CHAP. philosophy correspond each to some distinct virtue.1 Morality is the central point towards which all other inquiries converge: even natural science, although lauded as the inmost shrine of philosophy, is, according to Chrysippus, only necessary for the philosopher to enable him to distinguish between things good and evil, between what should be done, and what should be left undone. Far from approving of the pure speculation which Plato and Aristotle had commended as the height of human happiness, Chrysippus plainly asserted that to live for speculation is equivalent to living only for pleasure.3 With this view of Chrysippus most of the statements of the Stoics as to the relation of various branches of dom is the highest good for the See Diog. vii. 46: autǹy dè 2 Chrys. in Plut. Sto. Rep. 9, 6: δεῖ γὰρ τούτοις [se. τοῖς φυσικοῖς] συνάψαι τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον, οὐκ οὔσης ἄλλης ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν ἀμείνονος οὐδ ̓ ἀναφορᾶς, οὐδ ̓ ἄλλου τινὸς ἕνεκεν τῆς φυσικῆς θεωρίας παραληπτῆς οὔσης ἢ πρὸς τὴν περὶ ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν διά στασιν. 3 Chrys. in Plut. Sto. Rep. 3, 2: ὅσοι δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσι φιλοσόφοις ἐπιβάλλειν μάλιστα τὸν σχολαστικὸν βίον ἀπ ̓ ἀρχῆς, οὗτοί μοι δοκοῦσι διαμαρτάνειν ὑπονοοῦντες διαγωγής τινος ἕνεκεν δεῖν τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τούτῳ παραπλησίου, καὶ τὸν ὅλον βίον οὕτω πως διελκύσαι· τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν, ἂν σαφῶς θεωρηθῇ, ἡδέως. Διαγωγή had, it is true, been treated by Aristotle as an end in itself, and the reference here meant is to Aristotle; but Aristotle had carefully distinguished διαγωγή from ἡδονή. philosophy to each other agree, although there is a certain amount of vagueness about them, owing to reasons which will shortly be mentioned. Indeed, on no other hypothesis but that of a belief in the identity of philosophy and virtue can the internal structure and foundation of their system be satisfactorily explained. It is enough to remark here that the most important and most peculiar principles established by the Stoic School belong to the domain of ethics. In logic and natural science that School displays far less independence, for the most part following older teachers; and it is expressly noted, as a deviation from the ordinary teaching of the School, that Herillus, the pupil of Zeno, declared knowledge to be the highest good, thus raising knowledge rather than virtue to the chief rank in philosophy.' CHAP. tellectual A further illustration of this view of the business (2) Necesof philosophy is to be found in the Stoic doctrine of sity for invirtue. Philosophy should lead to right actions and knowledge. to virtue. But right action is, according to the 1 Cic. Acad. ii. 42, 129: Herillum, qui in cognitione et scientia summum bonum ponit: qui cum Zenonis auditor esset, vides quantum ab eo dissenserit, et quam non multum a Platone. Fin. ii. 13, 43: Herillus autem ad scientiam omnia revocans unum quoddam bonum vidit. iv. 14, 36: In determining the highest good, the Stoics act as one-sidedly, as if ipsius animi, ut fecit Herillus, cognitionem amplexarentur, actionem relinquerent. v. 25, 73: Sæpe ab Aristotele, a Theophrasto τέλος εἶπε τὴν ἐπιστήμην. CHAP. IV. Stoics, only rational action, and rational action is action which is in harmony with human and inanimate nature. Virtue consists therefore in bringing man's actions into harmony with the rest of the universe, and with the general order of the world. In order to render this possible, man must know the order and law of the universe; and thus the Stoics are brought back to the principles of Socrates, maintaining that virtue may be learnt; that knowledge is indispensable for virtue, or rather that virtue is identical with right knowledge. They define virtue in so many words as knowledge, vice as ignorance. If sometimes they seem to identify virtue with strength of will, it is only because they consider strength of will to be inseparable from knowledge, so that the one cannot be conceived of without the other. practical conceptions of the business of philosophy conducts us of itself to its intellectual aspect; philosophy being not only virtue, but all virtue being impossible without philosophy. The attainment of virtue, and the happiness of a moral life are the chief ends which the Stoics propose to themselves; but the (a) Aristo's possession of a comprehensive scientific knowledge is the only, and yet an indispensable, means thereto. (3) Position towards logic and natural science. views. The From these remarks it is clear that the Stoics regarded that kind of scientific knowledge as more immediately necessary which has to do with life, the morals, and the actions of mankind. As to the ne 1 Sen. Ep. 89, 8: Nam nec philosophia sine virtute est nec sine philosophia virtus. Ibid. 53, 8: We all lie in the slumber of error: sola autem nos philosophia excitabit... illi te totum dedica. 3 cessity of further scientific knowledge in addition to ethics, the earliest adherents of the Stoic teaching expressed different opinions. Zeno's pupil, Aristo of Chios, held that the sole business of man is to pursue virtue,' and that the sole object of speech is to purify the soul. This purifying process, however, is neither to be found in logical subtleties nor in natural science. Logic, as doing more harm than good, he compared to a spider's web, which is as useless as it is curious; or else to the mud on a road. Those who studied it he likened to people eating lobsters, who take a great deal of trouble for the sake of a little bit of meat enveloped in much shell. Convinced, too, that the wise man is free from every deceptive infatuation; and that doubt, for the purpose of refuting which logic had been invented, can be more easily overcome by a healthy tone of mind, than by argument, he felt no particular necessity for logic. Nay, more, he considered that excessive subtlety transforms the healthy action of philosophy into an unhealthy one. Just as little was Aristo disposed to favour the so-called encyclical knowledge: those who devote themselves to this 6 5 Ibid. 7. Diog. vii. 162: μáλioтa dè προσείχε Στωϊκῷ δόγματι τῷ τὸν σόφον ἀδόξαστον εἶναι. See Diog. vii. 163. 8 Aristo (in the 'Oμoiάμara) in Stob. Floril. 82, 16: ὁ ἐλλέβορος ὁλοσχερέστερος μὲν ληφθεὶς καθ aípei, eis de mávy σμikpà тρipleis πνίγει· οὕτω καὶ ἡ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λεπτολογία. CHAP. IV. СНАР. knowledge instead of to philosophy he compared to the suitors of Penelope, who won the maids but not the mistress. Natural science would probably have received a more favourable treatment at the hands of Aristo, had he not shared the opinion of Socrates, that it is a branch of knowledge which transcends the capacity of the human mind ;2 and having once embraced this notion, he was inclined to pronounce all physical inquiries useless. His attitude towards science has therefore been generally expressed by saying that he excluded from philosophy both logic and natural science, on the ground that both are useless; the former being irrelevant, and the latter transcending our powers. Even ethics was limited by Aristo to most fundamental notions-to inquiries as to good and evil, as to virtue and vice, as to wisdom and folly. The special application of these notions to the moral problems suggested by particular relations in life, he declared to be useless and futile; proper for nursemaids and trainers of young children, but not becoming for philosophers :4 1 Stob. 4, 110. * Cie. Acad. ii. 89, 123: Aristo Chius, qui nihil istorum (se. physicorum) sciri putat posse. * Dig, vìì. 160: Toy ɗe Quơixòy rómór xal rdr Aoyunda ärripei, deyar ròr pèr elvai drèp Huas, Tèr d' oidèr æpès Huâs, moror de rdy joindr elvai rods Huas. Stob. Floril. 80, 7: "Anerar kon raw Gerocurvas wapd reis eclarapOLS τὰ μὲν εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, τὰ δὲ μηδέν τοὺς ἡμεῖς, τὰ δ' ὑπὲρ ἡμεῖς, προς taas mer rd gebed, að mods tuas δὲ τὰ διαλεκτικά· μὴ γὰρ συμβάλο λεσθαι πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν βίου· drip huâs dè rà quoiká · àduvara γὰρ ἐγνώσθαι καὶ οὐδὲ παρέχειν Xpelar. Minue. Fel. Octav. 13, and Lactant. Inst. iii. 20, attribute this utterance to Socrates. According to Cic. De Nat. De., Aristo expressed doubts about the existence of a God. • Set. Math. vii. 13: al 'Apiστην δὲ ὁ Χίως οὐ μόνον, ὡς φασι, παρητείτο τήν τε φυσικὴν καὶ λογι in dewplar did rò drwpelès xal |