term for which he was hired, did not lose his right to recover for the unexpired portion of the term by failing to make reports for such unexpired portion, as naturally there was nothing to report for such period, as the school was not in session. Rudy v. School Dist. (1888) 30 Mo. App. 113. And see, also, Scott v. School Dist. (1874) 46 Vt. 452, holding that although by statute teachers were required to submit a register at the close of the school term, if the school committee, by his own conduct, and without the fault of the teacher, prevented the close of the term being reached by her, the failure to submit such a register would not prevent the recovery of her wages. But, in Hall v. School Dist. (1887) 24 Mo. App. 213, where a schoolhouse was burned down before the expira tion of the school month, the schoolteacher could not recover for the period taught by him, for the reason, inter alia, that he failed to make out the monthly report required by statute at the expiration of the month. The court in Rudy v. School Dist. (Mo.) supra, in distinguishing between its decision and that of Hall v. School Dist. says: "That case is on its facts distinguished from this, in that, there the contract was terminated by a casualty of such a nature that its performance became impossible; while here it was terminated by the defendant acting through its directors. The defendant could not render the making of these monthly reports nugatory and absurd, and then insist that the plaintiff should not recover his salary because he had not made them." R. P. D. R. T. BENTSON, Admr., etc., of Victor Bentson, Deceased, Appt., V. BEN C. BROWN,. Respt. Wisconsin Supreme Court - April 7, 1925. (186 Wis. 629, 203 N. W. 380.) Automobiles, § 44 — operation in violation of statute — gross negligence. 1. Although one who causes injury to another in operating an automobile in violation of statute is negligent per se, he is not necessarily guilty of gross negligence which will make unavailing the defense of contributory negligence. [See note on this question beginning on page 1424.] Pleading, § 329-gross negligence sufficiency. 2. Gross negligence is not charged in a complaint to recover damages for wrongful death by an allegation that defendant's acts were reckless, negligent, and unlawful. Negligence, § 8 — gross what is. 3. To constitute gross negligence, there must be either a wilful intent to injure, or that reckless and wanton disregard of the rights and safety of another or of his property, and that willingness to inflict injury, which the law deems equivalent to an intent to injure. [See 20 R. C. L. 23; 3 R. C. L. Supp. 1019; 4 R. C. L. Supp. 1325.] re Pleading, § 109 negligence covery for gross negligence. 4. There can be no recovery on the ground of gross negligence where the complaint charges only ordinary negligence or want of ordinary care, and the cause is tried on that theory. [See 20 R. C. L. 23, 24.] Appeal, § 668 - refusal to disturb verdict for defendant. 9. The rule that the appellate court will not disturb a verdict supported by credible evidence, which has been sustained by the trial court, unless it is clearly wrong, applies in favor of defendant as well as of plaintiff. Appeal, § 853 instruction as to minority verdict error. - 10. Under a statute providing that a verdict, finding, or answer agreed to by five sixths of the jurors shall be the verdict, finding, or answer of the jury, an instruction that "the result of this law is that if any ten or more of your number agree, you may answer any question submitted to you and return a verdict accordingly, ... but until ten or more of your number are agreed upon the answer that should be made to each question submitted, you cannot answer the question." is reversible error. Appeal, § 818 erroneous instruction nonprejudicial error. 11. Where the jury indicates that the verdict was that of each of them, it will be presumed that it was unanimous, and, therefore, an erroneous instruction permitting a verdict by less than the whole under erroneous circumstances is nonprejudicial. (Crownhart, J., dissents.) APPEAL by plaintiff from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Vernon County (Smalley, J.) in favor of defendant in an action brought to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's grandson, alleged to have been caused by defendant's negligence. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Messrs. Graves & Gulbrandsen for appellant. Messrs. C. J. Smith and Lines, Spooner, & Quarles, for respondent: There was no gross negligence as a matter of law. Jorgenson v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 153 Wis. 108, 140 N. W. 1088; Willard v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 150 Wis. 234, 136 N. W. 646; Wilson v. Chippewa Valley Electric R. Co. 120 Wis. 636, 66 L.R.A. 912, 98 N. W. 536; McClellan v. Chippewa Valley Electric R. Co. 110 Wis. 326, 85 N. W. 1018; Turtenwald v. Wisconsin Lakes Ice & Cartage Co. 121 Wis. 65, 98 N. W. 948; Haverlund v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. 143 Wis. 415, 128 N. W. 273; Riggles v. Priest, 163 Wis. 199, 157 N. W. 755; Clemens v. State, 176 Wis. 289, 21 A.L.R. 1490, 185 N. W. 209; Ludke v. Burck, 160 Wis. 440, L.R.A.1915D, 968, 152 N. W. 190; Pinoza v. Northern Chair Co. 152 Wis. 473, 140 N. W. 84: Brown v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 109 Wis. 384, 85 N. W. 271, 9 Am. Neg. Rep. 403. The verdict cannot be attacked. Dick v. Heisler, 184 Wis. 77, 198 N. W. 734; Kosak v. Boyce, 185 Wis. 513. 201 N. W. 757. Jones, J., delivered the opinion of the court: This is an action for damages for the loss of life of Victor, who was twelve and one-half years old and the grandson of the plaintiff. The defendant was driving southwest on state trunk highway No. 27, en route to his home in Viroqua, and (186 Wis. 629, 203 N. W. 380.) accident, stated that they heard someone call out that a car was coming, though they did not know who had done so; that at the time this statement was made the deceased was already at the edge of the road. Most of the witnesses state that the car was going "fast," or "as fast as some of them go." The jury found that the defendant had violated certain highway rules which constituted negligence, and that this negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. They also found that the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence, and on this verdict. the court entered judgment for the defendant. was approaching a turn on the road schoolyard, and who witnessed the in front of the Round Prairie schoolhouse. According to the testimony of the defendant and the person riding with him, the defendant was driving at the rate of about 25 miles an hour, but as he approached the turn he slowed down to about 20 miles an hour. The schoolhouse in question faces south down the road on which the defendant was about to turn and at this particular time, about noon on the 7th day of November, 1923, the children were just emerging from the schoolhouse. The deceased and three other boys came out of the schoolhouse and started to run to their ball field which was across the road in a southeasterly direction from the schoolhouse. The defendant saw the boys coming toward him when they were some distance away, but as he proceeded to turn to the south they left his line of vision, which was slightly obstructed by the passenger who was seated upon his right. The defendant testified that while making the turn he was watching the road, and when the turn was almost completed suddenly perceived the deceased in front of the moving car, and that before he could more than put on the brake the car struck the boy, and he was dead when the car stopped 65 feet further on. The testimony of the boys who accompanied the deceased was to the effect that one of them said that he would beat the deceased to the ball field, and that they all started running; that as they started across the road some one of them shouted, "There comes a car," though the nearest boy to the deceased swore that he did not hear this statement; that the companions of the deceased stopped at once by throwing themselves on the ground or catching the guy wire of a near-by telephone pole, but that the deceased, who was ahead, continued across the macadamized road and was struck by the approaching car while in the middle of the roadway. Several girls who were sitting under a tree in the There is discussion in both briefs relating to the negligence of the defendant. In the argument of counsel for the plaintiff, especial stress is laid on the fact that Victor was dragged 65 feet, and it is claimed that the car must have been driven faster than 20 miles per hour when the accident occurred. Much reliance is placed on the fact that the defendant failed to pass to the right of the center of the intersection, and on the claim that he failed to keep a proper lookout and violated the statute regulating the speed of a vehicle passing school grounds. The jury found that he failed to pass to the right of the center of the intersection; that he failed to properly reduce the speed; that he failed to use ordinary care in keeping a proper lookout, and that he failed to sound the horn as he approached the intersection. There was undoubtedly sufficient evidence to support these several findings, and it becomes unnecessary to state or discuss in detail the evidence which tended to show the defendant's negligence. fendant's negligence. The claim is made, although not much argued in the brief, that gross negligence was proven, and that for that reason contributory negligence was no defense. But there are several answers to this claim. There was no allegation of gross negligence in the complaint, and the case was tried on Pleadinggross negligence-sufilcieny. the theory of ordinary negligence. This appears not only from the pleadings, but from the special verdict, and from the requests made by the plaintiff as to the form of the special verdict and for instructions. The only words in the complaint which could be construed to hint toward gross negligence were "reckless, negligent, and unlawful," which were used to characterize the conduct of the defendant. There is no language charging that the acts complained of were wilful or wanton or intentional. It cannot be said that there are any averments in the pleadings showing such wilful or intentional disregard of the rights or safety of others as is necessary to constitute gross negligence. "It is "It is the settled law of this state that in order to constitute gross negligence gross-what is. there must be either Negligence- a wilful intent to injure, or that reckless and wanton disregard of the rights and safety of another or of his property, and that willingness to inflict injury, which the law deems equivalent to an intent to injure." Willard v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 150 Wis. 234, 136 N. W. 646; Gould v. Merrill R. & Lighting Co. 139 Wis. 433, 121 N. W. 161; Lemma v. Searle, 153 Wis. 24, 140 Ń. W. 65. Pleadingnegligence-re negligence. It has been several times held by this court that, where the complaint charges only ordinary negligence or want of ordinary care, and the case is covery for gross tried on that theory, there can be no recovery on the ground of gross negligence; that there is an essential difference between the two causes of action, and that the defendant is entitled to know the nature of the cause of action relied on. Lemma v. Searle, supra; Astin v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 143 Wis. 477, 31 L.R.A. (N.S.) 158, 128 N. W. 265; Turtenwald v. Wisconsin Lakes Ice & Cartage Co. 121 Wis. 65, 98 N. W. 948; Wilson v. Chippewa Valley Electric R. Co. 120 Wis. 636, 66 L.R.A. 912, 98 N. W. 536; McClellan v. Chippewa Valley Electric R. Co. 110 Wis. 326, 85 N. W. 1018. Moreover, it should be said that, although it is settled that the defendant violated the statutes in several respects, his emotion and conduct after the accident were quite inconsistent with any theory of wilfulness or intentional wrongdoing. It is contended by the counsel for the plaintiff that the operation of the automobile by the defendant was in such flagrant disregard of law as to make the automobile of the defendant a dangerous machine. The inference sought to be drawn is this: That, when an automobile is driven carelessly and in violation of a statute or statutes, it is to be classed as a dangerous instrumentality; that, as in the case of dynamite and firearms, such use in violation of a statute is to be regarded as gross negligence, depriving the wrongdoer of the defense of contributory negligence, under the rule declared in Pizzo v. Wiemann, 149 Wis. 235, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 678, 134 N. W. 899, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 803, 3 N. C. C. A. 149. But it is too well settled in this state to call for discussion that automobiles are not to be so classed. Hopkins v. Droppers, 184 Wis. 400, 36 A.L.R. 1156, 198 N. W. 738, 23 N. C. C. A. 993; Crossett v. Goelzer, 177 Wis. 455, 188 N. W. 627; Steffen v. McNaughton, 142 Wis. 49, 26 L.R.A. (N.S.) 382, 124 N. W. 1016, 19 Ann. Cas. 1227. It is also well settled that, when one operates an automobile in violation of a statute causing injury to another, the act is negligence per se, but not necessa operation in vio➡gross negligence. rily gross negli- Automobilesgence, that unless lation of statute gross negligence is established, the defense of contributory negligence is available. Hopkins v. Droppers, supra; Ludke v. Burck, 160 Wis. 440, L.R.A.1915D, 968, 152 N. W. 190. We all know of the shocking loss of life which is daily caused by the use of motor vehicles by careless and incompetent drivers. We also (186 Wis. 629, 203 N. W. 380.) know how greatly such vehicles contribute to human comfort and human welfare when they are properly managed. Of course, they may be so managed as to subject the operator to the consequences of his gross negligence. But considering the numerous provisions in the statutes regulating the use of automobiles, and the manner in which even careful persons use them, it would be a harsh and unpractical rule that should attempt to impose on the driver or owner violating one of the provisions, the heavy burdens consequent to gross negligence. In the present case several provisions of the statutes were violated, but that is not unusual, since, in most of the cases which automobile collision come before us, several violations are alleged in the complaint. In the oral argument and in the brief, counsel for the plaintiff have argued with all the earnestness and ability which the tragic occurrence would naturally inspire, that the finding of the jury as to contributory negligence should have been set aside. It is argued that Victor did not see the approaching car. There is no direct evidence that he did, but three of the boys who were running with him saw it and avoided any collisions, as above stated. The boy Thorkelson, as they were running, said to Victor, "I. will beat you," The same boy shouted "There comes a car." This was heard by two of the boys. Three girls who were sitting in the school grounds under a tree also heard this exclamation and saw the car approaching. Victor was a bright, active boy of a little more than usual height, who had attended the school for four years, and knew that the highway was a much traveled road, and of course knew the danger incident to crossing it without looking for passing cars. It is true, as claimed by the plaintiff's counsel, that the "look and listen" doctrine which is applied to persons approaching a railway track is not extended to persons who are using a city street in which ordi nary street traffic is going on. -highway crossing-duty of pedestrian to ob serve automobile. Under the testimony, the jury may have believed, and had the right to believe, either that Victor did not look, or that he saw the approaching car, and continued his race hoping to pass it safely. In either case it was for the jury to say gence in passwhether he was in the exercise of ordinary care. Trial-question for jury-negli ing in front of automobile. What is ordinary care depends on the attending circumIn this case the jury stances. were told that it meant such care as ordinarily prudent and careful children, of the same age, intelligence, and experience as Victor Bentson had on that day, ordinarily would exercise under the same or similar circumstances, and that it was his duty to exercise that amount of care to avoid injury. They were also told that, on the question of contributory negligence, the burden of proof was on the defendant to satisfy them to a reasonable certainty by the preponderance of the evidence. Counsel for the plaintiff argue that Victor was confronted by such an emergency that he could not act with deliberation, and therefore could not be held responsible for not choosing the best means of escape from danger. It is undoubtedly true that, when one is required to act suddenly and in the face of imminent danger, he is not required to act with the same care as if he had full opportunity to exercise his reasoning faculties. But this rule has |