through the nation, the enormous expenfe it must produce, would infallibly ruin them, if it was to be continued, and would drive them to fave themselves by a peace; that independent of this, France poffeffed means which would infallibly deftroy their bank, and their whole paper fyftem. He faid he knew very well it was generally conjectured that Buonaparte would leave Italy, and the army which had conquered under him, and which adored him; he affured [us that] nothing could be more unfounded than the conjecture, that Buonaparte had for more than ten days left Italy for Raftadt, to prefide over the congrefs which was formed for adjufting the affairs of the Empire. He faid that Pitt himself was fo confident of the abfolute neceffity of peace, that after the naval victory over the Dutch, he had fignified his readiness to treat on the fane terms he had offered before that action; we could not then rely on the affistance of England. What, he asked, would be our fituation if peace fhould be made with England before our difference with France would be accommodated? But, he continued, if even England thould be able to continue the war, and America fhould unite with her, it would not be in our power to injure France. We might, indeed, wound her ally; but, if we did, it would be fo much the worse for us. After having ftated the dangers attending us, if we fhould engage in the war, he proceeded to the advantages we might derive from a neutral fituation; and infifted at large on the wealth which would naturally flow into our country from the deftruction of England.

He next proceeded to detail the propofitions, which are in fubftance in the paper annexed, marked (A), except that he infifted that we should engage to use our influence with our government for the loan. He ftated exprefsly, that the propofitions were to be confidered as made by us; that M. Talleyrand would not be refponfible for the fuccefs of any one of them; he would only undertake to use his influence with the Directory in fupport of them. The propofition, he faid, concerning a fufpenfion of hoftilities on the part of France, was one which proceeded entirely from himfelf; M. Talleyrand had not been confulted upon it; and he could not undertake to say that that gentleman would confent even to lay it before the Directory. The propofition for an advance in the government of France, of as much money as was due from it to our citizens on contract, and as might be determined to be due for veffels improperly captured and condemned, was, he said, indifpenfable; unlefs we made that, it was unneceffary to make any other; for the others would not be received.

He expatiated on the vast advantages we should derive from delay; it was, he faid, abfolutely to gain our caufe. He returned to the danger of our fituation, and the policy of making with France any accommodation which France would affent to. Perhaps, faid he, you believe that in returning and expofing to

Dd 2

your

your countrymen the unreasonableness of the demands of this go.. vernment, you will unite them in their refiftance to thofe demands; you are mistaken-you ought to know that the diplomatic. fkill of France, and the means the poffeffes in your country, are fufficient to enable her, with the French party in America, to throw the blame which will attend the rupture of the negotiations on the federalifts, as you term yourfelves, but on the British party, as France terms you; and you may affure yourselves this will be done. He concluded with declarations of being perfectly difinterefted; and declared that his only motives for speaking thus freely were his friendship for M. Talleyrand, and his with to promote the interefts and peace of the United States.

We told him that the freedom with which he had spoken, and which was agreeable to us, would induce us to fpeak freely also; and for once to accompany our view of the prefent ftate of things with a retrospect of the paft: that America was the only nation upon earth which felt and had exhibited a real friendship for the republic of France; that among the empires round her, which were compelled to bend beneath her power, and to obey her commands, there was not one which had voluntarily acknowledged her government, or manifefted for it fpontaneously any mark of regard. America alone had stepped forward, and given the most unequivocal proofs of a pure and fincere friendship, at a time when almoft the whole European world, when Auftria, Germany, Pruffia, Ruffia, Spain, Sardinia, Holland, and Britain, were leagued against France: when her fituation was in truth hazardous, and it was dangerous to hold even friendly intercourfe with her, America alone ftood forward, and openly and boldly avowed her enthufiafm in favour of the republic, and her deep and fincere interest in her fate.

From that time to the prefent, the government and people of the United States have uniformly manifefted a finçere and ardent friendship for France, and have, as they conceive, in no single inftance given to this republic juft caufe of umbrage: if they have done fo, they with it to be pointed out to them. After the deter mination of France to break off all regular intercourfe with them, they have fent three envoys extraordinary to endeavour to make fuch explanations as might produce reconciliation; these envoys are prepared to investigate, and wish to investigate any measures which may have given offence-and are perfuaded that they can entirely juftify the conduct of their government.

To this diftant, unoffending, friendly republic, what is the conduct and the language of France? Wherever our property can be found, the feizes and takes it from us; unprovoked, the determines to treat us as enemies, and our making no refiftance produces no diminution of hoftilities against us. She abufes and infults our government, endeavours to weaken it in the estimation of the

people,

people, recalls her own minifter, refuses to receive ours; and, when extraordinary means are taken to make fuch explanations as may do away mifunderstandings, and fuch alterations in the exifting retations to the two countries, as may be mutually fatisfactory, and may tend to produce harmony, the envoys who bear thefe powers are not received; they are not permitted to utter the amicable wishes of their country; but, in the haughty ftyle of a master, they are told, that unless they will pay a fum, to which their resources fcarcely extend, that they may expect the vengeance of France, and, like Venice, be erafed from the lift of nations: that France will annihilate the only free republic upon earth, and the only nation in the univerfe which has voluntarily manifefted for her a cordial and real friendship. What impreffion must this make upon the mind of America, if, without provocation, France was determined to make war upon us, unlefs we purchased peace? We could not easily believe that even our money would fave us--our independence would never ceafe to give offence, and would always furnish a pretext for trefh demands. On the advantages of neutrality it was unneceffary to fay any thing; all the efforts of our government were exerted to maintain it; and we would never willingly part with it. With refpect to a political connexion with Britain, we told him, that America had never contemplated it. Whether the danger that he reprefented that government to be in, was or was not real, we would not undertake to decide. Britain, we believed, had much reafon to with for peace; and France had much reafon to with for peace alfo : if peace already exifted, it would not change the course America would purfue.

M. Y. manifefted the most exceffive impatience; he interrupted us, and faid, This eloquent differtation might be true; America might have manifefted, and he believed had manifefted great friendship for France, and had juft complaints against her; but he did not come to liften to thofe complaints. The minifter would, on our requeft, make for us certain propofitions to the Directory; he had ftated them to us; and all the anfwer he wifhed was, Yes or no. Did we or did we not folicit the minifter to make the propofition for us? We told him, that, without going farther into the difcuffion, we chofe to remark one or two things; they were, that the exifting treaties gave to France certain advantages, which were very effential; that efpecially the American coaft afforded a protection, near two thousand miles in extent, to the prizes made by France on her enemies, and refused that protection to the prizes taken from her; that the might be affured, that in cafe of war thefe advantages would be loft for ever. We also told him, we were convinced that France mifcalculated on the parties in America; that the extreme injustice offered to our country would unite every man against her. M. X. informed

us,

ss, that M. Talleyrand would not confent even to lay this propofition before the Directory without previoufly receiving the 50,000l. or the greater part of it.

M. Y. left in writing his propofitions, and we returned the anfwer annexed, and marked B.

November 1ft. It was at length agreed, that we would hold no more indirect intercourfe with the government.

November 3d. M. X. called on us, and told General Pinckney and General Marshall (Mr. Gerry not being within), that M. Y. wifhed once more to fee us. We anfwered, that we fhould at any time be glad to fee M. Y. as a private gentleman; but that if his object was only to repeat his propofitions for money, it was perfectly unneceffary to do fo; becaufe on that fubject it was impoffible for us to change the anfwer we had already given. We told him farther, that we confidered it as degrading our country to carry on farther fuch an indirect intercourfe as we had for fome time fubmitted to, and had determined to receive no propofitions, unlefs the perfons who bore them had acknowledged authority to treat with us. He faid, that perhaps M. Y. might have written powers from the minifter; and we replied, that, if he had, we hould receive his communications with pleafure. He fpoke of a probable peace with England, and, having requested us to be at home in the afternoon, left us.

About three o'clock he came, and, after fome converfation, in which we repeated in fubftance what is ftated above, he showed us a paper, which he faid was a copy of a letter prepared for us by M. Talleyrand, requesting an explanation of part of the President's fpeech, and which he faid would be fent, unlefs we came into the propofitions which had been made us. We wifhed to take a copy of it, which he declined permitting, faying, he was forbidden to allow it. We fpoke of the letter coming to us as a measure we had no expectation of preventing; and he faid, he could not understand that we wished it delayed. To which we answered, that the delay of a few days could not be defired, unlefs a hope exifted, that the Directory might become more friendly to our country.

He faid, that intelligence had been received from the United States, that if Colonel Burr and Mr. Maddifon had conftituted the miffion, the differences between the two nations would have been accommodated before this time. He added, as a fact he was not inftructed to communicate, that M. Talleyrand was preparing a memorial to be fent out to the United States, complaining of us as being unfriendly to an accommodation with France.

plied to this intelligence from the United States, that the minifter's correfpondents in America took a good deal on themselves, when they undertook to fay how the Directory would have received Colonel Burr and Mr. Maddifen; and that with refpect to the

memorial

memorial of M. Talleyrand, it would not be eafy for him to con vince our countrymen, that the statements we thould make were untrue; if, however, we were confident that our conduct would be' condemned, M. Talleyrand might be affured, that the fear of cenfure would not induce us to deferve it, but that we should act in a manner which our own judgments and confciences would ap-. prove of; and we trufted we thould be fupported by the great body of candid and honeft men. In this converfation we again ftated, that America had taken a neutral pofition; that fhe had faithfully fought to preferve it; that a loan of money to one of the belligerent powers was directly to take part in the war; and that to take part in the war against her own judgment and will, under the coercion of France, was to furrender our independence.

Exhibit A.

[Enclofed in the Envoys' Letter of November 8, 1797, No. II.] THE American envoys thall remain here for fix months, in the fame manner, and upon the fame footing with regard to etiquette, as did M. d'Aranjo, the envoy of Portugal.

II. There fhall be named a commiffion of five members, agreeably to a form to be established for the purpose of deciding upon the reclamations of the Americans, relative to the prizes made on them by the French privateers.

III. The American envoys will engage, that their government fhall pay the indemnifications, or the amount of the fums already decreed to the American creditors of the French republic, and by the commiffioners. This payment fhall be made under the name of an advance to the French republic, who fhall repay it in a time and a manner to be agreed upon.

IV. One of the American envoys fhall return to America, to demand of his government the neceffary powers to purchase, for cafh, the thirty-two millions of Dutch refcriptions belonging to the French republic, in cafe the envoys fhould conclude a treaty which fhall be approved by the two nations.

V. In the interval the definitive treaty fhall proceed, for the termination of all differences exifting between the French republic and the United States, fo as that the treaty may be concluded immediately on the return of the deputy.

VI. The queftion of the role d'equipage fhall remain fufpended until the return of the deputy, and the commiffion shall not pronounce upon any reclamation where this point fhall be in question. VII. During the fix months granted for the going and returning of the deputy, hoftilities against the Americans fhall be fufpended, as well as the procefs for condemnation before the tribunals: and the money of the prizes already condeinned, in the hands of the civil

officers