinable as of the time of the death of the decedent; the statute imposing the tax usually has no retrospective operation, and does not apply to estates in course of settlement or to property that has vested in the beneficiaries at the time the law goes into effect, at least unless the legislative intent plainly appears to the contrary." And such is true in regard to exemptions; a clear legislative intention: Estate of Mergentine, 129 App. Div. 367, 113 N. Y. Supp. 948, 953, citing Estate of Euston, 113 N. Y. 174, 3 L. R. A. 464, 21 N. E. 87; Estate of Fayerweather, 143 N. Y. 114, 38 N. E. 278; Estate of Harbeck, 161 N. Y. 211, 55 N. E. 850. 11 Succession of Pritchard, 118 La. 883, 43 South. 537. 12 Succession of Kohn, 115 La. 71, 38 South. 898. statutes providing for them will, as a rule, be given a prospective operation, applying only to the future, and not affecting the right of the state to taxes in case of deaths prior to the passage of the exemption act.15 If an educational bequest was subject to the inheritance tax at the time of the testator's death, the tax may be collected, notwithstanding proceedings therefor are not commenced until after an amendment to the statute exempting the bequest has gone into effect.16 In California it has been decided that the section of the statute which purports retroactively to exempt resident nephews and nieces, and educational and benevolent institutions, from the payment of unpaid collateral inheritance taxes, violates the constitutional provisions of that state forbidding special legislation releasing any existing obligation to the state, and prohibiting the legislature from making any gift to any individual." But in Maryland, where the legislature, by amendment, included "husbands" in the exempt class, and provided that the exemption should apply in all cases where the tax had not actually been paid, 15 Provident Hospital etc. Assn. v. People, 198 Ill. 495, 64 N. E. 1031; Succession of Becker, 118 La. 1056, 43 South. 701; Sherrill v. Christ Church, 121 N. Y. 701, 25 N. E. 50. The exemption in this last case was in favor of certain corporations. Said the court: "The act provides that the personal estate of certain corporations, among which are religious corporations, shall be exempt from taxation, and that the collateral inheritance tax act shall not apply to them. It is true that the state could by act of the legislature duly passed release taxes already due. But legislative acts are always construed as prospective in their operation unless by their plain language it can be seen that it was the legislative intention that they should have retroactive effect. This act was clearly prospective in its operation, and applied only to the future, and as this tax became due and payable before its passage, it may still be enforced in the manner provided in the collateral inheritance act." See, too, Estate of Wolfe, 2 Con. 600, 15 N. Y. Supp. 539. 16 Connell v. Crosby, 210 Ill. 380, 71 N. E. 350. 17 Estate of Stanford, 126 Cal. 112, 45 L. R. A. 788, 54 Pac. 259, 58 Pac. 462, Justice Henshaw dissenting. the court, adopting the language of counsel, said: "If the legislature is satisfied that a given tax is no longer necessary, that it is unjust, that a change of circumstances requires its repeal, that public policy demands that the repeal should be prompt, should give instant relief, and should therefore extend to all who had not yet actually paid, the legislature has in its discretion the constitutional right so to enact, without being at the same time compelled to embarrass the treasury by a sweeping restitution to all who had paid the tax from the time of its imposition. Under some circumstances such a retrospective exemption might be highly expedient, and under others not. The question is one of policy for the legislature, and not one of law for the courts." 18 19 § 133. Exemption Based on Valuation of Property. It is usual for inheritance tax laws to exempt certain transmissions from taxation if the valuation does not exceed a specified amount. There is no constitutional objection, as has already been seen, to this form of exemption. The valuation is generally determinable as of the date of the death of the decedent, for that is the time the transmission takes effect; hence the increase or income after death is not considered in estimating the value of the estate. But of course the question depends upon the legislative intent, as expressed in the statute, and in some states the increase arising between the date of the death and the date of distribution is taken into consideration.20 § 134. Manner of Determining Exemption.-Under the obscure wording of many statutes it is a matter 18 Montague v. State, 54 Md. 481, 488. See, also, Roman Catholic Church v. Niles, 86 Hun, 221, 33 N. Y. Supp. 243. 19 See sec. 24, ante. 20 See sec. 52, ante. of no small difficulty to determine whether the exemption is from the separate legacies or inheritances or from the aggregate value of the estate of the decedent. Some statutes have been construed to allow the exemption from each legacy or distributive share, or, otherwise expressed, to each legatee or distributee."1 At one time this rule prevailed in New York, but since the acts of 1892 and 1896, the whole property passing to persons not exempt must be considered together, and if the aggregate amount thereof exceeds the amount exempted by the statute, the tax is collectible, although each individual inheritance, bequest 21 People v. Koenig, 37 Colo. 283, 11 Ann. Cas. 140, 85 Pac. 1129; Booth v. Commonwealth, 130 Ky. 88, 33 L. R. A., N. S., 592, 113 S. W. 61; State v. Hamlin, 86 Me. 495, 41 Am. St. Rep. 569, 25 L. R. A. 632, 30 Atl. 76; State v. Probate Court, 101 Minn. 485, 112 N. W. 878; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 44 L. Ed. 969, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 747. The Minnesota court, in the above case, expresses the rule thus: In determining the value of the estate for the purpose of fixing the amount of the inheritance tax, where the estate descends to two or more legatees or devisees in equal shares, an exemption to each should be allowed. In the above Colorado case, the words "such estate" are construed as referring to property received by each person. In the case of State v. Hamlin, 86 Me. 495, 41 Am. St. Rep. 569, 25 L. R. A. 632, 30 Atl. 76, the court, in construing the Maine statute, says: "The question whether the exemption of five hundred dollars in the first section is an exemption from the corpus of the estate, or a several exemption of that sum from each portion of the estate passing by will or descent to persons outside the exempted classes, is raised by this appeal. A careful examination of the statute satisfies us that the legislature intended the exemption to apply to each taker within the class subject to the duty. The language of section 1 is that 'all property.. which shall pass by will or by the intestate laws of this state. . . . other than to or for the use of the father, etc., . . . . shall be liable to a tax of two and one-half per cent of its value above the sum of five hundred dollars,' etc., and any grantee under a conveyance made during the grantor's life, to take effect after his death, 'shall be liable for all such taxes.' It is difficult to construe this language to mean other than that such taker, subject to the tax, shall be liable upon the amount received above five hundred dollars. This construction is greatly aided by the second section. . . . . This provision is plainly inconsistent with the claim that the five hundred dollars exemption is to be taken once for all from the corpus of the decedent's entire estate." or devise is less than the exemption. The exemption is taken from the estate of the decedent as a whole, not from each interest transferred; and if the aggregate amount of the estate exceeds the amount of the exemption which the statute allows, the tax must be imposed upon each inheritance or bequest, irrespective of whether it exceeds the exemption.22 This interpre 22 Estate of Hoffman, 143 N. Y. 327, 38 N. E. 311; Estate of Corbett, 171 N. Y. 516, 64 N. E. 209; Estate of Costello, 189 N. Y. 288, 82 N. E. 139; Estate of Hall, 88 Hun, 68, 34 N. Y. Supp. 616; Estate of Birdsall, 22 Misc. Rep. 180, 49 N. Y. Supp. 450; Estate of De Graaf, 24 Misc. Rep. 147, 53 N. Y. Supp. 591; Estate of Curtis, 31 Misc. Rep. 83, 64 N. Y. Supp. 574; Estate of Rosendahl, 40 Misc. Rep. 542, 82 N. Y. Supp. 992; Estate of Garland, 88 App. Div. 380, 84 N. Y. Supp. 630; Estate of Mock, 113 App. Div. 913, 100 N. Y. Supp. 1130. In the Costello case the New York court of appeals decides that in case the personal property of the deceased person exceeds in the aggregate five hundred dollars, the amount passing to his nieces, although their individual shares are less than two hundred dollars, is taxable. And in the above Corbett case the New York court of appeals decides that when the aggregate amount of the personal property exceeds ten thousand dollars, the tax must be imposed upon each and all of the estates which are exempted therefrom, when the aggregate amount of the personal property does not exceed the sum of ten thousand dollars, except upon legacies to a bishop or any religious corporation. "To give a concrete illustration," said Chief Justice Parker, “of the working of the statute as construed by this court: An estate of fifteen thousand dollars, in which six thousand dollars was given to a bishop or religious corporation, which are specifically exempted from taxation by the statute, and nine thousand dollars given to a brother and sister, would not be taxable because the aggregate amount passing to persons not specifically exempted would not be of the value of ten thousand dollars; but if only five thousand dollars were given to the bishop or corporation and ten thousand dollars were given to the next of kin, whether in different classes or not, all would be taxed at the rate provided in the statute, because the aggregate amount thus given is equal to the sum of ten thousand dollars." In Estate of Conklin, 39 Misc. Rep. 771, 80 N. Y. Supp. 1124, it is said that by no possible construction can the Corbett case be made to hold that bishops and religious corporations are the only specific exemptions in the statute, and it is held that if an estate falls under two thousand five hundred dollars, of which all but two hundred and fifty dollars passes to sisters of the decedent, none of the property can be taxed. Said the court: "The sum of this law is, therefore, that, given an estate of less than ten thousand dollars value, it is taxable only when |