[Enclosure] Memorandum by the Ambassador in China (Johnson) NANKING, December 3, 1936. Mr. Y. Suma, Consul General and First Secretary of the Japanese Embassy, called, and in the course of conversation he remarked that the situation between China and Japan had not materially improved. He stated that during the last month or so he had noticed a distinct change for the worse in the attitude of the Chinese toward the Japanese, and that even the soldiers and officers of General Chiang's own troops were now urging a more anti-Japanese attitude. He ascribed this to several causes, among which he gave first place to the suspicions raised in China by the Japanese-German agreement recently signed in Berlin; but he also mentioned the Suiyuan situation which he described as very serious and very embarrassing to Japan. He stated that the Japanese Ambassador had had seven or eight meetings with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but that he and other members of the staff had had many meetings with the Chinese, and he could say that up to recently they had found themselves ninety per cent in material agreement in regard to the questions under discussion. However, the Chinese were now hesitating going any further in the matter because of the complications above referred to. He said they were now awaiting the report of an officer who had been sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Suiyuan to investigate the situation on the spot. With reference to the agreement between Germany and Japan calling for cooperation against the Comintern, Mr. Suma stated that this had been negotiated and signed in Berlin. From the way he referred to it I inferred that he felt the agreement had complicated matters very much for Japan here in China, for he stated that, although the Japanese Foreign Office had made a very positive statement to the effect that Japan would alone take steps to meet any threat from the Comintern, the Chinese seemed to be very suspicious. In this connection he also mentioned the Italian-Japanese agreement. Referring to the Suiyuan situation, he stated that this was very serious; that, whereas Chiang Kai-shek had not made up his mind in regard to the matter, he was being urged by a considerable part of his supporters to send the national forces now at Suiyuan into Chahar. He said that if these forces went into Chahar the situation would become most difficult. Mr. Suma's attitude seemed to be pessimistic. After a pause he branched out upon a line which, for him in his conversations with me, was very strange, and maybe significant. He said that on his recent visit to Tokyo, whither he had gone for the purpose of making a report to the Cabinet Council on Chinese conditions, with particular refer ence to their negotiations, he had had opportunity to talk with a number of very important people in Japan, during which conversations he had discovered that there was a great deal of sentiment in favor of an idea which he had long held. This idea was one which he had had in mind when he was in the Foreign Office and had charge of American affairs. Briefly put, his idea was that the very bad situation in the Pacific and in Asia should be stabilized, and he thought that America should do something to bring about such stabilization. He mentioned the League as a product of American idealists, and the fact that America had withdrawn; stated that he thought America and Japan might find it possible by some very simple agreement to stabilize the situation; referred to the Lansing-Ishii notes 86 as an example of what he had in mind; mentioned the Pacific, the Philippines, as the area which he believes will be covered. He was careful to state that these were his personal thoughts and that he was astonished that the higher authorities in Tokyo were not laboring to accomplish something along these lines, and asked what my personal opinion was. I stated that I felt sure the United States wished to live at peace with all of its neighbors; that it sought only their friendship and good will, being prepared to give its friendship and good will in return. I remarked that the stabilization of the situation in the East and in the Pacific by an arrangement such as Mr. Suma had in mind might be a very complicated matter. I referred to the fact that attached to the naval agreement 87 there was a four-power arrangement 88 under which the signatory powers, which included Japan and the United States, agreed to consult one another about their mutual interests (in their insular possessions) in the Pacific area. I stated that I was in some doubt as to the present status of the naval agreement and those agreements ancillary thereto, but that I thought they offered the approach necessary. They were at least recorded efforts to do the very thing which Mr. Suma presumably had in mind. I said that doubtless a great deal would have to be discussed preliminary to any stabilizing understanding. Mr. Suma agreed. The conversation then dwindled off and he made his departure, but I was somewhat puzzled by his approach. He left me feeling that the Japanese are not as sure of themselves as they have seemed to be, and that there appear to have been in official circles discussions of a possibility of Japan enlisting American support for an understanding which would establish the status quo as Japan had succeeded in building it up, thus giving her breathing space for a time. NELSON TRUSLER JOHNSON 86 Dated November 2, 1917, at Washington, Foreign Relations, 1917, p. 264. ST Treaty signed at Washington, February 6, 1922, Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. I, p. 247. 88 Treaty signed at Washington, December 13, 1921, ibid., p. 33. 693.94244/180 The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State No. 913 PEIPING, December 10, 1936. [Received January 4, 1937.] SIR: I have the honor to enclose a copy of despatch No. 13 of December 7, 1936, from the Consul at Tsinan 89 in which he reports the seizure by the Shantung Provincial authorities of a number of trucks in various parts of the Province, operated by armed Japanese and Korean smugglers. The smugglers are reported to have been arrested and turned over to the Japanese Consul General at Tsinan, while the trucks were detained at the Governor's Yamen. This is described as the first serious attempt on the part of the Governor to stop smuggling in Shantung Province. Consul Allison states that although all the elements are present for a real crisis, it is his opinion that there is no immediate danger of Sino-Japanese trouble.90 Respectfully yours, For the Ambassador: F. P. LOCKHART Counselor of Embassy 711.0012 Anti-War/1516 91 Memorandum by the Ambassador in China (Johnson) o1 NANKING, December 12, 1936. During the course of conversation to-day Sir Hughe 92 stated that he had a matter of some delicacy which he wished to communicate to me, and expressed the hope that if I saw Hsu Mo I would not mention it to him. He said that during a call which he had made at the Foreign Office, Mr. Hsu Mo, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, had made a suggestion to him which he, Hsu Mo, said was purely an idea of his own. He wondered what Sir Hughe's personal reaction was to a proposal or suggestion that the powers join in a kind of a joint statement in support of the Kellogg Pact. He had in mind a statement to be made perhaps by the British, the Americans, the Japanese, and the French, and in fact, all interested powers. His interest in such a suggestion arose out of a recently published agreement between Germany and Japan. Not printed. "On December 23 the trucks with contents were turned over to the Japanese Consul General at Tsinan after he had given oral assurance "that no more smuggling by Japanese or Koreans would occur in Shantung." (693.94244/196) 91 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in China in his despatch No. 285, December 15; received January 14, 1937. Sir Hughe Montgomery Knatchbull-Hugessen, British Ambassador in China. Sir Hughe said that he told Mr. Hsu Mo that there were difficulties in such a proposal; that as far as the British Government was concerned Sir Anthony Eden 93 had already made its position clear vis-àvis the German-Japanese agreement by a statement in Parliament deprecating national blocks. He asked Mr. Hsu Mo whether he had mentioned this proposition to any one else. Hsu Mo stated that he intended to talk to the American Ambassador about it. His idea was that the statement would include as many powers as possible, even Japan. I told Sir Hughe that of course I was in no position whatever to anticipate the reaction of the United States to such a suggestion; that the difficulties were obvious; that we had made our position quite clear in regard to the Kellogg Pact from time to time; that of course I would be interested in hearing whatever Mr. Hsu Mo might have to say on the subject and would report it to my Government. NELSON TRUSLER JOHNSON 893.00/13756: Telegram The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State NANKING, December 13, 1936-10 a. m. [Received December 13-8 a. m.] 349. Reuter this morning carries following official statement issued at 5 a. m.: "Telegraphic communications with Sian were interrupted this morning. Later reports were received that Chang Hsueh Liang with his troops had rebelled against the Central Government. Meanwhile, a circular telegram was issued advocating the overthrow of the Government. In this telegram it was clearly stated that he was offering 'the final advice to General Chiang Kai Shek' and was temporarily detaining General Chiang at Sian. At an emergency meeting of the Government leaders, it was decided that: (1) H. H. Kung will be in charge of the Executive Yuan; (2) The Standing Committee of the National Military Council will have from five to seven members. Ho Ying Chin, Chen Chien, Li Lieh Chun, Chu Pei Teh, Tang Sheng Chi, and Chen Shao Kuanz will be members of the Standing Committee; (3) Feng Yu Hsiang and members of the Standing Committee will be in charge of the Military Council's meetings; (4) General Ho Ying Chin will be in charge of troops movements and military operations; (5) Chang Hsueh Liang shall be dismissed from all posts and handed to the National Military Council for punishment. His non-commissioned officers shall be placed under the command of the National Military Council." Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Hsu Mo with whom I talked this morning confirms reports stating that Chang Hsueh Liang to whom was entrusted the Government's campaign against the Communists has apparently made common cause with them and is withdrawing his troops who were opposing them. Hsu Mo states that Government feels that it can control situation. Reuter reports that Chang Hsueh Liang in a circular telegram advocates resistance against Japan, Chinese treaty with Soviet Russia and the formation of democratic government. Nanking is quiet. Sent to the Department, Tokyo, Peiping. JOHNSON 893.00/13754: Telegram The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State PEIPING, December 13, 1936-1 p. m. [Received December 13-7 a. m.] 604. Embassy's 603, December 13, 11 a. m.94 Apparently under the initial stimulus offered by the funeral services of Tuan Chi Jui,95 some 400 Peiping students met yesterday afternoon upon the invitation of Sung Che Yuan after previous demonstrations which threatened some disorder and in which several students received injuries. The gates of the meeting place were first locked and troops put in position. Sung did not arrive but the Mayor came instead and spoke to the students in a conciliatory manner. The meeting apparently had anti-Japanese aspects and hand bills were distributed. These demand the breaking off of relations with Japan; resistance to Japanese troops in Suiyuan and Tsingtao; attack on the East Hopei regime of Yin Ju Keng; retrieving of North Chahar and Manchuria; support of the 29th Army and other patriotic defense organizations. It is reported without confirmation that a demonstration along somewhat the same lines and incorporating the same general demands occurred at Sian on December 9 and that Chang Hsueh Liang "gave his acceptance" to the program of the meeting after which the demonstrators made a long march to present to Chiang Kai Shek the demands for an anti-Japanese policy. Repeated to Tokyo. LOCKHART "Not printed; it reported the same information as telegram No. 349, December 13, 10 a. m., supra. * Provisional Chief Executive at Peking, 1924-26. |