CHAP. XVII. (4) Plants and animals. C. Mankind. particularly as the principle already indicated was most freely resorted to, and many explanations were given as being all equally possible.1 Out of the newly-made earth plants at first grew,2 and afterwards animals came forth, since the latter, according to Lucretius, can by no possibility have fallen from heaven.3 In other worlds also living beings came into existence, though not necessarily in all. Among these beings were originally, as Empedocles had previously supposed, all sorts of composite or deformed creatures. Those, however, alone continued to exist, which were fitted by nature to find nourishment, to propagate themselves, and protect themselves from danger. Romantic creatures, such as centaurs or chimæras, can never have existed here, because such beings would require conditions of life altogether different. Aiming, as the Epicureans did, at explaining the origin of men and animals in a purely natural on 1 Further particulars: clouds, Diog. 99; Lucr. vi. 451; Plut. Plac. iii. 4, 3; on rain, Diog. 100; Lucret. vi. 495; on thunder, Diog. 100; 103; Lucret. vi. 96; on lightning, Diog. 101; Lucr. vi. 160; on sirocco, Diog. 104; Lucr. vi. 423; Plac. iii. 3, 2; on earthquakes, Diog. 105; Lucr. vi. 535; Plac. iii. 15, 11; Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 20, 5; on winds, Diog. 106; on hail, Diog. 106; Plac. iii. 4, 3; on snow, thaw, ice, frost, Diog. 107-109; on the rainbow, Diog. 109; on the halo of the moon, Diog. 110; on comets, Diog. 111; on shootingstars, Diog. 114. Explanations are given by Lucretius of volcanoes (vi. 639), of the overflow of the Nile (vi. 712), of Lake Avernus (vi. 738-839), of the magnet (vi. 906-1087). 2 Lucret. ii. 1157; v. 780.. Otherwise, we learn that the Epicureans, just as little as the Stoics, attributed to plants a soul. Plut. Plac. v. 26, 3. 3 Lucr. ii. 1155; v. 787. Epic. in Diog. 74. 5 Anaximander, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia, and Democritus, all taught the procreation of living beings from earth. 6 Lucr. v. 834-921. CHAP. XVII. of the manner, they likewise tried to form notions equally according to nature, of the original state and historical development of the human race, ignoring in (1) Origin this attempt all legendary notions. On this point, human notwithstanding their leaning to materialistic views, race. they were more successful in propounding something rational. The men of early times, so thought Lucretius, were stronger and more powerful than the men. of to-day. Rude and ignorant as beasts, they lived in the woods in a perpetual state of warfare with wild animals, without justice or society. The first and most important step in a social direction was the discovery of fire, after which men learned to build huts, and clothe themselves in skins, when marriage and domestic life began,2 when speech, originally not a matter of convention, but, like the noises of animals, the natural expression of thoughts and feelings, was developed. The older the human race grew the more they learnt of the arts and skill which ministers to the preservation and enjoyment of life. These arts were first learnt by experience, under the pressure of necessity or the needs of nature. What had thus 1 v. 922-1008. Conf. Plato, Polit. 274, B; Arist. Pol. ii. S. Horace, Serm. i. 3, 99, appears to have had an eye to Lucretius. 2 Lucr. v. 1009-1025. Epicurus, in Diog. 75, thus expresses his views as to the origin of language: тà óvóμara ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὴ θέσει γενέσθαι, ἀλλ ̓ αὐτὰς τὰς φύσεις τῶν ἀνθρώπων Kal' “Kaσтa čovn tôia maoxovoas πάθη καὶ ἴδια λαμβανούσας φαντάσματα ἰδίως τὸν ἀέρα ἐκπέμπειν . . ὕστερον δὲ κοινῶς καθ ̓ ἕκαστα тà čovη Tà tôiα тeoñvai πрÒS TÒ τὰς δηλώσεις ἧττον ἀμφιβόλους γενέσθαι ἀλλήλοις καὶ συντομω τέρως δηλουμένας. He who invents any new thing puts, at the same time, new words into circulation. Lucret. v. 1026-1088, explains in detail that language is of natural origin. On the voice, Ibid. iv. 522; Plut. Plac. iv. 19, 2. been discovered was completed by reflection, the more gifted preceding the rest as teachers.' In exactly the same way civil society was developed. Individuals built strongholds, and made themselves rulers. In time the power of kings aroused envy, and they were massacred. To crush the anarchy which then arose magistrates were chosen, and order established by penal laws. It will subsequently be seen that Epicurus explained religion in the same way by natural growth. The apotheosis of nature, which has been apparent in Epicurus' whole view of history, becomes specially prominent in his treatment of psychology. This Epic. in Diog. 75: àλλà un ὑποληπτέον καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσιν πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτὴν περιεστώτων πραγμάτων διδαχθῆναί τε καὶ ἀναγκασθῆναι· τὸν δὲ λογισμὸν τὰ ὑπὸ ταύτης παρεγγυηθέντα καὶ ὕστερον ἐπακριβοῦν καὶ προσεξευρίσκειν, ἐν μέν τισι θᾶττον ἐν δέ τισι βραδύτερον. Lucr. v. 1450: Forests on fire, melting brass, first taught men how to work in metal (ν. 1239-1994). Horses and elephants were used for help in war, after attempts had been previously made with oxen and wild beasts (ν. 1295). Men first dressed themselves in skins; afterwards they wore twisted, and then woven materials (v. Usus et impigræ simul experientia 1009; 1348; 1416). The first mentis Paulatim docuit . . . all arts. Ibid. 1103: Inque dies magis hi victum vitam que priorem Lucretius then tries to explain ideas of planting and agriculture were taken from the natural spread of plants (v. 1359). The first music was in imitation of birds; the first musical instruthe wind was heard to whistle; ment, the pipe, through which from this natural music, artificial music only gradually grew (v. 1377) The measure and arrangement of time was taught by the stars (v. 1434); and, comparatively late, came the arts of poetry and writing (v. 1438). Lucr. v. 1106. treatment could, after all that has been said, be only purely materialistic. The soul, like every other real being, is a body. In support of this view the Epicureans appealed to the mutual relations of the body and the soul, agreeing on this point with the Stoics.' The body of the soul, however, consists of the finest, lightest, and most easily-moved atoms, as is manifest from the speed of thought, from the immediate dissolution of the soul after death, and, moreover, from the fact that the soulless body is as heavy as the body in which there is a soul. Hence Epicurus, again agreeing with the Stoics, described the soul as consisting of a material resembling fire and air,3 or more accurately, as composed of four elements, fire, air, vapour, and a fourth nameless element. It consists of the finest atoms, and is the cause of feeling, and according as one or other of these elements preponderates, the character of man is of one or the other kind. Like the Stoics, Epicurus believed that the soul element is received by generation from the parents' souls, and that it is spread over the whole body, growing as the body grows. At the same 1 Lucr. iii. 161; Diog. 67. 2 Lucr. iii. 177; Diog. 63. 3 Diog. 63 : ἡ ψυχὴ σῶμά ἐστι λεπτομερές παρ' ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα παρεσπαρμένον· προσεμφερέστατον δὲ πνεύματι θερμοῦ τινα κρᾶσιν ἔχοντι. 66: ἐξ ἀτόμων αὐτὴν συγκεῖσθαι λειοτάτων καὶ στρογ γυλοτάτων πολλῷ τινι διαφερουσῶν τῶν τοῦ πυρός. Lucr. iii. 231; 269; Plut. Plac. iv. 3, 5; Alex. Aphr. De An. 127, b. 5 Lucr. iii. 288. 6 According to Plut. Plac. v. 3, 5, he considered the seed an ἀπόσπασμα ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ; and, since he believed in a feminine σπέρμα, he must have regarded the soul of the child as formed by the intermingling of the soul-atoms of both parents. Ibid. v. 16, 1. Diog. 63; Lucret. iii. 216; Metrodor. Tepì aloentŵv (Vol. СНАР. XVII. CHAP. XVII. time he makes a distinction in the soul somewhat similar to that made by the Stoics in their doctrine / of the sovereign part of the soul (ýyeμovikóv).1 Only the irrational part of the soul is diffused as a principle of life over the whole body, the rational part having its seat in the breast. To the rational part belongs mental activity, sensation, and perception, the motion of the will and the mind, and in this sense life. Both parts together make up one being, yet they may exist in different conditions. The mind may be cheerful whilst the body and the irrational soul feel pain, or the reverse may be the case. It is even possible that portions of the irrational soul may be lost by the mutilation of the body, without detriment to the rational soul, or consequently to life.3 When, however, the connection between soul and body is fully severed, then the soul can no longer exist. Deprived of the surrounding shelter of the body its atoms are dispersed in a moment, owing to their lightness; and the body in consequence, being likewise unable to exist without the soul, goes over into corruption. If this view appears to hold out 1 Lucr. iii. 98, denies the assertion that the soul is the harmony of the body. 2 Diog. 66; Lucr. iii. 94; 136; 396; 613; Plut. Plac. iv. 4, 3. Lucretius calls the rational part animus or mens, and the irrational, anima. The statement, Pl. Phil. iv. 23, 2, that Epicurus made feeling reside in the organs of sense, because the yeμovikov was feelingless, can hardly be correct. 3 Diog. and Lucr. In sleep, a portion of the soul is supposed to leave the body (Lucr. iv. 913), whilst another part is forcibly confined within the body. Probably this is all that is meant, Diog. 66. Epic. in Diog. 64. Lucr. iii. 417-827, gives an elaborate proof of the mortality of the soul. Other passages, Plut. N. P. Sua. Vi. 27. 1 and 3; 30, 5; Sext. Math. ix. 72, hardly need to be |