secured, in accordance with law. A receipt or certificate from the officer of such other state or country charged with the duty of collection of such tax, or the acceptance of such guaranty or security, shall be prima facie evidence in this state of the fact of such payment, guaranty or security.'

§ 28. Detention of Property in Safe Deposit.— There are statutes which forbid safe deposit companies, on the death of a lessee of a box or safe, from delivering the contents to his heirs or personal representatives, except after ten days' notice to the state treasurer and attorney general, or other designated officers of the government, and requiring such corporations to retain a sufficient portion of such contents to pay the inheritance tax on the property on deposit or in safekeeping. Failure to obey the law renders the deposit company liable for the tax itself and for a heavy penalty besides. These statutes are not unconstitutional as applied to safe deposit companies and other corporations doing a similar business. Nor are they unconstitutional when applied to lessees of safe deposit boxes and their heirs and representatives, even in cases where boxes are rented jointly by two or more persons or by a partnership, and one of the partners or joint lessees dies. The enforcement of the law may result in delay and inconvenience to heirs and legatees, but delay is necessarily incident to the settlement and distribution of the estate of a decedent. And when the interests of the state are considered, it does not seem unreasonable that it should, through its proper representative, be given opportunity to protect itself from loss of revenue through the withdrawal and concealment or transfer of securities and other valuable assets. The 32 See West Virginia statute, post.

heirs and legatees are not the only parties interested. The money received by the state in the form of inheritance taxes constitutes a part of the public revenue, and the right of the state to those taxes vests, in point of time, at the time the estate vests, that is, upon the death of the decedent. Therefore, the state has a vested financial right in the estate of every deceased person which is subject to the payment of the inheritance tax, and this right is equal in degree to that of the personal representatives, the heirs, or the legatees of the decedent, and it vests at the same moment of time when their interests vest. Statutory provisions which require the representative of the state to have notice of the time when property held by safe deposit companies, the former owners of which are deceased, is to be surrendered and removed and delivered to the personal representative, heir or legatee of the decedent, are not an unreasonable measure for the protection of the state from the loss of property to which it has a vested right; and they do not invade the constitutional rights, either of the safe deposit companies or of the representatives, heirs, and legatees.

33

33 National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 250 Ill. 584, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 95 N. E. 973.

CHAPTER III.

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES.

§ 33. Statutes Adopted from Another State.

§ 38.

§ 37. Constitutionality of Tax Imposed Pending Administration. Law Governing Estates in Remainder.

§ 39.

§ 40.

Law Governing Remainders-Constitutional Questions.
Law Governing Powers of Appointment.

43. Repeal and Re-enactment of Statute. § 44. Repeal of United States Statute.

§ 33. Statutes Adopted from Another State.-It is a familiar canon of construction that when one state adopts a statute of another state it is presumed to adopt the construction previously placed upon the statute by the courts of the latter, but is not bound by their decisions rendered after the adoption of the statute. Such subsequent decisions will be given respectful consideration, but they are persuasive only, and entitled to no greater weight than may be due to the reasoning found therein.' These rules are applicable where one state adopts the inheritance tax statute of another state. And where the provisions of the inheritance tax statutes of two states are in substance the same, the decisions of the courts of one

1 Germania Life Ins. Co. v. Ross-Lewin, 24 Colo. 43, 65 Am. St. Rep. 215, 51 Pac. 488; Nicollet Nat. Bank v. City Bank, 38 Minn. 85, 8 Am. St. Rep. 643, 35 N. W. 577; Pratt v. Miller, 109 Mo. 78, 32 Am. St. Rep. 656, 18 S. W. 965; Stadler v. First Nat. Bank, 22 Mont. 190, 74 Am. St. Rep. 582, 56 Pac. 111; In re O'Connor, 21 R. I. 465, 79 Am. St. Rep. 814, 44 Atl. 591; Wyoming Coal Min. Co. v. State, 15 Wyo. 97, 123 Am. St. Rep. 1014, 87 Pac. 337, 984.

2 People v. Griffith, 245 Ill. 532, 92 N. E. 313; Miller v. McLaughlin, 141 Mich. 425, 104 N. W. 777.

of the states construing the law will be resorted to by the courts of the other state for aid in reaching the proper interpretation to be placed upon the law.3

§ 34. Statutes in Pari Materia.—Another wellrecognized rule of construction is, that when divers statutes relate to the same thing, all should be taken into consideration in construing any one of them; acts in pari materia are to be taken together as if they were one law. And statutes on cognate subjects, though not strictly in pari materia, may be referred to in order to elucidate the intention of the legislature in enacting any given statute." Accordingly, it has been contended that when there has been no previous decision in the state on a question involved in the interpretation of an inheritance tax statute, such as the situs of the property, the rulings of the highest court of the state on the general tax laws should be not only persuasive but controlling. But the Illinois court has held against this contention, saying: "One of the chief reasons given in support of the legality of inheritance taxes has been that they are not 'taxes' in the strict sense of the term. This law has no relation to the general revenue law. The

8 State v. Pabst, 139 Wis. 561, 121 N. W. 351.

4 Pryor v. Winter, 147 Cal. 554, 109 Am. St. Rep. 162, 82 Pac. 202; Wilson v. Donaldson, 117 Ind. 356, 10 Am. St. Rep. 48, 3 L. R. A. 266, 20 N. E. 250; Russ v. Commonwealth, 210 Pa. 544, 105 Am. St. Rep. 825, 1 L. R. A., N. S., 409, 60 Atl. 169.

"Statutes are in pari materia which relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things. The word 'par' must not be confounded with the term 'similis.' It is used in opposition to it, as in the expression 'magis pares sunt quam similes; intimating not likeness merely, but identity. It is a phrase applicable to the public statutes or general laws, made at different times and in reference to the same subject": United Society v. Eagle Bank, 7 Conn. 456, 468.

5 State v. Frederickson, 101 Me. 37, 115 Am. St. Rep. 295, 8 Ann. Cas. 48, 6 L. R. A., N. S., 186, 63 Atl. 535; St. Louis v. Howard, 119 Mo. 41, 41 Am. St. Rep. 630, 24 S. W. 770.

two acts cannot be held to be in pari materia. 'While the object of both is to raise revenue for the support of the government, they have nothing else in common.' They were passed at different times, and upon entirely different theories. One taxes the property itself, and the other the right of succession to the property.'

§ 35. Strict or Liberal Construction.-The statement is not infrequently met with, in the opinions of courts, that inheritance tax laws should be construed strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer; that the government is bound to express its intention to tax in clear and unambiguous language; and that in case of doubt or ambiguity arising on the terms of the statute, every intendment is indulged against the taxing power. No satisfactory reason, however, has been advanced for such a rule, and it is doubtful, indeed, whether the rule has, to any considerable extent, been observed. One would suppose that such laws, like any other statutes, should be given a reasonable and liberal interpretation with a view to effectuate the intention of the legislature. And it is gratifying to note that whatever the courts may have said on this question, they have, in fact, generally given inheritance tax statutes a liberal con

People v. Griffith, 245 Ill. 532, 92 N. E. 313.

People v. Koenig, 37 Colo. 283, 11 Ann. Cas. 140, 85 Pac. 1129; Matter of Stewart, 131 N. Y. 274, 14 L. R. A. 836, 30 N. E. 184; Estate of Harbeck, 161 N. Y. 211, 55 N. E. 850; Estate of Kimberly, 27 App. Div. 470, 50 N. Y. Supp. 586; Estate of Kerr, 159 Pa. 512, 28 Atl. 354; Bailey v. Henry (Tenn.), 143 S. W. 1124; Eidman v. Martinez, 184 U. S. 578, 46 L. Ed. 697, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 515; Disston v. McClain, 147 Fed. 114, 77 C. C. A. 340; Lynch v. Union Trust Co., 164 Fed. 161, 90 C. C. A. 147.

The rule of strict construction, ordinarily applied to the operation and effect of a statute imposing a tax and to proceedings thereunder, does not apply to the Minnesota statute imposing a tax on inheritances: State v. Bazille, 97 Minn. 11, 7 Ann. Cas. 1056, 6 L. R. A., N. S., 732, 106 N. W.