with which they apologized for and ascribed any occafional injuries they fuftained to the force of circumstances; the interest which they continued openly to take in all the fortune of this republic-manifefted partialities of a very different fort from those which have been so unjustly attributed to them.

At this period too, a great principle was brought into difcuffion, the difpaffionate confideration of which is effential to the fair eftimate of the charges made by France against the government of the United States. The property of French citizens was taken by British cruifers and fhips of war, out of American bottoms, and the American government fubmitted to the practice. The propriety of fubmitting to it depends entirely on the naked right of the captors, under the exifting circumftances of the cafe, to exercife fuch a power. The circumftances were these in the treaty of commerce made between France and the United States in February 1778, it was ftipulated in substance, that neither party fhould take out of the veffels of the other, the goods of its enemy, but that the character of the bottom fhould be imparted to its cargo. With England the United States had made no ftipulation on the subject.

It follows then, that the rights of England, being neither diminished or increased by compact, remained precifely in their natural state, and were to be afcertained by fome pre-exifting acknowledged principle.

This principle is to be fearched for in the law of nations. That law forms, independent of compact, a rule of action by which the fovereignties of the civilized world confent to be governed. It prescribes what one nation may do without giving just caufe of war, and what, of confequence, another may and ought to permit without being confidered as having facrificed its honour, its dignity, or independence.

What then is the doctrine of the law of nations on this fubject? Can neutral bottoms of right, independent of particular compact, protect hoftile goods? The question is to be confidered on its own right, uninfluenced by the wishes or the interests of a neutral or belligerent power.

It is a general rule that war gives to a belligerent power a right to seize and confifcate the goods of his enemy. However humanity may deplore the application of this principle, there is perhaps no one to which man has more univerfally affented, or to which jurists have more uniformly agreed. Its theory and its practice have unhappily been maintained in all ages. This right then may be exercised on the goods of an enemy wherever found, unlefs oppofed by a fuperior right. It yields by common confent to the fuperior right of a neutral nation to protect, by virtue of its fovereignty, the goods of either of the belligerent powers found within its jurifdiction. But can this right of protection, ad

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mitted to be poffeffed by every government within its own limits in virtue of its abfolute fovereignty, be communicated to a vessel navigating the high feas?

It is fuppofed that it cannot be fo communicated; because the ocean being common to all nations, no abfolute sovereignty can be acquired in it-the rights of all are equal, and must neceffarily check, limit, and restrain each other. The fuperior right therefore of abfolute fovereignty to protect all property within its own territory, ceases to be fuperior when the property is no longer within its own territory, and may be encountered by the oppofing acknowledged right of a belligerent power to feize and confifcate the goods of his enemy. If the belligerent permits the neutral to attempt without hazard to himself, thus to ferve and aid his enemy, yet he does not relinquish the right of defeating that attempt whenever it fhall be in his power to defeat it. Thus it is admitted that an armed veffel may ftop and search at sea a neutral bottom, and may take out goods which are contraband of war, without giving caufe of offence, or being supposed in any degree to infringe neutral rights. But this practice could not be permitted within the rivers, harbours, or other places of a neutral, where its fovereignty was complete. It follows then that the full right of affording protection to all property whatever, within its own territory, which is inherent in every government, is not transferred to a veffel navigating the high feas. The right of a belligerent over goods of his enemy within his reach, is as complete as his right over contraband of war; and it feems a pofition not eafily to be refuted, that a fituation that will not protect the one, will not protect the other. A neutral bottom then does not of right, in cafes where no compact exifts, protect from his enemy the goods of a belligerent power.

To this reafoning the practice of nations has conformed, and the common understanding of mankind feems to have affented. Vattel, B. 3, Sect. 115, fays pofitively," that effects belonging to an enemy, found on board a neutral thip, are feizable by the rights of war."

Vattel is believed to be fupported by the most approved writers on the fame subject. It is deemed unneceffary to multiply citations to this point, because France herfelf is fuppofed to have decided it. In her maritime ordonnance of the year 1744, which is confidered as having been in force in 1778, enemies goods in neutral bottoms generally are declared liable to feizure and confifcation. From the operation of this rule are excepted the veffels of Den-. mark and the United Provinces, to whom special treaties fecured the exception. In the ordonnance of the 26th of July 1778, the firft article of which is confidered as forbidding the cruisers of France to ftop and bring into port neutral veffels, having on board the goods of an enemy, a power is referved to revoke the privilege

granted to neutrals by that article, if the enemy should not grant the fame privilege within fix months from the publication of that regulation. This clearly indicates a conviction that the exemption from captures of the goods of an enemy, which fhould be found on board the veffel of a neutral power, not having ftipulated fuch exemption by treaty, was a privilege granted by the ordonnance; and that the mere revocation of the ordonnance would abolifh the privilege, and reftore the ancient rule. It will not be contended that France continued in a long courfe of practice and of legiflation oppofed to her own opinion of the laws of nations. It must then be confidered as the opinion of France, that under the law neutral bottoms afford no protection to the goods of an enemy. This principle, thus admitted to have been established, is fuppofed by fome to have been changed by the armed neutrality. A new law of nations, it is pretended, was introduced by the confederation; but who were the parties to that confederation, and what was its object? The northern maritime powers united to protect by force, in their own bottoms, during the then existing war, the goods of either and of all the belligerent powers. The com pact in its own nature was confined with respect to its object and its duration. It did not purport to change, nor could it change permanently and univerfally, the rights of nations not becoming parties to it. It did indeed hold forth the promise of future more permanent, and more general engagements for the fame object; but fuch engagements were never formed. How then can this temporary and partial convention be confidered as altering, radically and generally, principles which have been radically and univerfally adopted, and in the modifications of which all have an intereft? Would France herfelf admit that a combination, fuch as that which conftituted neutrality, may rightfully change the law of nations, and establish a new code of univerfal obligation? It is believed that no nation on earth would more perfeveringly oppofe fuch an invafion of its fovereignty.

There feems then to be no folid ground for maintaining, that the general law of nations has been at all varied by the armed neutrality.

It remains to inquire whether the treaties between France and the United States pledge either nation to affert and establish the principle, that free bottoms make free goods.

The treaty of amity and commerce, concluded the 6th of February 1778, ftipulates reciprocally for the right of trading with and protecting the goods of the enemy of either party in the effels of the other, and in turn furrenders its own goods found in the veffels of an enemy; but it contains no clause impoling on either party the duty of extending the principle, or of fupporting its application to other nations. The ftipulations of that treaty are negative as well as affirmative. They specify as well the difabilities

difabilities intended to be created, and the duties to be impofed, as the priviliges defigned to be granted. Had it been intended that either nation fhould have been bound to maintain this principle in its intercourse with others, or fhould have been in any degree incapacitated from profecuting freely that intercourse, without the previous admiffion of the principle, a ftipulation to that effect would have been made. No fuch ftipulation having been made, the parties cannot be prefumed to have intended it. Indeed it would have been madnefs in the United States, under their prefent circumstances, to have formed fuch an agreement. There being no exprefs ftipulation to this effect, it cannot be supposed to have been implied. Nations forming a folemn compact which ought to regulate their conduct towards each other, which is to be reforted to for the ftandard of adjufting their differences, do not leave to implication fuch delicate and important points. Indeed, if a great principle not mentioned is permitted to be implied, the object of a written agreement, which is itself to evidence all the obligation it creates, is totally defeated. But who is to make the implication, and to what extent is implication to be allowed? It is very eafy to perceive, that the doctrine of implying in contracts ftipulations never formed, would destroy all certainty of conftruction, and open a boundlefs field of controverly to the contracting parties.

It refults from the very nature of a contract which affects the rights of the parties, but not of others, and from the admiffion of a general rule of action, binding independent of compact, which may be changed by confent, but is only changed fo far as that confent is actually given, that a treaty between any two nations must leave to all others thofe rights which the law of nations acknowledges; and must leave each of the contracting parties fubject to the operation of thofe rights. For the truth of this pofition, believed to be fo clear in itfelf, and which it is fuppofed the hiftory of Europe will illuftrate, the ordonnance of 1744, al ready quoted, is confidered as furnishing an unequivocal authority. By that ordonnance, the law of nations is applied to all thofe neutrals with whom France had not ftipulated, that the quality of their bottoms fhould be imparted to their cargoes, while those with whom fuch ftipulations had been made, are exempted from the application of the law.

The defire of establishing univerfally the principle that neutral bottoms fhall make neutral goods, is perhaps felt by no nation on earth, more strongly than by the United States. Perhaps no nation is more deeply interested in its establishment. It is an object they keep in view, and if not forced by violence to abandon, they will purfue in fuch manner as their own judgment may dictate as being beft calculated to attain it; but the wish to establish a principle is effentially different from a determination that it is already

established.

eftablished. The interefts of the United States could not fail to produce the wish; their duty forbid them to indulge it, when deciding on a mere right. However folicitous America might be to purfue all proper means, tending to obtain for this principle the affent of all or any of the maritime powers of Europe, the never conceived the idea of obtaining that confent by force.

The United States will only arm to defend their own rights: neither their policy nor their interefts permit them to arm, in order to compel a furrender of the rights of others. These and other confiderations, which have been fubmitted to the government of France, produced on the part of the United States, a decifion, that their bottoms could not of right protect the goods of a belligerent power from an enemy not bound to respect the principle. This decifion was founded on the most perfect conviction that it was enjoined by the law of nations; and that good faith, refpect for truth, and for the duties of an upright and honeft judgment, render it indifpenfable. This conviction remains unfhaken. If these arguments, which still appear conclufive to the American government, have not the fame operation on the judgment of France, they must at least be fufficient to evince the fincerity with which that government has acted; and to prove that its conduct, in this refpect, was produced by a fenfe of duty, and not by any partiality for a nation against which it was, at that time, confiderably irritated by other causes.

The undersigned, Citizen Minifter, rely too implicitly on your candour and difcernment, to apprehend that you will eftimate improperly the motives which on this effential point have influenced and guided the United States.

The early decifion of the American government on this fubject was immediately openly avowed, and amply fupported by Mr. Jefferson, the then secretary of state, in his letter to Mr. Genet, dated the 24th of July 1793, and in his letter to Mr. Morris, dated 16th of Auguft in the fame year. The arguments which thofe letters contain, were fuppofed to have fatisfied the government of France, fince its minifters in the United States no longer controverted the principle they fupported. Indeed thofe arguments appeared too conclufive to permit a doubt concerning the fuccefs which would attend them.

In August 1794, when Mr. Monroe, the then minifter of the United States to this republic, was received into the bosom of the Convention, France obviously did not confider the acknowledgment of this established principle of the law of nations, as indicating a partiality towards her enemy. The language used on the occafion could only have been used to the minister of a nation whose friendship was valued, and whofe conduct had evinced the fincerity of its profeffions. It was then declared "that the fweeteft, the frankeft fraternity united in effect the two republics,"