CHAP. XXIII. B. Carneades. Comparing with the theory of Arcesilaus, that which was propounded by Carneades a century later, the same view is found to be underlying; but the whole system is more fully developed, and has received a firmer groundwork. Of the immediate followers of Arcesilaus it can only be stated that they adhered to their teacher. It may be presumed that they did little in the way of expanding it, since the ancients are silent as to their labours, only Carneades 2 being mentioned as the continuer of the Geffers, De Arcesila Successoribus: Gött. 1845. Arcesilaus was succeeded by Lacydes of Cyrene, who died 240 B.C., after presiding over the School for 26 years, having entrusted it to the care of the Phocæans Telecles and Euandros (Diog. iv. 59-61). The descriptions of him in Diog. 1. c., Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, Plut. De Adul. 22, Elian, V. H. ii. 41, Athen. x. 438, a, xiii. 606, c, Plin. H. N. x. 22, 51, referring particularly to individual peculiarities which he appears to have had, must be received with caution. Diog. calls him arp σεμνότατος καὶ οὐκ ὀλίγους ἐσχηκὼς ζηλωτάς· φιλόπονός τε ἐκ νέου καὶ πένης μὲν, εὔχαρις δ' ἄλλws Kal Evóμiλos. In doctrine, he deviated little from Arcesilaus, and, having first committed to writing the teaching of the New Academy, is said to have been its founder (Diog. 59). According to Diog. vii. 183, he appears to have taught in the Academy during Arcesilaus' lifetime. Panaretus (Athen. xii. 552, d; Æl. V. H. x. 6), Demophanes, and Ecdemus or Ecdelus (Plutarch. Philopon. 1 Arab. 5, 7) are also called pupils of Arcesilaus. The most distinguished pupil of Lacydes, according to Eus. xiv. 7, 12, was Aristippus of Cyrene, also mentioned by Diog. ii. 83. Another, Paulus, is also mentioned by Timotheus, in Clemens, Strom. 496, D. His successors were Telecles and Euandros. Euander, it would appear, according to Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 16, Diog. 60, Eus. 1. c., having survived his colleague, was followed by Hegesinus (Diog. 60; Cic. 1. c.) or Hegesilaus (Clemens, Strom. p. 301, c), the immediate predecessor of Carneades. 2 Carneades, the son of Epicomus or Philocomus, was born at Cyrene (Diog. iv. 62; Strabo, xvii. 3, 22; Cic. Tusc. iv. 3, 5), and died, according to Apollodorus (Diog. 65), 129 B.C., in his 85th year. Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 16. Valer. Max. viii. 7, 5, with less probability, extends his age to 90. His birth must therefore have been in 213 B.C. Little is known of his life. He was a disciple and follower of Hegesinus, but at the same time re Academic Scepticism. The importance attaching to Carneades is therefore all the greater, and he is in consequence called the founder of the third or New Academy. Nor is this done without reason, witness the admiration which his talents called forth among cotemporaries and posterity, and the flourishing condition in which he left his School.3 Himself a pupil of Chrysippus, and resembling him in tone ceived instruction in dialectic (Cic. Acad. ii. 30, 98) from the Stoic Diogenes, and studied with indefatigable zeal (Diog. 62) philosophic literature, and in particular the writings of Chrysippus (Diog. 62; Plut. Sto. Rep. 10, 44; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, 13). In 156 B.C. he took part in the well-known association of philosophers, and produced the greatest impression on his Roman hearers by the force of his language and the boldness with which he attacked the current principles of morals. Shortly before his death he became blind (Diog. 66). He left no writings, the preservation of his doctrines being the work of his pupils, in particular of Clitomachus (Diog. 66, 67; Cic. Acad. ii. 31, 98; 32, 102). Respecting his character, we may gather from a few expressions that, whilst vigorous in disputation (Diog. 63; Gall. Ν. Α. vi. 14, 10), he was not wanting in repose (Diog. 66). We can well believe that he was a just man, notwithstanding his speech against justico (Quintil. xii. 1, 35). Sext. Pyrrh. i. 220; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, 12; Lucian.; Macrob. 20. 2 His School held him in such esteem, that it not only considered him, together with Plato, to be a special favourite of Apollo, but that tradition said an eclipse of the moon commemorated his death; συμπάθειαν, ὡς ἂν εἴποι TIs, aivITTOμévov TOÙ μeď v KаλλÍσTOV TŵV ǎσтрwv (Diog. 64). Strabo, xvii. 3, 22, says of him: οὗτος δὲ τῶν ἐξ Ακαδημίας ἄριστος piλorówv dμoλoyeîrai; and there was only one opinion among the ancients regarding the force of his logic, and the power and attraction of his eloquence. Plut. Garrul. 21; Diog. 63. Conf. Dog. 62; Cic. Fin. iii. 12, 41; De Orat. ii. 38, 161; iii. 18, 68; Gell. N. A. vi. 14, 10; Numen. in Eusebius, Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 2 and 5; Lactant. Inst. v. 14; Plut. Cato Maj. 22. The latter, speaking of his success at Rome, says: μάλιστα δ' ἡ Καρνεάδου χάρις, ἧς δύναμίς τε πλείστη καὶ δόξα τῆς δυνάμεως οὐκ ἀποδέουσα. . . ὡς πνεῦμα τὴν πόλιν ἠχῆς ἐνέπλησε. καὶ λόγος κατεῖχεν, ὡς ἀνὴρ Ελλην εἰς ἔκπληξιν ὑπερφυής, πάντα κηλῶν καὶ χειρούμενος, ἔρωτα δεινὸν ἐμβεβληκε τοῖς νέοις, ὑφ' οἱ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν καὶ διατριβῶν ἐκTeσóvτes évovoiŵoi repì piλ000φίαν. Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 16. CHAP XXIII. CHAP. XXIII. (1) Negative side of his teach ing. (a) Denial of possibility of formal knowledge. of mind, Carneades expanded not only the negative side of the Sceptical theory in all directions with an acuteness worthy of the more ancient Sceptics; but he was also the first to investigate the positive side of Scepticism, the doctrine of probability, and to determine the degrees and conditions of probability. By his labours in both ways he carried the philosophy of Scepticism to its greatest scientific perfection. As regards the negative side of these investigations, or the refutation of dogmatism, the attacks of Carneades were directed partly against the formal possibility of knowledge, and partly against the chief actual results of the knowledge of his day, in both of which polemics he had mainly to do with the Stoics.1 To prove the impossibility of knowledge he appeals sometimes to experience. There is no kind of conviction which does not sometimes deceive us; consequently there is none which guarantees its own truth.2 Going then further into the nature of our notions, he argues, that since notions consist in the change produced on the soul by impressions from with Cic. Tusc. v. 29, 82; N. D. ii. 65, 162; Plut. Garrul. 23; Augustin. c. Acad. iii. 17, 39. 2 Sext. 1. c.: Kal dǹ пρŵτos μèv αὐτῷ καὶ κοινὸς πρὸς πάντας ἐστὶ λόγος καθ' ὃν παρίσταται ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστιν ἁπλῶς ἀληθείας κριτήριον, οὐ λόγος οὐκ αἴσθησις οὐ φαντα 1 Sext. Math. vii. 159: Taûra Kai d'Apkeσlλaos. d de Kapveádns οὐ μόνον τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἀντιδιετάσσετο περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου. In Math. ix. 1, Sextus charges the School of Carneades with unnecessary diffuseness in discussing the fundamental principles of every sys-σία οὐκ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων· πάντα tem. The Stoics were, however, yàp таûτа ovλλýßdny diapeúdetai the chief object of its attack. Яuâs. out, they must, to be true, not only furnish information as to themselves, but also as to the objects causing them. Now, this is by no means always the case, many notions avowedly giving a false impression of things. Hence the note of truth cannot reside in an impression as such, but only in a true impression. It is, however, impossible to distinguish with certainty a true impression from one that is false. For independently of dreams, visions, and the fancies of madmen, in short from all the unfounded chimeras which force themselves on our notice under the guise of truth, it is still undeniable that many false notions resemble true ones most unmistakably. The transition, too, from truth to falsehood is so gradual, the interval between the two is occupied by intermediate links so innumerable, and gradations so slight, that they imperceptibly go over one into the other, and it becomes impossible to draw a boundary line between the two opposite spheres.3 Not content with proving this assertion in regard to the impressions of the senses, Carneades went on to 1 Sext. 1. c. 160–163. 2 Conf. Sext. vii. 403; Cic. Acad. ii. 15, 47; 28, 89-Carneades being undoubtedly meant, although not mentioned by name. According to Cic. Acad. ii. 13, 40; 26, 83, the Academic system of proof rests on the four following propositions: (1) that there are false notions; (2) that notions cannot be known, i.e. be recognised as true; (3) that of two indistinguishable notions, it is impossible to know the one and not the other; (4) that there CHAP. XXIII. CHAP. XXIII. prove it with regard to general notions based on experience and intellectual conceptions. He showed that it is impossible for us to distinguish objects so much alike as one egg is from another; that at a certain distance the painted surface seems raised, and a square tower seems round; that an oar in the water seems broken, and the neck-plumage of a pigeon assumes different colours in the sun; that objects on the shore seem to be moving as we sail by, and so forth; in all of which cases the same strength of conviction belongs to the false as to the true impressions.3 He showed further that this applies equally to purely intellectual ideas; that many logical difficulties cannot be solved; that no absolute distinction can be drawn between much and little, in short between all differences in quantity; and that it is the most natural course in all such cases to follow Chrysippus, and to avoid the dangerous inferences which may be drawn by withholding judgment. Arguing from these facts Carneades concluded at first in regard to impressions of the senses, that there is no such thing as pavraoía KaтаληπTIKη in the Stoic sense of the term, in other 5 1 Cic. Acad. ii. 13, 42: Dividunt enim in partes et eas quidem magnas: primum in sensus, deinde in ea, quæ ducuntur a sensibus et ab omni consuetudine, quam obscurari volunt, tunc perveniunt ad eam partem, ut ne ratione quidem et conjectura ulla res percipi possit. Hæc autem universa etiam concidunt minutius. 2 Sext. vii. 409; Cic. Acad. ii. 26, 84; 7, 19; 25, 79; Numen. 4 in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 5. 4 The fallacy called ψευδόμενος is carefully investigated by Cic. Acad. ii. 30, 95, as an instance in point. 5 Sext. 416; Cic. 1. c. 29, 92. Since Chrysippus attacked the chain-argument, it may be supposed that this fallacy had been used by Arcesilaus against the Stoics. |