that question and could give his Government a reply of his own making: that it is perfectly clear to anyone in this country that the American people and the American Government are at present disinclined toward "foreign entanglements", especially anything in the nature of political commitments which would tie this country to other countries or involve us in conflicts between other countries; and that it is also clear that this country remains, as it always has been, well disposed toward China-whence it would be unlikely that we would commit ourselves to or pursue a policy obviously prejudicial to China's interests and in the nature of taking sides with another or other countries against China. The Ambassador said that he was glad to have what I had said and that he hoped and trusted that the American Government would be on guard. He then inquired whether we had any news of new Japanese activities in China, and I replied that we had not. He made the observation that things appeared comparatively quiet in China and that the Japanese were not pressing expressly upon any one demand. S[TANLEY] K. H[ORNBECK] 793.94/7725: Telegram The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State NANKING, February 18, 1936-10 a. m. [Received February 18-7:40 a. m.] 35. 1. I am informed by responsible official of Executive Yuan that Chiang Kai Shek has now set the "limit of Japanese aggression" at which the Chinese "must" begin fighting as invasion of or interference in Shantung or Suiyuan. Formerly the "limit" was Chahar; this official states that both regions, Chahar and Hopei, are now considered as effectively lost to China as is Manchukuo, the chief hope of the negotiations in the North being to save the Government's face by continuing as long as possible the lip service of the Hopei-Chahar Council. According to this and other reliable sources, the Yellow River continues [to] be the principal front line in the Chinese plans for defense. However, I learn authoritatively from another source that the general staff's aerial survey section which has been making reconnaissance maps and fire plans along that line has suddenly ceased this work because of intrigue thought to have been inspired by Japanese, thus leaving the Chinese artillery at present without means of conducting indirect fire if fighting should occur. 2. Recent large shipments of motor trucks from Pukow to the northwest and other considerations have tended to confirm belief held in some circles that Chiang is preparing to assist Soviet Russian forces against the Japanese. On the other hand Chiang yesterday told an American correspondent in confidence and not for publication that China positively would remain neutral in event of Soviet-Japanese hostilities. 3. To the Department and Peiping. To Tokyo by mail. ATCHESON 793.94/7731 : Telegram The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State PEIPING, February 18, 1936-9 p. m. [Received February 18-11:20 a. m.] 1. Following apparently a decision of the Japanese military in North China to try to obtain more satisfactory press reports about their activities, certain Japanese officers have suddenly become more communicative than had been the case for some weeks. Among them is Doihara who told pressmen yesterday at Peiping among other things that (1) it is not necessary for the National Government to approve appointments of Japanese advisers to the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, (2) the Council need not be separated for the National Government, (3) the Japanese might assist in suppression of Communism if it should threaten North China, (4) the Japanese will not invade North China, (5) he does not insist on Asia for the Asiatics, and (6) Pu-yi 88 will not come to North China in March (in reply to a question specifying that month). 2. Embassy's 8, January 8, noon, paragraph 5.80 Although students in Peiping returned to classes after prolonged winter vacation, they are creating difficulties in some schools. These movements have not yet reached important proportions. The student movement in Peiping is in confusion, presumably as the result of efforts of radical students to gain control of the Peiping Students Union [and?] the objectives of the radicals are not clear. In the opinion of one responsible educator, the radicals may intend to bring about a conflict between Japanese and Chinese in order to promote Communism. 3. The financial situation of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council is obscure. It is understood that negotiations between it and the National Government over division of revenues have practically reached a deadlock. 4. There are lacking concrete signs of dissatisfaction on the part of Japanese military at the slow progress of the Council toward a greater degree of autonomy. 88 Manchu ex-Emperor of China, "Emperor Kang-teh of Manchoutikuo" since 8 Not printed. 5. Embassy's 44, February 4, noon, paragraph 3. Lieutenant Colonel Ikeda, North China Garrison staff officer, has returned to Tientsin from Tokyo where he was supposedly engaged in significant conversations. LOCKHART 793.94/7734: Telegram The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State PEIPING, February 20, 1936-5 p. m. [Received February 20-4:45 p. m.9o] 79. A reliable official of the local Japanese Embassy has expressed the following views in private conversation. The present apparent relaxation of Japanese military policy with respect to North China is the outcome of the conversations during the middle of January of such important officers as Doihara, Isogai, and Itagaki (See Embassy's 15, January 13, 4 p. m., paragraph 1). They arrived at an agreement that (1) direction of Japanese military policy in North China is to be removed from the hands of the Kwantung army, (2) Doihara will return to Japan in March, and (3) the policy will be in hands of the North China Garrison. The North China Garrison is to be enlarged (the degree of increase is not yet known but will probably be double the present strength) and will be under the command of a lieutenant-general. This means that Tada will go. His successor is not yet known but it will not be Doihara. This agreement was arrived at because of the international situation, principally the attitude toward Japan of Russia, the United States and Great Britain, and because of the differences of opinion existing between Itagaki and Tada on the one hand and Doihara on the other with regard to policy. There will be quiet for 3 or 4 months not necessarily because of a change of objective but because of a change of method. 3. The Foreign Office policy is the most reasonable explanation available of the seeming pause of the Japanese military with the procrastination of Chinese military in attaining a degree of autonomy desirable to the Japanese military. An unofficial but informed and frank Japanese has also recently stated that Doihara will go to Japan next month and that there will be quiet in North China for some time. Repeated to Nanking, by mail to Tokyo. LOCKHART 90 Telegram in two sections. 893.797 Manchuria/5 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) No. 950 WASHINGTON, February 20, 1936. 91 SIR: Reference is made to despatch No. 189, December 2, 1935, from the Consul General at Mukden to the Ambassador at Peiping 1 reporting discrimination against American automotive trucks in favor of Dowa trucks. A notation on the despatch indicates that a copy was transmitted to you. In principle the Department believes that when there occur in Manchuria specific instances of discrimination against American trade and American products the record should be kept clear as to this Government's continued interest in the effective maintenance of the principle of equal opportunity by bringing to the attention of the appropriate Japanese authorities the instances of such discriminatory treatment. The Department has noted that in the case discussed by the Consul General at Mukden, the Consul General does not regard the present time as opportune for the making of formal representations. Having in mind both this fact and the view with regard to principle that is expressed above, the Department raises for the consideration of and decision by the Embassy the question whether it might not be advisable for the Counselor or the First Secretary of the Embassy orally and informally to bring to the attention of the Japanese Foreign Office the fact that the Embassy has received information indicating that the Kwantung Army as well as railways and other organizations in Manchuria are placing obstacles in the way of the purchase of American trucks on a freely competitive basis. Very truly yours, For the Secretary of State: WILLIAM PHILLIPS 761.94/877: Telegram The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Moscow, February 21, 1936-9 p. m. [Received February 22-7:15 a. m.] 58. Litvinov said to me today that he feared the Japanese elections might have resulted in an increase in the strength of the Seiyukai which would strengthen the hands of the Japanese militarists. He asserted, however, that even if the militarists should be strengthened he had no fear of an early Japanese attack on the Soviet Union. He stated that all the Soviet Government's reports from Manchuria indicated that the Japanese were having great difficulty in controlling the native population; that the resistance to the Japanese in 1 Not printed. North China was much greater than anticipated; that the Japanese financial situation was more grave than it appeared to be; that in addition to the Emperor, his closest advisers, the leading businessmen, the navy and at least half the officers of the army were opposed to war on the Soviet Union at the present time. He added that he anticipated Japanese refusal of the Soviet proposal that there should be a neutral member on the border commission to be set up by Japan, Manchukuo and the Soviet Union. He said that if this proposal should be rejected he would be ready to accept the Japanese proposal for a mixed commission consisting of the Soviet Union on one side and Japan and Manchukuo on the other. Litvinov said that he as well as all the British and French statesmen with whom he had talked had been delighted by the defeat of the proposed American neutrality legislation because they felt that the proposed legislation would have prevented the United States from giving support to England, France and the Soviet Union in case of war with Germany. He made no further reference to the United States and did not bring up Soviet-American relations. He said that he had just received word that both Eden and Flandin would attend the League meeting on the coordination of sanctions at Geneva on March 2d contrary to their statements to him that they would not attend. He stated that he was uncertain whether or not he would go because he felt that there was nothing important to discuss. He said "sanctions are dead" and added that in view of recent Italian successes he considered it beyond the realm of possibility that the League could make any compromise proposal similar to the HoareLaval proposal.92 He commented further that no one today would be ready to take the moral onus of proposing a reward to the aggressor after the wave of indignation which had greeted the Hoare-Laval proposal. In this connection it seems pertinent to add that when I saw Attolico, the Italian Ambassador to Germany, on my way through Berlin on February 12th he said to me that he had been in Rome recently and that he felt the moment was approaching when it might be appropriate for the President of the United States to propose mediation along the lines of the Hoare-Laval proposal with certain modifications in favor of Italy. As Attolico spent considerable time with Mussolini in January and as he went on to elaborate his remark most seriously I derived the impression that Mussolini may be deluded enough to hope that he can persuade the President to rush in where the successors of Hoare and Laval now fear to tread. BULLITT 92 For the Anglo-French proposal, see Foreign Relations, 1935, vol. 1, pp. 699-723, passim; it was arranged between the French Premier, Pierre Laval, and the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare. |