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wherever there is a proper knowledge and a right disposition, such particular applications will come of themselves without teaching; but when these are wanting, all exhortations are useless.1

CHAP.

IV.

and Cle

These views are mentioned as peculiar to Aristo, (b) Views and as points in which he differed from the rest of of Zeno his School; and, to judge from Aristo's controversial anthes. tone, the opposite views were those almost universally entertained by Stoics. That controversial tone, in fact, appears to have been directed not only against assailants from without-such as the Peripatetics and Platonists-but far more against those members of the Stoic School, who attached greater importance than he did to the application of moral maxims to particular relations in life, and to logical and

πρὸς κακοῦ τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσιν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ τόπου τινὰς συμπεριέγραψε καθάπερ τόν τε παραινετικὸν καὶ τὸν ὑποθετικὸν τόπον· τούτους γὰρ εἰς τίτθας ἂν καὶ παιδαγωγοὺς πίπτειν (almost a literal translation is given of these words by Seneca, Ep. 89, 13)—àрkéîola dè τрòs тò μакарíws βιῶναι τὸν οἰκειοῦντα μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν λόγον, ἀπαλλοτριοῦντα δὲ και κίας, κατατρέχοντα δὲ τῶν μεταξύ τούτων, περὶ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ πτοηθέντες Kakodaiμovovoi. Seneca, Ep. 94, 1: Eam partem philosophiæ, quæ dat propria cuique personæ præcepta. quidam solam receperunt. sed Ariston Stoicus è contrario hanc partem levem existimat et quæ non descendat in pectus usque; ad illam habentem præcepta [? ad vitam beatam] plurimum ait proficere ipsa de

...

creta philosophiæ constitutionem-
que summi boni, quam qui bene
intellexit ac didicit, quid in qua-
que re faciendum sit, sibi ipse
præcepit.

1 Seneca, § 12, asks for whom
should such exhortations be ne-
cessary for him who has right
views of good and evil, or for him
who has them not? Qui non
habet, nihil a te adjuvabitur;
aures ejus contraria monitionibus
tuis fama possedit; qui habet
exactum judicium de fugiendis
petendisque, scit, quid sibi facien-
dum sit, etiam te tacente; tota
ergo pars ista philosophia sub-
moveri potest. In § 17, he con-
tinues: A madman must be cured,
and not exhorted; nor is there
any difference between general
madness and the madness which
is treated medically.

CHAP.

IV.

physical inquiries. Among their number must have been Zeno and Cleanthes; for had not Zeno set the example to his School of dividing philosophy into logic, ethics, and natural science? Do not the titles of his logical and physical treatises 2 prove this fact; as also statements in reference to theoretical knowledge and natural science which are expressly attributed to him? Moreover, Zeno himself recommended to others, and himself pursued, logical inquiries.3 Indeed, his whole mental habit, with its keen appreciation of even the subtleties of the Megarians, bears testimony to an intellectual line of thought which is far removed from that of Aristo.1 It was, moreover, Zeno who chose that dry and unadorned logical way of giving his teaching, which is found in its greatest perfection in Chrysippus.5 Logical and scientific treatises are also known to have been written by Cleanthes, who allotted separate

1 Diog. vii. 39.

2 Logical treatises, those rep λέξεων, λύσεις καὶ ἔλεγχοι, περὶ λόγου-physical treatises, those περὶ ὅλου and περὶ οὐσίας.

3 Plut. Sto. Rep. 8, 2: Ave dè σοφίσματα καὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν, ὡς τοῦτο ποιεῖν δυναμένην, ἐκέλευε παραλαμβάνειν τοὺς μαθητάς.

According to Diog. 32, he declared the ἐγκύκλιος παίδεια το be useless-a testimony worth very little; for it is a moot point, in what sense Zeno made this statement. Perhaps he was only anxious to exclude those studies from the narrower sphere of philosophy.

Proofs will be given later.

6

• The Catalogue in Diog. 174, mentions logical treatises repl λόγου, περὶ ἐπιστήμης, περὶ ἰδίων, περὶ τῶν ἀπόρων, περὶ διαλεκτικῆς, περὶ κατηγορημάτων. To these may be added, from Athen. 467, d; 471, b, the rhetorical treatises περὶ τρόπων and περὶ μεταλήψεως. Of greater importance were the physical and theological treatises: περὶ τῆς τοῦ Ζήνωνος φυσιολογίας (2, B.); Twv 'Нpakλelтov è§nYŃσELS (4, B.); πpòs Anμókρitov, πepl

eŵr, Tepl uavтIKîs (Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6); Tepl yıɣávrov (in Plut. De Flum. 5, 3); and the μvià (Athen. xiii. 572, e), which is probably identical with the apχαιολογία of Diogenes.

parts to logic, to rhetoric, and to natural science, in his division of philosophy. The name of Cleanthes is one otherwise of frequent occurrence in discussing the natural science, but more particularly the theology, of the Stoics. Still more exhaustive inquiries into logic and natural science appear to have been set on foot by Sphærus; all proving that the energies of the Stoic School must have been directed to this subject before the time of Chrysippus, although these branches of science were no doubt subservient to ethics, and ethics held the most important and highest place in their philosophy. At a later time, when Chrysippus had expanded the system of the Stoics in every direction, especial attention was devoted to logic; and the necessity for logic and natural science came to be generally recognised. More especially was this the case with regard to natural science, including theology.' All ethical inquiries must start, according to Chrysippus, with considering the universal order and arrangement of the world. Only by a study of nature, and of what God is, can anything really satisfactory be stated about good and evil, and other kindred topics.2

1 Diog. vii. 178, mentions (1) logical and rhetorical writings: περὶ τῶν Ἐρετρικῶν φιλοσόφων, περὶ ὁμοίων, περὶ ὅρων, περὶ ἕξεως, περὶ τῶν ἀντιλεγομένων (3, Β), περὶ λόγου, τέχνη διαλεκτική (2, Β), περὶ κατηγορημάτων, περὶ ἀμφιβολιών; (2) treatises on science: περὶ κόσμου (2, Β), περὶ στοιχείων, περὶ σπέρματος, περὶ τύχης, περὶ ἐλαχίστων, πρὸς τὰς ἀτόμους καὶ

τὰ εἴδωλα, περὶ αἰσθητηρίων, περὶ
Ἡρακλείτου (5, Β), περὶ μαντικῆς.

2 Chrys. in the 3rd B, wepì
θεῶν (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 9, 4): οὐ
γάρ ἐστιν εὑρεῖν τῆς δικαιοσύνης
ἄλλην ἀρχὴν οὐδ ̓ ἄλλην γένεσιν ἢ
τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῆς
κοινῆς φύσεως· ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ δεῖ
πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχειν,
εἰ μέλλομέν τι ἐρεῖν περὶ ἀγαθῶν
καὶ κακῶν. The same writer, in

CHAP.

IV.

CHAP.

IV.

The connection between logic and the real aim of all philosophical inquiry is less obvious. Logic is compared by the Stoics to the shell of an egg, or to the wall of a city or garden; and is considered to be of importance, because it contributes towards the discovery of truth and the avoiding of error.2 The value attached to logic was, therefore, due to its scientific method; logic, according to them, being limited to the art of technical reasoning; and thus, following Aristotle, an unusually full treatment was allowed by the Stoics to the theory of the syllogism.3 That the value must have been considerable is proved by the extraordinary care which Chrysippus devoted to the subject;4 hence, the Stoics would

φυσικαὶ θέσεις (Ibid. 5): οὐ γὰρ
ἐστιν ἄλλως οὐδ ̓ οἰκειότερον ἐπελ-
θεῖν ἐπὶ τὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν
λόγον οὐδ ̓ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς οὐδ ̓ ἐπὶ
εὐδαιμονίαν, ἀλλ ̓ ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς
φύσεως καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου
διοικήσεως.

1 Sert, Math. vii. 17 ; Diog. 40.
2 The chief divisions of the
logic of the Stoics (Diog. 42,
46) are considered important for
special purposes. The doctrine
περὶ κανόνων καὶ κριτηρίων is of
use, helping us to truth, by
making us examine our notions;
δρικόν, because it led to the
knowledge of things by means
of conceptions; διαλεκτική (which
includes the whole of formal
logie), because it produced ἀπρο-
πτωσία ( = ἐπιστήμη τοῦ πότε δεῖ
συγκατατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ), ἀνεικαιό-
της (= ἰσχυρὸς λόγος πρὸς τὸ
εἰκὸς, ὥστε μὴ ἐνδιδόναι αὐτῷ),
ἀνελεγξία ( = ἰσχὺς ἐν λόγῳ, ὥστε

μὴ ἀπάγεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἀντι-
κείμενον), ἀματαιότης (= ἕξις ἀνα-
φέρουσα τὰς φαντασίας ἐπὶ τὸν
ὀρθὸν λόγον). Its value was
therefore chiefly negative, pre-
serving from error. See Seneca,
Ep. 89, 9: Proprietates verborum
exigit et structuram et argumen-
tationes, ne pro vero falsa sub-
repant.
Sert. Math. vii. 23:
ὀχυρωτικὸν δὲ εἶναι τῆς διανοίας
τὸν διαλεκτικὸν τόπον; Pyrrh. ii.
247: ἐπὶ τὴν τέχνην τὴν διαλεκ
τικὴν φασὶν ὡρμηκέναι οἱ διαλεκ
τικοὶ (the Stoics), οὐχ ἁπλῶς ὑπὲρ
τοῦ γνῶναί τι ἐκ τίνος συνάγεται,
ἀλλὰ προηγουμένως ὑπὲρ τοῦ δι'
ἀποδεικτικών λόγων τὰ ἀληθῆ καὶ
τὰ ψευδῆ κρίνειν ἐπίστασθαι.

• This may be seen in Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 134203, 229; Math. viii. 300; as well as from the catalogue of the writings of Chrysippus in Diogenes.

The only part which incurs

never allow, in dispute with the Peripatetics, that logic was only an instrument, and not a part of philosophy. To later writers the rigid logical mode of treating subjects regardless of all beauty of language appeared to be a peculiarity of the Stoic school,' and hence that school was characteristically known as the School of the Reasoners.2 Frequent instances will be found hereafter of the Stoic preference for dry argument and formal logic;3 in Chrysippus this fondness degenerated to a dry formalism devoid of

taste.

4

CHAP.

IV.

The foregoing remarks have already established C. Divithe three main divisions of philosophy which were philosophy. sions of universally acknowledged by the Stoics - Logic,

the blame of Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 10, 1) is the sceptical logic, which leaves contradictions unsolved: roîs μèv γὰρ ἐποχὴν ἄγουσι περὶ πάντων ἐπιβάλλει, φησὶ, τοῦτο ποιεῖν, καὶ συνεργόν ἐστι πρὸς ὁ βούλονται· Tois d' ETLOTHμηv éveрyaŠoμévois, καθ ̓ ἣν ὁμολογουμένως κιωσόμεθα τὰ ἐναντία στοιχειοῦν.

1 Cic. Parad. Procem.: Cato autem perfectus mea sententia Stoicus... in ea est hæresi, quæ nullum sequitur florem orationis neque dilatat argumentum: minutis interrogatiunculis, quasi punctis, quod proposuit efficit. Cic. Fin. iv. 3, 7: Pungunt quasi aculeis interrogatiunculis angustis, quibus etiam qui assentiuntur nihil commutantur animo. See also Diog. vii. 18, 20.

2 In Sextus Empiricus, ΔιαλεκTIKO is their ordinary name. It is also found in Plut. Qu. Plat.

F

5.

x. 1, 2. Cic. Top. 2, 6; Fin. iv.
3, 6.

3 After the example of the
Megarians, the Stoics were in the
habit of couching their arguments
in the form of a question. Hence
the terms λόγον ἐρωτῶν (Diog.
vii. 186), interrogatio (Sen. Ep.
82, 9; 85, 1; 87, 11), interro-
gatiuncula (Cic.), which are em-
ployed even when their arguments
were not in this form.

4 Called μέρη, τόποι, εἴδη, γένη. * Diog. 39 : τριμερῆ φασιν εἶναι τὴν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγον· εἶναι γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸ μέν τι φυσικὸν, τὸ δὲ ἠθικὸν, τὸ δὲ λογικόν. οὕτω δὲ πρῶτος διεῖλε Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεὺς ἐν τῷ περὶ λόγου καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ αἱ περὶ λόγου καὶ ἐν τῇ α' τῶν φυσικῶν, καὶ ̓Απολλόδωρος δ Ἔφιλλος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν εἰς τὰ δόγματα εἰσαγωγῶν, καὶ Εὔδρομος ἐν τῇ ἠθικῇ στοιχειώσει, καὶ Διογένης ὁ Βαβυλώνιος, καὶ Ποσειδώ

(1) Threefold divi

sion.

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