trol of the Committee on Ways and Means, a tariff bill, leaning at all events toward reform, might be passed. The reform measure which was proposed by Representative Morrison in 1883 found forty-one Democratic votes solidly against it in the House when it came to a vote during the following year. But, as will presently be seen, the drift of events was such as to force a tariff reform policy upon the Democratic party. The forty-one who had opposed tariff reform in 1884 dwindled to thirty-six in 1886, and by the end of that year had fallen to twenty-six. In 1888 there were only eight Democrats who voted against the Mills bill and before the close of the decade there was scarcely a Democrat who would have ventured to vote with the Republicans on a protectionist measure in the House of Representatives. In the Senate somewhat the same conditions had been produced, although the change had not gone so far as in the House. This development must, it would seem, be largely attributed to the work done by President Cleveland and to his influence in building up a party upon whom he could depend and which would accept tariff reform as the leading issue of the day.1

There were several reasons why a revision of the tariff was necessary in 1883. As often happens, the period of currency discussion, which was immediately produced by the bad Treasury and banking conditions prevailing after 1873, and which was followed by the measures for resumption and other 'changes, was succeeded by a period of trade expansion which almost necessarily developed a tariff discussion. Among other circumstances which immediately tended to excite interest in the subject was the great increase in Treasury receipts from customs. The average surplus was more than $100,000,000 annually for the next few years after the resumption of specie payments in 1879. As usual, it was necessary to reduce revenue by a reduction of the tariff. The time was, moreover,

1 For a review of the decade 1880-1890 as regards tariff, see Henry Loomis Nelson in Forum, Vol. 18, Nov., 1894, "William L. Wilson as Tariff Reformer."

apparently favorable for the process known as "revision of the tariff by its friends." A strong protectionist majority was in control of Congress and there was no reason to fear that any free trade ideas would be allowed to creep into the revision. The act of 1882 was therefore a sufficiently safe step for the Republicans. It provided for the appointment of a tariff commission which should recommend desirable changes for consideration at the next session of Congress. The Commission was chiefly composed of high protectionists, but when Congress met in December, 1882, there seemed to be little or no chance of the passage of any measure. The House could not agree upon a tariff bill and it was only through the action of the Senate in amending an internal revenue reduction measure, by the addition of the recommendations of the tariff commission in a modified form, that the tariff question was again brought before the House. Protectionists in the House, however, were not satisfied with the work of their own tariff commission, and the measure sent back by the Senate was referred to a conference committee which raised many of the duties and finally left the act much more nearly in harmony with the existing schedules than it had been when passed by the Senate. This bill was finally forced through both houses by a strict party vote. It really produced but a very slight change in the protective duties. The tariff on steel rails was materially cut, but only because the new schedule, owing to the fall in the price of steel, was still practically prohibitive. Some changes in wool and woolen goods had taken place, the tariff on the former article receiving a genuine reduction; but, all, in all, the tariff act of 1883 contained no consistent principle and was animated by no real desire to give up the policy of protection, even where it was no longer needed. It was, in fact, simply a concession to the general feeling that the tariff needed revision. About as much was gained in very many of the duties as was lost by others. In short, the agitation had been without substantial result. As Mr. Hayes, who was

President of the Tariff Commission and who had been an important figure in the legislative manoeuvers leading to the passage of the act, remarked:

"It was a concession to public sentiment, a bending of the top and branches to the wind of public opinion to save the trunk of the protective system. In a word, the object was protection through reduction. We were willing to concede only to save the essentials * We wanted the tariff to be made by our friends."

From this outline of events, it can readily be understood that the act of 1883 was not likely to yield much satisfaction to those manufacturers who wished to see our export trade developed. It was being recognized more and more that we could not hope to shut our markets to all the world and yet have other countries continue willing to trade with us. Some concessions must necessarily be made if we were to gain openings for our products abroad. Foreign countries had for some time shown extreme dissatisfaction with our tariff policy, and had taken more or less direct steps toward discrimination against us. The free trade period in Europe had come to an end and the era of tariff warfare had fully set in. Our merchants were realizing this fact. They were beginning to see, also, that our tremendous natural resources must inevitably enable us to produce upon such a great scale that we would be compelled to seek for trade opportunities outside our own market. However, we were not as yet in a position to compete actively with foreign manufacturers upon equal terms. This fact naturally gave increased strength to the idea of purchasing openings for our goods abroad by making corresponding concessions to certain kinds of goods when admitted to our markets.

Another force was at work tending to stimulate the demand for some effort designed to bring us into closer trade relations with foreign countries. This was the situation of the agricultural interests. There had been a sharp rise of general prices, in 1880 and the succeeding years, in consequence of the

general improvement in business conditions and the stronger demand for our goods. The increase led to higher expenses of production for the farmer without materially assisting him in marketing his product. It seemed as if some concessions to the agricultural interests ought to be made, by finding new openings for the products of our farms abroad and thus raising prices to correspond with those of manufacturers. This, of course, stimulated the wish to secure reciprocal trade arrangements with foreign countries, and by that means to open a market to our manufacturers under exceptionally favorable conditions, while also offering at least a nominal field to our farm products. Such a policy had an attractive sound and speedily attained a certain popularity throughout the country. It was well received by politicians because it held out the promise of a lengthy period of investigation with no action for a long time to come and no definite results at the end. The kind of reciprocity to be adopted, the nature of the agreements to be made, being left vague, it was clear that the reciprocity idea committed them to nothing in particular. It would always be possible to reject any given reciprocity treaty on the ground that it was unfair to us. None of the protected interests had anything to say against the general principle and they saw that it would be high time to offer objections to any particular agreement that might be proposed, when that agreement should become a question of immediate importance.

It was evident at the start, therefore, that either one of two kinds of reciprocity might be pursued as a policy. We might arrange for reciprocity in manufactured goods or for reciprocity in agricultural products; or, on the other hand, we might enter into such agreements with foreign countries as would permit us to exchange our manufactured goods against their agricultural products or our products of agriculture against the output of their factories. was also clear that the choice between these kinds of reciprocity and the selection of one which would actually

It

be pursued as a policy must not merely depend upon the stipulation of a treaty agreement, but also upon the nature of our commercial relations with the country in question. For example, it would be possible for us to conclude a treaty of reciprocity with such a country as Germany, whereby we should provide for the free entry of both manufactured and agricultural products into this country in exchange for similar treatment of our goods by our competitor. Yet, in this case, it would not be reasonable to expect that we should import cereals from Germany. We should continue to send them our grain and they would continue to send us their manufactures. Reciprocity, in other words, cannot, as was seen, ordinarily change the course of international trade save in very limited respects; it can at most only promote its progress along the lines which it has marked out for itself. In our experience with Canada, we had tried to see what could be done in the exchange of products of similar kinds on similar terms between two areas of substantially the same general character. In our experiment with Hawaii we had shown what could be done toward stimulating the export both of agricultural and manufactured products to a country needing both and sending us in exchange tropical products of a kind raised only to a limited extent within the borders of the United States. The gain to be secured in the latter trade accrued in a degree both to the agriculturist and the manufacturer, though in a larger measure to the latter. The consumers' interests were not at all considered. In the Canadian treaty the main benefit had come to the consumer, being transferred to him by a competitive process. As in the history of most cases of protection and of new experiments in the control of international trade, the first step away from the interest of the consumer was very speedily taken. The Hawaiian treaty, as just shown, had concerned itself primarily with the interests of the producing class. But the struggle over the benefits of reciprocal trade could not stop at this point. It necessarily passed with little delay to