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of this division, the various branches of a science of nature were mapped out, based on a graduallyincreasing development of the powers of life. But no serious attempt was made by the Stoics to work out this thought. With the single exception of man, we know exceedingly little of their views on organic beings.1

= ἕξις ἐξ αὐτῆς κινουμένη κατὰ σπερματικούς λόγους ἀποτελοῦσά τε καὶ συνέχουσα τὰ ἐξ αὑτῆς ἐν ὡρισμένοις χρόνοις καὶ τοιαῦτα δρῶσα ἀφ' οίων ἀπεκρίθη. It hardly need be repeated that the force is one and the same, which at one time appears as is, at another as φύσις. Conf. Diog. 138; Themist. 1. c.; Sext. Math. ix. 84.

The belief that blood circulates in the veins, spiritus in the arteries, which was shared by the Peripatetics, deserves to

be mentioned here, Sen. Nat.
Qu. ii. 15, 1; also the explana-
tions of sleep, death, and age in
Plut. Plac. v. 23, 4; the assertion
that animals are not only deficient
in reason, but in emotions, and
that even in man the emotions
are connected with the rational
soul. Posidonius, however, de-
nied this statement, and Chrys-
ippus believed that animals had
3 ηγεμονικόν. He even discovered
in dogs traces of an unconscious
inference. Sext. Pyrrh. i. 69.

CHAP.

VIII.

CHAP.
IX.

A. The
soul.
(1) Ma-
terialistic
nature of
the soul.

CHAPTER IX.

THE STUDY OF NATURE. MAN.

THE Stoic teaching becomes peculiarly interesting,
when it begins to speak of Man; and on this sub-
ject, as on every other, its tone was decided by the
tone of the whole system. On the one hand, the
Stoic materialism could not fail to show itself most
unmistakeably in the department of anthropology ;
on the other hand, the conviction that all actions
must be referred to active forces, and all the several
active forces to one original force, could not be held
without leading to a belief in the oneness and in
the dynamical power of the soul. Not only does
it follow, as a corollary from the materialistic view
of the world, that the soul must be in its nature-
corporeal, but the Stoics took pains to uphold this
view by special arguments. Whatever, they said,
influences the body, and is by it influenced in turn,
whatever is united with the body, and again se-
parated from it, must be corporeal.
can the soul be other than corporeal?

1 Cleanthes, in Nemes. Nat. Hom. p. 33, and Tert. De An. c. 5: οὐδὲν ἀσώματον συμπάσχει

How, then,
Whatever

σώματι οὐδὲ ἀσωμάτῳ σῶμα ἀλλὰ σῶμα σώματι· συμπάσχει δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι νοσοῦντι καὶ τεμ

has extension in three dimensions is corporeal; and this is the case with the soul, since it extends in three directions over the whole body. Moreover, thought and motion are due to animal life. Animal life is nurtured and kept in health by the breath of life.3 Experience also proves that mental qualities are propagated by natural generation, and that they must be consequently connected with a corporeal substratum.4 The mind is therefore nothing but fiery breath; and the human soul is described by the Stoics sometimes as fire, sometimes as breath, at other times, more accurately, as warm breath, diffused throughout the body, and forming a bond of union for the body," in the very same way that

νομένῳ καὶ τὸ σῶμα τῇ ψυχῇ· αἰσχυνομένης γοῦν ἐρυθρὸν γίνεται καὶ φοβουμένης ὠχρόν· σῶμα ἄρα ἡ ψυχή. Chrysippus, in Nemes. p. 34: ὁ θάνατός ἐστι χωρισμός ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος· οὐδὲν δὲ ἀσώματον ἀπὸ σώματος χωρίζεται· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐφάπτεται σώματος ἀσώματον· ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ καὶ ἐφάπτεται καὶ χωρίζεται τοῦ σώματος· σῶμα ἄρα ἡ ψυχή.

1 Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 2. 2 Divg. 157; Cic. N. D. ii. 14, 36. • Zeno, in Tertull. 1. c.: Quo digresso animal emoritur: consito autem spiritu digresso animal emoritur: ergo consitus spiritus corpus est, consitus autem spiritus anima est: ergo corpus est anima.

• Cleanthes, in Nemes. l. c. 32: οὐ μόνον ὅμοιοι τοῖς γονεῦσι γινόμεθα, κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, τοῖς πάθεσι, τοῖς ἤθεσι, ταῖς διαθέσεσι· σώματος δὲ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀνόμενον, οὐχὶ δὲ ἀσώματον· σῶμα ἄρα ἡ ψυχή.

5 Chrysippus, in Galen, Hipp. et Plut. iii. 1: ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦμά ἐστι σύμφυτον ἡμῖν συνεχές παντὶ τῷ σώματι διήκον. Zeno. Macrob. Somn. i. 14: Zenon [dixit animam] concretum corpori spiritum . . . Boëthos (probably the Stoic is meant) ex aëre et igne [constare]. Diog. in Galen, ii. 8: τὸ κινοῦν τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὰς κατὰ προαίρεσιν κινήσεις ψυχική τίς ἐστιν ἀναθυμίασις. Cic. Nat. D. iii. 14, 36; Tusc. i. 9, 19; 18, 42 : Zeno considers the soul to be fire; Panatius believes that it is burning air. Diog. L. vii. 156, on the authority of Zeno, Antipater, Posidonius, says that it is πνεῦμα σύμφυτον, πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον. Stob. Eel. i. 796 (Plut. Plac. iv. 3, 3). Cornut. N. D. p. 8 : καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἡμέτεραι ψυχαὶ πῦρ εἰσι. Ar. Didymus, in Eus. Pr. Εr. xv. 20, 1 : Zeno calls the soul αἴσθησιν ἢ ἀναθυμίασιν (should be αἰσθητικὴν ἀναθυμίασιν). Ps. Plut.

CHAP.

IX

CHAP.
IX.

the soul of the world is diffused throughout the world, and forms a bond of union for the world.' This warm breath was believed to be connected with the blood; and hence the soul was said to be fed by vapours from the blood, just as the stars are fed by vapours from the earth.2

From

The same hypothesis was also used to explain the origin of the soul. One part of the soul was believed to be transmitted to the young in the seed.3 the part so transmitted there arises, by development within the womb, first the soul of a plant; and this

Vit. Hom. c. 127: The Huxhv of Στωϊκοὶ ὁρίζονται πνεῦμα συμφυές kal ȧvalvμíaoi alσOnTikhν ávaπTоμένην ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν σώματι ὑγρῶν. Longin. in Eus. Ibid. 21, 1 and 3. Alex. De An. 127, b: oi and Tŷs στοῖς πνεῦμα αὐτὴν λέγοντες εἶναι συγκείμενόν πως ἔκ τε πυρὸς καὶ ἀέρος. Since, however, every Tveûμa is not a soul, a soul is stated to be πνεῦμα πὼς ἔχον (Plotin. Enn. iv. 7, 4); and the distinctive quality of the soulelement is its greater warmth and rarity. Plut. Sto. Rep. 41, 2: Chrysippus considers the ψυχή το | be ἀραιότερον πνεῦμα τῆς φύσεως I Kai λETTOμEρÉσTepov. Similarly, Galen, Qu. An. Mores, c. 4: The Stoics say that both puris and Vuxn is veûua, but that the TVEUμa is thick and cold in púσis, dry and warm in ψυχή.

Chrysippus. The process is further explained by Iamb. in Stob. Ecl. i. 870 and 874, Themist. De Anim. f. 68, a, Plotin. iv. 7, 8, as being κparis, i.e. an intermingling of elements. That the soul forms the bond of union for the body, and not vice versâ, was

a point vindicated by the Stoics against the Epicureans. Posid. in Achil. Tat. Isag. c. 13; Sext. Math. ix. 72.

2 Galen. Hippocr. et Plat. ii. 8, on the authority of Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Diogenes; Longin. in Eus. Pr. Eν. xv. 21, 3; M. Aurel. v. 33; vi. 15; Ps. Plut. Vit. Hom. 127.

3 Zeno described the seed as veμa μee' vypoû ¥ʊxîs μépos kal ἀπόσπασμα μίγμα τῶν τῆς vuxns μepwv (Arius Didymus, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 20, 1), or as σύμμιγμα καὶ κέρασμα τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων (Plut. Coh. Ir. 15). See also Chrysip. in Diog. 159, and Tertullian, De An. c. 27. According to Sphærus, in Diog. 159, the seed is formed by separation from all parts of the body, and can consequently produce all. Panatius (in Cie. Tusc. i. 31, 79) proves, from the mental similarity between parents and children, that the soul comes into existence by generation. For the mother's share in producing the soul, see Ar. Did.

becomes the soul of a living creature, after birth, by the action of the outer air. This view led to the further hypothesis that the seat of the soul must be in the breast, not in the brain; since not only breath and warm blood, but also the voice, the immediate expression of thought, comes from the breast.2

Nor is this further hypothesis out of harmony with the notions generally entertained as to the nature of man. Plato and Aristotle had already fixed on the heart as the central organ of the lower powers, having assigned the brain to reason, with the view of distinguishing the rational from the mere animal soul. When, therefore, the Stoics assimilated man's rational activity to the activity of the senses, deducing both from one and the same

1 Plut. Sto. Rep. 41, 1 and 8; C. Not. 46, 2. De Primo Frig. 2, 5: oi ΣTwikol kal tò пveûμa λéYoval év Tois owμaσi τŵv Врepŵv τῇ περιψύξει στομοῦσθαι καὶ μεταβάλλον ἐκ φύσεως γενέσθαι ψυχήν. Similarly, Plotin. Enn. iv. 7, 8; Hippolyt. Refut. Hær. c. 21; Tertull. De An. c. 25. Plutarch (Plac. v. 16, 2; 17, 1; 24, 1) draws attention to the inconsistency of saying that the animal soul, which is warmer and rarer than the vegetable soul, has been developed out of it by cooling and condensation.

2 On this point, the Stoics were not altogether agreed. Some (not all, as Plut. Pl. Phil. iv. 21, 5, asserts) made the brain the seat of the soul, in proof of which they appealed to the story of the birth of Pallas. Sert. Math. ix. 119; Diog. in Phædr. Fragm. De Nat. De. col. 6. Conf. Krische

Forschungen, i. 488, and Chrysip.
in Galen, 1. c. iii. 8. It appears,
however, from Galen, 1. c. i. 6, ii.
2 and 5, iii. 1, Tertull. De An. c.
15, that the most distinguished
Stoies-Zeno, Chrysippus, Dio-
genes, and Apollodorus-decided
in favour of the heart. The chief
proof is, that the voice does not
come from the hollow of the
skull, but from the breast. Chrys-
ippus was aware of the weakness
of this proof, but still did not
shrink from using it. At the
same time, he also appealed to
the fact (ii. 7; iii. 1; iv. 1) that,
by universal assent, supported
by numerous passages from the
poets, the motions of the will and
the feelings proceed from the
heart.

Aristotle had assigned no
particular organ of the body to

reason.

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