considered that it gave no clue whatever to the amount in circulation, it being notorious, that they lay, for the most part, in the bankers' chests, who, being unable to form any sort of estimate of the demand likely to come on them, found themselves obliged to be prepared for any possible emergency.

Mr. Hume thought it would answer little purpose to have an account of the small notes issued, unless we had an account of the large notes also. Neither in France, America, nor in any other country, was there any secresy or mystery of this kind.

Mr. Maberly said, the very opposition of the Bank and government to this amendment would induce him to press it. As the Bank made large profits by the monopoly, they were bound to give every information to the public by which those profits might be ascertained. What had been observed by an hon. member as to a quantity of Bank-notes being locked up in the coffers of the bankers, afforded no argument against the motion; because those notes might, at any moment, be brought out, and gold demanded for them. The Bank had, on several occasions, acted with great impolicy; for when the exchanges were against them, they had not contracted their issues. Now, if their issues were published, the country would be aware of such imprudence on the part of the Bank. It was not necessary that the exchanges should be greatly against us to cause the Bank to be drained of its gold. One half per cent would be sufficient to effect this; and the House would be convinced of this when they reflected, that the insurance on gold to Paris was only a quarter per cent.

Alderman Thompson said, that although he had opposed this bill, he conceived that if it was to pass, it was better that it should pass without delay. As this bill gave the Bank the privilege of issuing small notes, it might be proper that they should furnish an account of the issues of such notes; but as the Bank derived no privilege from it as to its other issues, there was no reason why it should be required to furnish any account respecting them. The Bank might as well be called upon for an account of their discounts.

Mr. Hobhouse said, that it was his intention to propose that country bankers should also furnish an account of their issues. Such account would afford greater security against their failure than any other

measure. If they were not required to do this, failures would occur as frequently from their issue of 51. notes, as from their issue of 17. and 21. notes.

Mr. Monck said, that the amount of paper in circulation could not be accurately ascertained, unless the country bankers, as well as the Bank of England, were required to give an account of the amount of their issues. He hoped therefore that the hon. member would persevere in his intention.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer hoped the bill would be permitted to go through its present stage that evening; as there would be two more opportunities afforded for hon. gentlemen to propose amendments to it.

Mr. Hume said, it would be very improper that this bill should be hurried through the committee at that late hour. He would therefore move, that the chairman report progress, and ask leave to sit again.

The committee divided: for the motion 11; against it 66; majority 55.

Mr. Hume expressed his determination to continue dividing the committee as often as it was attempted to proceed. The chancellor of the Exchequer consented to the adjournment; and the chairman reported progress, and asked leave to sit again on Monday.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Lord

Monday, February 27. SCOTCH BANKING SYSTEM.] Melville presented a petition from Edinburgh, praying their lordships not to consent to any measure for altering the system of the currency in Scotland.

The Earl of Roseberry could not allow the petition to be read, without stating, not only that there had been not one dissentient voice at the numerous and respectable meeting when this petition was signed, but also that there had not been one dissentient voice at any meeting which had been held, and he believed there would not be a single dissentient voice at any of the meetings about to be held. There was in Scotland an unanimous, but not clamorous opposition to the proposed measure of extending to Scotland the bill for suppressing small notes. Men of all parties, who had never agreed on any one subject before, were united in this, and had stated, in the strongest way possible, that no project ever thought of was so

he was afraid there would be little chance of any alteration of the Corn-laws.

likely to derange, not merely the currency, but the whole transactions of the country.

CORN LAWS.] Lord King said, he had several petitions to present against the landlords' act—the bread-taxing act which in the petition, was described by the more common name of the Corn-laws. The first petition was from the ladies boot and shoemakers of London and Westminster. It generally happened with respect to all grievances which were petitioned against, that it required a quarter of a century, before parliament would listen to complaints, and set about correcting an evil. Such had been the case with the city job, the Bank Restriction act. That grievance had lasted a quarter of a century, and he was afraid this bread-taxing act, which had been in force since 1815, would last as long. The subject was allowed to be one which ought to be considered; but then it was very doubtful when the day of consideration would come. Last year it was said the subject would be taken up this year; and this year their lordships were told the consideration was to be taken up the next. But if the time of consideration was doubtful, it was still more doubtful how far the interest of those who gained by the law would not be suffered to prevail against the public interest. Perhaps his majesty's ministers might be divided on this, as they were on some other questions; and in that case, if ever they did come to a decision, the time of coming to it must be very doubtful indeed. On this subject the noble lord opposite and his friend acted a part of a nature something like what the dissenters described as "backsliding," or at least were resolved to be only " occasional conformists." In fact, he believed they were now busy looking out for the strongest side. In another place they had been compared to the devil of the metaphysicians; but they might, with more propriety, be compared to the ass of the metaphysicians placed between two bundles of hay, and so equally attracted by the flavour of each, that he did not know how to turn. He thought, however, that they most of all resembled the common ass, which always yielded to the heaviest blows. They were now well basted on one side by the landed interest, and unless the manufacturers and other parts of the population could thump them harder, VOL, XIV.

The Earl of Limerick did not rise to oppose the petition from so distinguished a body, but to express his satisfaction at finding himself agreeing in opinion, for once, with the noble lord. He was glad to hear that a quarter of a century was likely to elapse before the Corn-laws were repealed; because he was persuaded that before that time expired, the petitioners themselves would alter their opinion on the subject.

The Earl of Lauderdale, when he heard from the reading of the title of the petition that it came from ladies' boot and shoemakers, he thought it must be against the corns which they inflicted on the fair sex, and from which the latter had much need of relief. That was a practice in which a reform would be very desirable. Ordered to lie on the table.

BANK CHARTER AMENDMENT BILL BANK ADVANCES ON GOODS.] The Marquis of Lansdown rose, before the order of the day was read, to say a few words on a subject of much importance, which he could not so conveniently introduce on the report of the committee on the Bank Charter bill being brought up, when he intended, pursuant to the notice he had given, to move a clause compelling banks or branches of the Bank of England to pay in coin at the places where their notes might be issued. His motive for rising at the present moment was, to ask the noble earl opposite a question, the answer to which might save trouble, by rendering unnecessary observations on the subject in the future discussion of the bill. What he wished to ask was, whether applications had been made by government to the directors of the Bank, with the view of inducing them to engage in a new plan or system-new at least in practice to them

by which money was proposed to be advanced on goods pawned or pledged to the Bank? If he did not receive a satis factory answer to his question, he should take the opportunity of bringing under their lordships' consideration a new principle, which, if it corresponded with the representation given of it, he could not help thinking was most important and most alarming.

The Earl of Liverpool had no hesitation in answering the noble marquis, that a communication had taken place between some of the members of his majesty's

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government, and some of the directors of the Bank, on the subject to which the noble marquis had alluded. But he was not then able to say what the decision of the Bank would be on the subject.

The Marquis of Lansdown expressed his regret, that any application of the kind had been made to the Bank of England to induce it to adopt so questionable a measure; and he earnestly hoped that the application would be re-considered by government; or, if the government were resolved not to re-consider it, that the directors would not lend themselves to any such measure. He was the more inclined to express this hope, because, without arguing whether it was proper to make application to the Bank to give relief, but assuming that such application was necessary, he was prepared, if the proposed plan were adopted, to contend that that mode of relief was by far the most objectionable which could be resorted to. It was a doctrine admitted on all sides, that the proper and salutary course for the Bank, was to leave that body, in its transactions with the public, in as free and unembarrassed a state as possible; because they would then be able to regulate their issues according to the rise or fall of the foreign exchanges. Now, with respect to the exchanges, nothing was more likely to tie up, and embarrass the Bank more than the measure which seemed now to be proposed; namely, that of making advances to a great extent on deposits of goods. At the time of the commercial distress in 1793, this subject had been forced on the consideration of the legislature; and both Mr. Pitt and the late lord Melville were decidedly against any proposition for advances on goods, which were then unsaleable. Both these statesmen had laid down, in the strongest terms, the principle, that it was not proper to induce the Bank to depart from the regular course on which its affairs had been conducted. He should quote their words. On its being suggested in the debate, that the management of the relief should be left to the Bank, Mr. Pitt observed, "that from the nature of the business, the Bank had declined interfering, because the species of the security to be given was not such as the Bank had been accustomed to receive. The measure now proposed was of a temporary nature. The practice of the Bank upon discount was permanent. The Bank took securities for what business they transacted in this

way, at two months. The security to be given here was not determinable at that time, and the deposit was of a nature which the Bank had not been accustomed to act upon." What lord Melville said upon the subject was still stronger, and was particularly important, as his view of the cause of the distress of that period was similar to that attributed to the distress of the present time since he connected it with over-trading. On that occasion Mr. Secretary Dundas "begged leave to enter his protest against any declaration, that the present embarrassment of the merchants and manufacturers was the effect of the poverty of the country. He considered it as precisely the reverse, and would maintain, however odd it might sound, that it was occasioned by the uncommon prosperity of the nation-a prosperity which had induced some individuals to push their speculations beyond the extent of their own private capitals, but by no means beyond the capital of the nation. To call upon the Bank of England to deviate from that line of conduct which it had proposed to itself, and under which it had flourished, he deemed by no means prudent. The Bank discounted upon certain securities; but discounted on the principle of having its returns in two months. The measure now proposed admitted of a more tended period for repayment, and was entirely different from what was the usage of that corporation." Now, if there were reasons then for not inducing the Bank to deviate from its usual practice of discounts, how much more did all those considerations on which that opinion was founded, apply now, when, by the common consent of all men who reflected on the subject, it was agreed that it was to the state of the exchanges that the Bank had to look for the regulation of their issues. He believed there was no man bold enough to deny this doctrine. But, if this attention to the state of the exchanges was at all times to be observed by the Bank, how much more would it be necessary now, if a deficient circulation was to be followed by a great and sudden supply. Nobody could tell what effect such a course might have on the exchanges, by which it was the particular duty of the Bank to regulate issues. Could it then be safe to induce the Bank to increase to a large extent their issues at a time like the present, on securities of a kind on which it had been not customary to make

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