of his acting freely, that it is implied in every purpose which he forms, in every promise which he makes, in the blame which he attaches to himself when he does wrong, and in the tenor of his thoughts, resolutions, and conduct. The conscience of every man tells him of the distinction between right and wrong, and that he is accountable to God for the use of all his talents and opportunities. It tells him also that in what he does he acts voluntarily, and without any physical restraint whatever. But while he acts voluntarily, he is not left to act arbitrarily, without law, without motive, and without end. Neither does his acting freely, and from choice, imply, that his mind must be in a state of indifference as to good or evil, or inclined to the one just as much as to the other. Such a state of mind as this does not and cannot exist. The mind is in every case biassed either towards what is good, or what is evil, and according to the predominant state of the mind, will be its prevailing desires and volitions.

Of the ever-blessed God, who is most free in all that he does, we must affirm that he is so strongly inclined to what is holy and just and good, that though he is in the highest degree free, he can never do any thing but what accords with the boundless perfection of his nature. deny himself, he cannot but his laws and government. served, in proportion as any creature resembles the Creator in his moral attributes, will be the resemblance in his moral conduct. The angels of light,

He cannot lie, he cannot support the authority of And, as I formerly ob

because they are confirmed in holiness, are not at liberty to do evil, and are morally incapable of committing it. If we heard a deed of atrocity imputed to them, we should at once pronounce the imputation false, because the high excellency of their nature gives us an unlimited confidence and an absolute certainty, that their conduct will be invariably holy and beneficent. We know that the fallen angels, on the other hand, from the depravity of their nature, are predisposed to what is evil, and so strong is our conviction of their moral incapacity to do good, that we could not credit any testimony that would go to ascribe goodness to them. Yet they also have a power of acting voluntarily, and according to choice. Mankind, as was noticed on a former occasion, may be considered as holding an intermediate state between angels of light and those of darkness. They have fallen from their original state of holiness and innocency, but they are placed under an economy of mercy, under which pardon and reconciliation are offered through the Mediator. There is less uniformity in their conduct, especially in the earlier stages of the christian life, because there are opposite principles contending in their nature, and rendering them more variable as the one or the other predominates. This variability is diminished in any one, just in proportion as he makes progress in holiness, and as all his powers and faculties are laid under the restraint of virtuous principles and habits. In proportion as man approaches to the holiness of heaven, or the dark and deep depravity of hell, does he act

with unvarying uniformity. Yet, in both cases, is he a moral agent, acting from choice, and accountable to God for his actions.

It is, thus, so far from being necessary to moral agency to have the power of acting without any fixed principle, that the exercise of such a power is incompatible with the endowment of reason and understanding. While any being continues holy, he will most surely obey without deviation the laws which the Creator prescribes. And if even we, whose powers and experience are so limited, can confidently predicate of any given number of beings, perfectly holy, or perfectly depraved, that they will follow a certain line of conduct, and yield to certain motives, because their hearts are alike, must not the all-seeing God have the most absolute foreknowledge of the conduct of his accountable creatures, and consequently have been able from eternity to form his purposes without any interference with their moral agency? Is the action of any creature the less free, because it is foreknown. I may confidently presume that the message of salvation will be rejected by many to whom it is sent, because I know that in many cases the heart is averse to it, and that in the great majority of instances men yield to this aversion; but surely my previous presumptive knowledge of the fact can have no influence on the agency or the guilt of those who thus reject the counsel of God? The foreknowledge of God, indeed, renders it most certain that what is foreseen shall exist; but this foreknowledge no more lessens or affects the freedom of the agent, than

my knowing beforehand that when a being reaches the point of hopeless and confirmed depravity, his conduct will be "evil, and that continually," impairs his liberty. If it be allowed that the foreknowledge of God would not affect the agency of his creatures, formed with the powers and capacities of accountable beings, had he left them to themselves without law and without government, on what principle can it be supposed that his foreknowledge lessens their freedom in acting, because he has placed them under a system of government suited to their rational nature? His having adapted the system of his government to all the beings and events that can possibly exist through eternity, only shews the comprehensiveness of his wisdom, but does not imply any thing at variance with the freedom of moral agents.

Of the numerous illustrations which might here be adduced, I will confine myself to the history of our blessed Saviour. None, I presume, will deny that he acted voluntarily in all that he did,—in his making himself of no reputation, and taking upon him the nature of man, and in humbling himself, and becoming obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. None can deny this without impeaching the veracity of our Lord.

"Therefore doth the Father love me, because I lay down my life; no man taketh it from me; but I lay it down of myself. This commandment received I of my Father." It was because he acted freely, most freely, that his obedience and sufferings are so rewardable and meritorious,-that God has highly exalted him, and given him a name that is

above every name,-and that angels and the redeemed for ever celebrate his glories while they say,

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Worthy is the Lamb that was slain, to receive power, and riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honour, and blessing." But while it is thus evident that the Saviour was most free in all that he did and suffered, his doings and sufferings were rendered absolutely certain, not only by the foreknowledge of God, but by his prophetic declarations and unconditional promises. God promised so effectually to uphold him by his Spirit, that he could not fail in attaining the end for which he came into the world; that his kingdom would be established from the river unto the ends of the earth, and that all nations would become subject to him; that he would surely save a great multitude from sin and death, that he should see his seed, and prolong his days, and that the pleasure of the Lord would prosper in his hands; and that he should be great, and reign over the house of Jacob for ever, and of his kingdom, that there should be no end. this the purpose and the promise of God rendered most certain: and yet He of whom it was promised and predicted was perfectly free in all that he did and suffered.

SECTION III.-Makes God to be the Author of Sin.

All

It is objected to the doctrine of the divine decrees, that it represents God as the author of sin. If all things come to pass according to the purpose and foreordination of God, then there is nothing in the