The converfation continued for nearly two hours; and the public and private advance of money was preffed and repreffed in a variety of forms. At length M. X. said that he did not blame us; that our determination was certainly proper, if we could keep it ; but he showed decidedly his opinion to be, that we could not keep it. He faid that he would communicate, as nearly as he could, our conversation to the minifter, or to M. Y. to be given by him to the minifter; we are not certain which. We then separated. On the 22d of October, M. Z. a French gentleman of refpectable character, informed Mr. Gerry, that M. Talleyrand, minister of foreign relations, who profeffed to be well difpofed towards the United States, had expected to have feen the American minifters frequently in their private capacities; and to have conferred with them individually on the objects of their miffion; and had authorized M. Z. to make this communication to Mr. Gerry. The latter fent for his colleagues, and a conference was held with M. Z. on the fubject, in which General Pinckney and General Marthall expreffed their opinions, that, not being acquainted with M. Talleyrand, they could not with propriety call on him; but that, according to the cuftom of France, he might expect this of Mr. Gerry, from a previous acquaintance in America. This Mr. Gerry reluctantly complied with on the 23d, and with M.Z. called on M.Talleyrand, who, not being then at his office, appointed the 28th for the interview. After the first introduction, M. Talleyrand began the conference. He faid, that the Directory had paffed an arrête, which he offered for perufal, in which they had demanded of the envoys an explanation of fome parts, and a repa ration for others, of the Prefident's fpeech to Congrefs of the 16th of May laft: he was fenfible, he said, that difficulties would exift, ̧ on the part of the envoys, relative to the demand; but that by their offering money he thought he could prevent the effect of the arrête. M. Z. at the request of Mr. Gerry, having stated that the envoys have no fuch powers, M. Talleyrand replied, they can in fuch cafe take a power on themfelves, and propofed that they fhould make a loan. Mr. Gerry then addreffed M. Talleyrand diftinctly in English, which he faid he understood, and flated, that the uneafinefs of the Directory, refulting from the President's fpeech, was a fubject unconnected with the objects of the miffion; that M. Barras, in his fpeech to Mr. Monroe, on his recall, had expreffed himself in a manner difpleafing to the government and citizens of the United States; that the Prefident, as the envoys conceived, had made fuch obfervations on M. Barras's fpeech as were neceffary to vindicate the honour of the United States; that this was not confidered by our government as a fubject of difpute between the two nations, that having no inftructions refpecting it, we could not make any explanations or reparations relating to it; and that M. Talleyrand himfelf was fufficiently acquainted with the conftitution of the United States to be convinced of the truth of thefe obfervations. Mr. Gerry further ftated, that the powers of the envoys, as they conceived, were adequate to the difcuffion and adjustment of all points of real difference between the two nations; that they could alter and amend the treaty, or, if neceffary, form a new one; that the United States were anxiously defirous of removing all caufes of complaint between themfelves and France, and of renewing their former friendship and intercourfe on terms which would be mutually honourable and beneficial to the two nations, but not on any other terms; that as to a loan, we had no powers whatever to make one; that if we were to attempt it, we should deceive himself and the Directory likewife, which as men of honour we could not do; but that we could fend one of our number for inftructions on this propofition, if deemed expedient, provided that the other objects of the negotiation could be difcuffed and adjusted; that as he had expreffed a defire to confer with the envoys individually, it was the with of Mr. Gerry that fuch a conference fhould take place, and their opinions thus be afcertained, which he conceived correfponded with his own in the particulars mentioned. M. Talleyrand, in anfwer, faid, he should be glad to confer with the other envoys individually, but that this matter about the money must be fettled directly, without fending to America; that he would not communicate the arrête for a week; and that if we could adjust the difficulty refpecting the speech, an application would nevertheless go to the United States for a loan. A courier arrived at this moment from Italy, and M. Talleyrand appearing impatient to read the letters, Mr. Gerry took leave of him immediately. He followed to the door, and defired M. Z. to repeat to Mr. Gerry what he, M. Talleyrand, had faid to him. Mr. Gerry then returned to his quarters with M. Z. took down the particulars of this interview as before ftated, fent for Generals Pinckney and Marshall, and read it to them in the presence of M. Z. who confirmed it. Generals Pinckney and Marshall then defired M. Z. to inform M. Talleyrand that they had nothing to add to this conference, and did not wifh that the arrête might be delayed on their account. Anfwer of M. Barras, Prefident of the Executive Directory, to the Speech of Mr. Monroe, on taking leave, to which the 'Speech of the Prefident of the United States refers. "Mr. Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America, "BY prefenting to-day your letters of recall to the Executive Directory, you give to Europe a very strange fpectacle. "France, rich in her liberty, furrounded by a crowd of victories, strong ftrong in the esteem of her allies, will not abafe herfelf by calcu lating the confequences of the condefcenfion of the American go. vernment to the fuggeftions of her former tyrants.-Moreover," the French republic hopes, that the fucceffors of Columbus, Ramhiph, and Penn, always proud of their liberty, will never forget that they owe it to France. They will weigh-in their wisdom the magnanimous benevolence of the French people with the crafty careffes of certain perfidious perfons, who meditate bringing them back to their former flavery. Affure the good American people, Sir, that, like them, we adore liberty; that they will always have our esteem, and that they will find in the French people republican generofity, which knows how to grant peace as it does to caufe its fovereignty to be refpected. "As to you, Mr. Minifter Plenipotentiary, you have combated for principles, you have known the true interefts of your country. Depart with our regret. In you we give up a reprefentative to America, and retain the remembrance of the citizen whose perfonal qualities did honour to that title." October 29th. M. X. again called on us. He faid M. Talleyrand was extremely anxious to be of fervice to us, and had requefted that one more effort fhould be made to induce us to enable him to be fo. A great deal of the fame converfation which had paffed at our former interviews was repeated. The power and the haughtiness of France was again difplayed to us. We were told, that the deftruction of England was inevitable; and that the wealth and arts of that nation would naturally pafs over to America, if that event fhould find us in peace. To this obfervation we replied, that France would probably forbid America to receive them, in like manner as fhe had forbid Switzerland to permit the refidence in its country of a British minifter. We told him alfo, that we were fenfible of the value of peace, and therefore fought it unremittingly, but that it was real peace we fought for, and real peace only which could be defirable. The fum of his propofition was, that if we would pay, by way of fees (that was his expreffion), the fum of money demanded for private ufe, the Directory would not receive us; but would permit us to remain in Paris as we now were; and we should be received by M. Talleyrand, until one of us could go to America and confult our government on the fubject of the loan. These were the circumstances, he faid, under which the minister of Portugal had treated. We afked him if, in the mean time, the Directory would order the American property not yet paffed into the hands of the privateersmen, to be restored. He faid explicitly, that they would not. We asked him, whether they would fufpend further Probably intended for Raleigh. depredations depredations on our commerce? He faid they would not but M. Talleyrand obferved, that on this fubject we could not fuftain much additional injury, because the winter feafon was approaching, when few additional captures would be made. We told him that France had taken violently from America more than fifty 'millions of dollars, and treated us in every respect as enemies, in return of the friendfhip we had manifested for her; that we had come to endeavour to restore harmony to the two nations, and to obtain compenfation for the injuries our countrymen fuftained; and that in lieu of this compenfation, we were told that if we would pay twelve hundred thousand livres, we might be permitted to remain in Paris, which would only give us the benefit of seeing the plays and operas of Paris for the winter, that we might have time to afk from our country to exhaust her resources for France, whofe depredations would be continued. He again stated, that by this procedure we fhould fufpend a war; and that, perhaps, in five or fix months, power might change hands. We told him that what we withed to fee in France was a temper fincerely friendly to the United States, and really difpofed to do us juftice; that if we could perceive this, we might not fo much regard a little money, fuch as he ftated to be ufual, although we fhould hazard ourselves by giving it; but that we faw only evidences of the most extreme hoftility towards us: war was made upon us fo far as France could make it in the present state of things; and it was not even proposed, that on receiving our money this war fhould ceafe: we had no reason to believe that a poffible benefit could refult from it; and we defired him to say, that we would not give a fhilling, unless American property unjuftly captured was previously reftored, and further hoftilities fufpended; and that unless this was done, we did not conceive that we could even confult our government concerning a loan that if the Directory would receive us and commence negotiations, and any thing occurred which rendered a confultation of the government neceffary, one of us would return to America for that purpofe. He faid, that without this money we should be obliged to quit Paris; and that we ought to confider the confequences: the property of the Americans would be confifcated, and their veffels in port embargoed. We told him, that unless there was a hope of a reconciliation, thefe evils could not be prevented by us; and the little delay we might obtain would only increase them; that our miffion had induced many of our countrymen to trust their veffels into the ports of France, and that if we remained in Paris, that very circumftance would increase the number; and confequently the injury which our countrymen would fuftain, if France could permit herself so to violate her own engagements and the laws of nations. He expreffed a wish that M. Y. fhould fee us once more. We told him that a vifit from M. Y. as a private gentleman, VOL. VII. Dd would would always be agreeable to us; but if he came only with the expectation that we should ftipulate advances of money, without previously, establishing a folid and permanent reconciliation, he might fave himself the trouble of the application, because it was a fubject we had confidered maturely, and on which we were immoveable. He parted with us, faying, if that was the cafe it would not be worth while for M. Y. to come. In the evening, while General Pinckney and General Marshall were abfent, M. Y. and M. X. called, and were invited by Mr. Gerry to breakfast with us the next morning. October 30. Immediately after breakfast the fubject was refumed. M. Y. fpoke without interruption for near an hour. He faid that he was defirous of making a last effort to serve us, by propofing fomething which might accommodate the differences between the two nations; that what he was now about to mention had not by any means the approbation of the Directory; nor could M. Talleyrand undertake farther than to make from us the propofition to the Directory, and ufe his influence for its fuccefs; that last week M. Talleyrand could not have ventured to have offered fuch propofitions; but that his fituation had been very materially changed by the peace with Emperor. By that peace he had acquired in an high degree the confidence of the Directory, and now poffeffed great influence with that body; that he was alfo closely connected with Buonaparte and the generals of the army in Italy, and was to be confidered as firmly fixed in his poft, at least for five or fix months; that under thefe circumftances he could undertake to offer, in our behalf, propofitions which before this increase of influence he could not have hazarded. M. Y. then called our attention to our own fituation, and to the force France was capable of bringing to bear upon us. He faid that we were the belt judges of our capacity to refift, fo far as depended on our own refources, and ought not to deceive ourselves on fo interesting a fubject. The fate of Venice was one which might befal the United States. But he proceeded to obferve, it was probable we might rely on forming a league with England. If we had fuch a reliance, it would fail us. The fituation of England was fuch, as to compel Pitt to make peace on the terms of France. A variety of caufes were in operation, which made fuch an effect abfolutely certain. To lay nothing of the oppofition in England to the minifter and to the war, an oppofition which the fears of the nation would increase; to fay nothing of a war against England which was preparing in the North; an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men, under the command of Buonaparte, fpread upon the coast of France, and aided by all the vaft refources of his genius, would moft probably be enabled to invade England: in which event their government would be overturned; but fhould this invafion not be abfolutely effected, yet the alarm it would spread through |