"The they would punish the murderer. ments of the manufacturers as well as the hon. baronet; and he could take it upon him to say, that they were not afraid of an extension of the principles of free trade, provided no reserve was made, and that those principles were applied to the article of corn as well as to all others. The silk trade, in particular, did not fear a competition with the manufacturers of France, if the corn trade were thrown open; except, perhaps, in a few fancy articles. He believed ministers were well inclined to carry their principles of free trade to corn as well as to all other articles; but they feared the influence which might be opposed to them on the corn trade, and from what had occurred in another place, there was no doubt that influence was very considerable. But, notwithstanding the existence of that influence, let ministers propose the measure, and it would, he little doubted, be carried in that House; and then, if it failed in another place, the country would see where the blame lay. He now came to the observations of the president of the Board of Control. He regretted extremely that a question involving the in-curred in representing lord Amherst as terest of millions should be considered an episode scarcely worth answering. This indifference on so important a subject was the more to be lamented, as there was not a free press in India. That had been put down by the most arbitrary and illegal proceedings. It was no defence to say that the governor had a power of acting according to what he judged best for the interests of the country. He had undoubtedly a great discretionary power; but he was not to use it in a manner inconsistent with the laws of England; and those laws did not sanction such proceedings. He had no right to put down the press, until it had been proved that the use of it, in any particular instance, had been illegal. With respect to the Burmese war, the right hon. gentleman had said, that he (Mr. H.) was bound to prove the assertion, that it had been wantonly commenced. The present was not the time for entering into a discussion on that point; but he would at the proper season be prepared to contend, that there was not, in the papers which had been produced, any document to show that the Burmese nation had discovered a disposition to commence the war. It was true that a subject of ours had been murdered in their territory; but they admitted the fact, and said that, as far as they could, an excellent man in private life; but, as Mr. Fremantle said, he could assure the House, that every one of the public letters which had recently been received, held out confident hopes of a successful termination of hostilities in India. The hon. gentleman had said, that the Court of Directors had no confidence in lord Amherst. This statement was disproved by the fact, that the directors had, if they chose to exercise it, the power of recalling him; which they had not done. Ought the conduct of such a man to be judged of by private letters? If there was any part of the noble lord's conduct on which the hon. gentleman could lay his finger in the way of censure, he was warranted in doing so ; but let him do it on ostensi ble grounds, and not on the irresponsible communications of private individuals. Sir C. Forbes said, it should, in justice to lord Amherst, be stated, that he was not in any degree implicated in the unfortunate occurrence at Barrackpore. He therefore hoped, that, in justice to the noble lord, all papers relating to that transaction would be laid before the House. Mr. Wynn could not see on what ground it should have been thought, that lord Amherst was implicated in the affair of Barrackpore. He was in possession of a variety of documents, which would remove any such opinion; but he did not think it necessary to lay them before the House. Equally unfounded were the reports which were daily published as extracts from private letters from India. The writers of those letters filled them with idle gossip, as if they wished to as certain how far the credulity of their friends in England would go. Mr. Hume defended the authenticity of the information contained in the letters to which he had referred. As to the affair at Barrackpore, the conduct of the government was most blameable, in neglecting to give any answer to the applications made to them on the part of the troops which had refused to march. The then adjutant-general was now in London, and therefore the truth of the circumstance to which he alluded might be easily ascertained. Another ground on which he objected to the conduct of the Indian government on that occasion, was the manner in which it had behaved towards the native officers of the refractory troops. It was admitted, that they had remained faithful to their engagement to the Company, and refused to join their mutinous troops; yet, after this, and because they had not foreseen or prevented what had happened, every one of them was dismissed the service, as no longer worthy of the confidence of the Company. Was this a just or reasonable course towards men who had acted with such fidelity; or was it any encouragement to officers who might be placed in similarly delicate situations? Again he asked, what was the conduct of the government towards the unfortunate men who had been convicted of mutiny? They were (many of them men of high caste) condemned to work in irons on the public roads. It was true this was a commutation of the punishment of death, but he believed there was not one of them who would not prefer being shot, to dragging out an existence in that degraded situation. Was the conduct of the Indian government approved here at home on this point? On the contrary, the moment the circumstance became known here, did not the Court of Directors, and the Board of Control, concur in sending out orders for the unconditional discharge of the unfortunate men? All he wished for, was correct information on this subject. If he should find that he was in error, he should be most happy to retract what he had said. Mr. Fremantle observed, that the hon. member was greatly misled, if he believed that no communication was made to the refractory troops for ten days before it was found necessary to resort to force. The very reverse was the fact; for, from the time that they first objected to march, up to the period when the fatal termination of the affair occurred, communications were every day made to them, and no pacific effort that could be resorted to was left untried. An offer was made on the part of the general officer in command, to refer the case to a court of inquiry, and the troops were told to send those of their body in whom they could most confide, to attend that court, and explain the nature of their complaints; and that if found reasonable, they should be immediately redressed. They refused, however, to listen to any terms of accommodation. The address was then agreed to. HOUSE OF LORDS. Monday, February 6. MR. COWPER-CLERK ASSISTANT.] Lord Gifford read a letter from Mr. Cowper, stating that, from infirmity he was unable to attend to discharge the duties of his office, and begging that their lordships would be pleased to accept his resignation. He further begged leave to lay before the House the deep sense of the gratitude he felt for the attention they had paid to him during forty-one years he had been their servant. The Earl of Liverpool said, there could be but one opinion, as to what ought to be done on hearing the letter which had just been read. He was sure their lordships would take the earliest opportunity of recording the sense they entertained of Mr. Cowper's services. He therefore gave notice, that to-morrow he would bring forward a motion on the subject. HOUSE OF COMMONS. Monday, February 6. it would diminish the pressure upon the Bank and the metropolis, incident to an un-, favourable state of the exchanges, by spreading it over a wider surface; on the other hand, it would cause such pressure to be earlier felt, and thereby ensure an earlier and more general adoption of precautionary measures neces-sary for counteracting the inconveniences incident to an export of the precious metals, But though a recurrence to a gold circulation in the country, for the reasons already stated, might be productive of some good, it would by no means go to the root of the evil. COPIES of COMMUNICATIONS between the We have abundant proof of the truth of this First Lord of the Treasury and the Chan- position, in the events which took place in cellor of the Exchequer, and the Gover-the spring of 1793, when a convulsion occurred nor and Deputy Governor of the Bank in the money transactions and circulation of of England, relating to an alteration in the the country more extensive than that which Exclusive privileges enjoyed by the Bank of England. we have recently experienced. At that period nearly a hundred country banks were obliged to stop payment, and Parliament was induced to grant an issue of Exchequer-bills to relieve the distress. Yet, in the year 1793, there were no one or two pound notes in circulation in England, either by country banks or by the Bank of England. No. I. Fife House, Jan. 13. Gentlemen.-We have the honour of trans mitting to you herewith a Paper, containing our views upon the present state of the Banking System of this country, with our suggestions thereupon, which we request you will lay before the Court of Directors of the Bank of England for their consideration. We have the honour to be, gentlemen, &c. (Signed) LIVERPOOL. FREDERICK JOHN ROBINSON. The Governor and Deputy-Governor of the Bank of England. The panic in the money-market having subsided, and the pecuniary transactions of the country having reverted to their accustomed course, it becomes important to lose no time in considering whether any measures can be adopted to prevent the recurrence in future, of such evils as we have recently experienced. However much the recent distress may have been aggravated, in the judgment of some, by incidental circumstances and particular measures, there can be no doubt that the principal source of it is to be found in the rash spirit of speculation which has pervaded the country for some time, supported, fostered, and encouraged by the country banks. The remedy, therefore, for this evil in future, must be found in an improvement in the circulation of country paper; and the first measure which has suggested itself, to most of those who have considered the subject, is a recurrence to gold circulation throughout the country, as well as in the metropolis and its neighbourhood, by a repeal of the act which permits country banks to issue one and two pound notes until the year 1833; and by the immediate enactment of a prohibition of any such issues at the expiration of two or three years from the present period. It appears to us to be quite clear, that such a measure would be productive of much good; that it would operate as some check upon the spirit of speculation, and upon the issues of country banks; and whilst, on the one hand, We have a further proof of the truth of what has been advanced, in the experience of Scotland, which has escaped all the convulsions which have occurred in the money-market of England for the last thirty-five years, though Scotland during the whole of that time has had a circulation of one-pound notes; and the United Kingdom have been carried on exclusmall pecuniary transactions of that part of the sively by the means of such notes. The issue of small notes, though it be an aggravation, cannot therefore be the sole or even the main cause of the evil in England. The failures which have occurred in England, unaccompanied as they have been by the same occurrences in Scotland, tend to prove that there must have been an unsolid and delusive system of banking in one part of Great Britain, and a solid and substantial one in the other. It would be entirely at variance with our deliberate opinion, not to do full justice to the lation and commercial credit, Bank of England, as the great centre of circu We believe that much of the prosperity of the country for the last century is to be ascribed to the general wisdom, justice, and fairness of the dealings of the Bank; and we further think, that during a great part of that time, it may have been, in itself and by itself, fully equal to all the important duties and operations confided to it. But the progress of the country during the last thirty or forty years, in every branch of industry, in agriculture, manufactures, commerce, and navigation, has been so rapid and extensive, as to make it no reflection upon the Bank of England to say, that the instrument, which, by itself, was fully adequate to former transactions, is no longer sufficient without new aids to meet the demands. of the present times. We have to a considerable degree, the proof of this position, in the very establishment of so many country banks. Within the memory of many living, and even of some of those now engaged in public affairs, there were no country banks, except in a few of the great commercial towns. The money transactions of the country were carried on by supplies of coin and Bank notes from London. The extent of the business of the country, and the improvement made from time to time in the mode of conducting our increased commercial transactions, founded on pecuniary credit, rendered such a system no longer adequate, and country banks must have arisen, as in fact they did arise, from the increased wealth and new wants of the country. The matter of regret is, not that country banks have been suffered to exist, but that they have been suffered so long to exist without control or limitation, or without the adoption of provisions calculated to counteract the evils resulting from their improvidence or excess. In England there are said to be between 800 and 900 country banks; and it is no exaggeration to suppose that a great proportion of them have not been conducted with a due attention to those precautions which are necessary for the safety of all banking establishments, even where their property is most ample. When such banks stop, their creditors may ultimately be paid the whole of their demands, but the delay and shock to credit may, in the mean time, involve them in the same difficulty, and is always attended with the greatest injury and suffering in the districts where such stoppages occur. If this be the case where the solidity of the bank is unquestionable, what must it be when (as too often happens) they rest on no solid foundation. In Scotland there are not more than thirty banks; and these banks have stood firm amidst all the convulsions in the money-market in England, and amidst all the distresses to which the manufacturing and agricultural interests in Scotland, as well as in England, have occasionally been subject. Individuals are, from the nature of the institutions, precluded from speculating in the manner in which persons engaged in country, and even in London banks, speculate in England. Banks of this description must necessarily It would be vain to suppose, that we be conducted upon the general understood and could now, by any act of the legislature, ex-approved principles of banking. tinguish the existing country banks, even if it were desirable; but it may be within our power, gradually at least, to establish a sound system of banking throughout the country; and if such a system can be formed, there can be little doubt that it would ultimately extinguish and absorb all that is objectionable and dangerous in the present banking establish ments. There appear to be two modes of attaining this object: First, That the Bank of England should establish branches of its own body in different parts of the country. If the concerns of the country could be carried on without any other bank than the Bank of England, there might be some reason for not interfering with their exclusive privilege; but the effect of the law at present is, to permit every description of banking, except that which is solid and secure. The Bank of England may perhaps propose, as they did upon a former occasion, the extension of the term of their exclusive privilege, as to the metropolis and its neighbourhood, beyond the year 1833, as the price of this con Let the Bank of England reflect on the dangers to which it has been recently subject, Secondly, That the Bank of England should and let its directors and proprietors then say, give up its exclusive privilege as to the num-whether, for their own interests, such an imber of partners engaged in banking, except provement as is suggested in the banking within a certain distance from the metropolis. system is not desirable, and even necessary. It has always appeared to us, that it would have been very desirable that the Bank should have tried the first of these plans-that of establishing branch banks, upon a limited scale. But we are not insensible to the difficulties which would have attended such an experiment, and we are quite satisfied that it would be impossible for the Bank, under present circumstances, to carry into execution such a system, to the extent necessary for providing for the wants of the country. There remains, therefore, only the other plan -the surrender by the Bank of their exclusive privilege, as to the number of partners, beyond a certain distance from the metropolis. The effect of such a measure would be, the gradual establishment of extensive and respectable banks in different parts of the country; some perhaps with charters from the Crown, under certain qualifications, and some without. Here we have again the advantage of the experience of Scotland. cession. It would be very much to be regretted that they should require any such condition. It is clear that in point of security they would gain by the concession proposed to them, inasmuch as their own safety is now necessarily endangered by all such convulsions in the country circulation as we have lately and formerly witnessed. In point of profit, would they lose any thing by it, for which they are entitled to demand compensation. It is notorious, that at the present time their notes circulate in no part of England beyond the metropolis and its neighbourhood, except in Lancashire; and perhaps for that district some special provision might be made. ] HOUSE OF COMMONS as it is the interest, so it has been and ever will be the endeavour, of the country bankers to keep the Bank of England notes out of circulation in those parts of the kingdom where their own circulation prevails. In this they must always be successful, whilst public credit continues in its ordinary state, and the exchanges not unfavourable to this country. The consequences are, that in such times the Bank of England becomes in a manner the sole depository for gold; and in times of an opposite tendency, the sole resort for obtaining it; that at one period their legitimate profit is curtailed by an accumulation of treasure beyond what would be required by a due attention to their own private safety as a banking establishment; and at another period they are exposed to demands which endanger that safety, and baffle all the ordinary calculations of foresight and prudence. If, then, the Bank of England has no country circulation, except in the county above named, the only question for them to consider is, whether, on the ground of profit, as well as security to themselves, the existing country circulation shall or shall not be improved. With respect to the extension of the term of their exclusive privileges in the metropolis and its neighbourhood, it is obvious, from what passed before, that parliament will never agree to it. Such privileges are out of fashion; and what expectation can the Bank, under present circumstances, entertain that theirs will be renewed? But there is no reason why the Bank of England should look at this consequence with dismay. They will remain a chartered corporation for carrying on the business of banking. In that character they will, we trust, always continue to be the sole bankers of the state, and with these advantages, so long as they conduct their affairs wisely and prudently, they always must be the great centre of banking and circulation. Theirs is the only establishment at which the dividend due to the public creditor can by law be paid. It is to be hoped, therefore, that the Bank will make no difficulty in giving up their exclusive privileges, in respect to the number of partners engaged in banking, as to any district-miles from the metropolis. Should the Bank be disposed to consent to a measure of this nature in time to enable the government to announce such a concession at the opening of parliament, it would afford great facilities to the arrangement which they may have to propose for ensuring the stability of private credit, in which the support of public credit and the maintenance of public prosperity are so materially and closely involved. No. II.-At a Court of Directors at the Bank, January 20: This court having taken into consideration the important paper received from the first lord of the Treasury and the chancellor of the Exchequer, have resolved on certain views and sentiments therein laid That however essentially they may differ down and expressed, it is not for the court at the present moment to offer any opinions of their own, the paper appearing to be intended as declaratory of the grounds on which his majesty's ministers have come to the determination to require the Bank to give up its exclusive privilege as to the number of partners engaged in banking, except within a certain distance from the metropolis. It cannot, however, be considered inconsistent with this forbearance, to state the apprehensions of the court of Directors, that confidence is not so fully restored as lord Liverpool and the chancellor of the Exchequer seem to imagine. public and private, remains in a very uncertain Though the panic has subsided, credit, both and anxious state. parts extremely defective, cannot be controThat the country circulation is in many verted; and the Bank would very reluctantly oppose itself to any measures tending to ameliorate it, but would be glad to promote part, should such be found practicable, or by that object, either by fresh exertions on their any reasonable sacrifice. Under the uncertainty in which the court of Directors find themselves with respect to the effect which they may have on the interests details of the plans of government, and the of the Bank, this court cannot feel themselves justified in recommending to their proprietors sanctioned and confirmed as it is by the solemn to give up the privilege which they now enjoy, acts of the legislature. No. III. The first lord of the Treasury and the chancellor of the Exchequer have duly 20th inst. considered the answer of the Bank of the They cannot but regret that the court of Directors should have declined to recommend of the paper delivered by the first lord of the to the court of Proprietors the consideration Treasury and the chancellor of the Exchequer to the governor and deputy governor of the Bank on the 13th instant. pears to the first lord of the Treasury and The statement contained in that paper applicit on all the points to which it relates, that chancellor of the Exchequer so full and exthey have nothing further to add, although they would have been, as they still are, ready tions which might be put, for the purpose of to answer, as far as possible, any specific ques"removing the uncertainty in which the court of Directors state themselves to be with respect to the details of the plan suggested in that paper." to consider is, whether they are willing to reAfter all, the simple question for the Bank number of partners engaged in banking at a linquish their exclusive privilege as to the certain distance from the metropolis? The first lord of the Treasury and the chancellor of the Exchequer are satisfied that the |