793.94/8211: Telegram The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State GENEVA, October 1, 1936-midnight. [Received October 1-8:30 p. m.] 374. Wellington Koo and Quo Tai Chi 23 arranged a meeting with me. At the risk of repeating information which you already possess and because they expressly requested that you be informed, I repeat their statements.24 They told me that they had asked their Government for information respecting the Japanese demands. The Government furnished this information and authorized them to convey it confidentially to representatives of "friendly governments". They said they had conveyed the information to Halifax,25 Delbos 26 and Litvinov,26a in addition to myself. The demands were presented approximately September 15, orally by the Japanese Ambassador to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs at Nanking; the Chinese countered by suggesting that the various incidents in which Japanese nationals were involved should be discussed and liquidated first. This, the Japanese were unwilling to do and pressed for the discussion of the demands. The Chinese then countered by: (1) abolition of the Tangku truce, (2) cancellation of the Eastern Hopei autonomous government, (3) cessation of Japanese smuggling, (4) cancellation of a military agreement which compelled the withdrawal of Chinese troops from the two northern provinces. They stated that the Japanese Ambassador then suspended negotiations on the grounds that the Minister for Foreign Affairs lacked plenipotentiary powers. The demands are not in the form of an ultimatum. No date is fixed before a reply must be received but severe pressure is being brought upon the Chinese for quick action, including Arita's recent threat before the foreign correspondents. The demands follow: (1) the autonomy of the five northern provinces, (2) an economic cooperation with the whole of China, similar to that now existing in the North, (3) agreement for joint measures for defense against Communism, (4) appointment of Japanese advisers in the Central Government, (5) establishment of air communications between Japan and China, particularly with Shanghai and Foochow, (6) a special or preferential tariff agreement, (7) complete suppression of anti-Japanese propaganda including the revision of 23 Chinese Ambassadors in France and the United Kingdom, respectively. 24 25 The Department replied that this report "is helpful and is appreciated." Viscount Halifax, Lord Privy Seal and leader of the British House of Lords. 26 Yvon Delbos, French Minister for Foreign Affairs. 26 Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs. school texts and special restrictions upon Koreans naturalized in China, including their expulsion from military schools. In terminating Koo stated that he learned on "good authority" that the French and British had discussed the matter here and intended to instruct their Ambassadors in Tokyo to make representations. They hope that our Government as well, will take some step to bring about a détente in the Sino-Japanese relations. WILSON 793.94/8272 The Chargé in Japan (Dickover) to the Secretary of State No. 2061 TOKYO, October 1, 1936.' [Received October 19.] SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report upon SinoJapanese relations, supplementing that contained in Embassy's despatch No. 2041 of September 17, 1936.27 The apprehensions which had prevailed in Japan that the anniversary of the September 18 incident in Mukden might be made the occasion for further attacks upon Japanese in China were realized when there occurred in close succession the Swatow, Fengtai, Hankow and Shanghai affairs. [Here follows résumé of recent incidents and Japanese public reaction thereto.] Summary. The developments in Sino-Japanese relations during the past two weeks have served to gain support in Japanese political circles for the advocate of a strong China policy and to strengthen the force of public opinion behind them. Japan's objectives in addition to the immediate settlement of the incidents appear to be (1) the eradication by China of anti-Japanese activities which would incidentally have the effect of embarrassing Chiang Kai-shek with the Kuomintang and weaken his position; and (2) the creation of an autonomous regime under Japanese influence in North China. There would appear to be also other minor objectives, such as the reduction of China's customs duties and the appointment of Japanese advisers to the National Government. In this connection, it is well to bear in mind Hirota's three points which underlie Japan's objectives in China. There are evidences that it is Japan's policy to press China to give in to the Japanese demands, as far as can be done short of resort to outright military coercion, using to the best advantage the leverage afforded by the series of incidents that have occurred. Should China 27 Not printed. refuse to accede to the demands relating to the suppression of antiJapanese activities, there will probably be an increase in the naval protection for Japanese residents in port cities. If Nanking refuses to give way to the demands relating to North China, the Japanese army will probably pursue a policy of slow and steady penetration advancing towards the goal as opportunities present themselves. Respectfully yours, E. R. DICKOVER 793.94/8209: Telegram The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State SHANGHAI, October 2, 1936-3 p. m. [Received October 2-10: 10 a. m.] 527. My October 1, 4 p. m. No substantial change in measures adopted yesterday by Japanese forces though a few barricades are reported to have been removed. Slight exodus of Chinese from Chapei and Hongkew districts. First Special District Court today rendered decision in the Nakayama case, two suspects being sentenced to death and the third accused being found not guilty. Verdict which is pleasing to the Japanese, though resented in some Chinese circles, may now result in relaxation of strong "precautionary" measures taken by the Jap anese. Repeated to Department and Peiping. By mail to Nanking. GAUSS 793.94/8207: Telegram The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State PEIPING, October 2, 1936-3 p. m. [Received October 1-7:30 p. m.] 471. Department's 126, September 30, 7 p. m. to Tokyo. 1. Considering situation outlined in my 470, September 29, 4 p.m. I do not believe that any useful purpose would be served by an approach by us at this time either to the Japanese or to the Chinese Government. 2. British Ambassador informed me this evening that he had instructed his Counsellor at Nanking to visit Foreign Office and urge prevention further provocative incidents. I believe Chinese Government to be doing everything in its power to accomplish this, but I am convinced that situation is beyond their control and I am at a loss to know what else we could recommend except complete surrender. [3]. British Ambassador also informed me that Kawagoe had seen his Military Attaché who recommended that he leave Nanking. Kawagoe, however, is remaining in Nanking to prevent situation falling completely into the hands of the military. British Ambassador stated that Kawagoe is reported by Chinese Foreign Office representative to have urged Chinese acceptance as refusal would result in fall of Japanese Cabinet and coming into power in Tokyo of a much more extreme government. 4. In my opinion a direct approach from us at this time at Tokyo, considering present temper of Japanese military, would harm rather than help. I yield in this regard, however, to Tokyo's opinion as to whether an expression of concern made to the Japanese without simultaneous representations at Nanking might aid Hirota Cabinet in facing pressure from military. 5. I still entertain views set forth in my 191, December 2, 3 p. m.28 Repeated to Tokyo, Nanking. JOHNSON 793.94/8210: Telegram The Chargé in Japan (Dickover) to the Secretary of State TOKYO, October 2, 1936-7 p. m. [Received October 2-9: 10 a. m.] 202. 1. According to Domei, the Foreign Office authorities commenting upon a London report circulated by Reuter containing a purported revelation attributed to "diplomatic sources" of Japanese demands, among which was mentioned the right to station troops along Yangtze, the right to edit Chinese school texts, and autonomy of the five northern provinces, declared that the alleged demands were malicious propaganda aimed at alienating Japan and China and stated that the Consulate General at Nanking had on September 26 filed with the Chinese Foreign Office a strong protest in which it was pointed out that the spread of such reports was contrary to an arrangement between the two Governments not to reveal the contents of the negotiations. 2. Foreign Office spokesman today, according to Japan Times, announced that as the Japanese Government was conducting its negotiations with a careful attitude it had decided to despatch the director of the Asiatic Bureau of the Foreign Office to Nanking immediately in order to convey the intentions of the Government to Ambassador Kawagoe. Repeated to Peking. Foreign Relations, 1935, vol. III, p. 460. DICKOVER 793.94/8212: Telegram The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State PEIPING, October 2, 1936-7 p. m. [Received October 2-9: 35 a. m.] 472. My 470, September 29, 4 p. m., and my 471, October 2, 3 p. m. Major Imai, Japanese Assistant Military Attaché, in conversation with foreign press correspondents here this morning stated that he was pleased that in this area there had thus far occurred no such unfortunate incidents as have taken place in the "South". He said that the Japanese authorities had taken measures to prevent such incidents here in the North but that if such an incident should occur it would be "seized upon". He did not specify what action would be taken by the Japanese but the American correspondents present gained the definite impression that he took it for granted that an "unfortunate incident" would inevitably occur and that stern action would follow. In view of the provocative and truculent attitude of the Japanese military it will be surprising if an "unfortunate incident" does not occur here in the North or in other regions in China despite all preventive action now being taken by the Chinese authorities arising out of the open rejoicing of the Japanese on the occasion of the anniversary of the Mukden incident, the constant exhibition in Peiping and surrounding regions of Japanese soldiers and military equipment, the forthcoming maneuvers of Japanese forces between here and Tientsin, the continual maneuvers of the Japanese landing forces in Shanghai, all invite such incidents, unaltered by the danger inherent in the enmity toward Chiang Kai Shek of political opponents, intellectuals and radical elements. The situation continues to be definitely and increasingly alarming. Repeated to Tokyo. 793.94/8215 JOHNSON Memorandum by the Secretary of State [WASHINGTON,] October 2, 1936. The Chinese Ambassador called and urged that the American Government take action similar to that taken by the British Government at Tokyo in asking the Japanese Government to be moderate and conciliatory toward China. I replied that we are following developments in relations between China and Japan with care and genuine interest; that we very much regret the serious conditions; that we will give every attention and consideration to each phase as it develops; |