a slight upward trend in cocoa. Other articles declined heavily at the same time.

The trade with Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Salvador and Santo Domingo exhibits no features of any special interest. In none of them is there any clear and unmistakable effect traceable to reciprocity; in each of them there are the same inexplicable declines in some lines of exports from the United States, and although, here and there, there is a marked growth in the trade of some particular article going to or coming from one of the countries, this is almost always compensated by a similar decline elsewhere. Guatemalan trade actually grew after the abrogation of the treaty, and the same was true of that with Honduras, Nicaragua and Salvador.

Turning from the statistics of trade with the South American countries to those representing our dealings with Europe, an explanation of the course of events seems harder than ever to find. Our exports to Germany had been growing rapidly from 1888 to 1891. In the latter year they reached $92,795,456. The treaty with Germany went into effect on February 1, 1892, and our exports for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1892 (which thus included about five months of reciprocity), were $105,521,558. Yet, during the year next succeeding, they were only $83,578,988, or less than they had been during any year since 1889. In 1894 our exports rose again to about $92,357,163, but this sum was not so large as the amount we had sent abroad in 1891. So of imports. These in 1890 were $98,837,683, yet in 1892 they were only $82,907,553. They rose again in 1893 but fell off heavily in the fiscal year 1894, just prior to the abrogation of the reciprocity treaty. The termination of the agreement seemed to help more than it hurt them, for they rose to $81,014,065 in 1895. Almost exactly the same story, both as regards exports and imports, is seen in the trade with Austria-Hungary,

In the accompanying charts, the course of events in the trade between the United States and the various reciprocity

countries of the McKinley Act has been traced. As will be seen, by following the lines marked on the charts, it usually appears that both exports and imports fall off in 1893 and 1894, probably as a result of the bad commercial conditions of those years, although there are exceptions to the rule. For example, in the case of Santo Domingo there is an increase, both in exports and imports, from 1892 to 1894 inclusive, and the decline does not come until 1895, after the abrogation of the reciprocity treaty. In the case of Porto Rico, the highest point in exports is reached in 1892 and a fairly steady decline thereupon ensues. Imports from Porto Rico, on the other hand, reached their highest point in 1893, and immediately declined very heavily, reaching low water mark in 1895. The course of trade with Porto Rico, however, must be explained by political and other conditions which had little or nothing to do with the reciprocity question. The main inference to be drawn from the statistical and graphic summary thus given is that little or no direct influence on trade can be attributed to reciprocity. The commercial conditions of the time were so much disturbed throughout the world, and particularly in the United States, that trade would in any event have been likely to suffer some severe fluctuations. There were also circumstances tending to have an important influence which, of themselves, would probably have sufficed to obscure the effect of the reciprocity policy.

That the trade situation just sketched was deeply disappointing to the adherents of the reciprocity doctrine goes without saying. Pursuant to the request embodied in a Senate resolution of April 6, 1892, relative to commercial agreements made with other countries, President Harrison transmitted a message in which he sketched the outlook for the growth of commerce under the new agreements. The message indicated at the start some degree of recognition of the fact that the reciprocity situation was unsatisfactory. "It is proper to suggest," wrote the President, "that the practical effect of these arrange

ments cannot be measured by the commerce of a month or year, for the result must depend not alone upon the character of concessions secured by diplomatic negotiations but by the degree to which they are utilized by private commercial enterprise." In other words, the President recognized that the prevalent opinion of the country was correct in feeling that the results attained under the reciprocity treaties were proving more or less unimportant. In the opening words of the message just quoted, he unmistakably indicated a disposition to shift the burden of responsibility for the failure of the treaties to create an immediate growth in our trade to the unreadiness of our business men to take advantage of the trade openings said to be held out to them. As if, however, to take off the sharpest edge of the rebuke thus implied, the President further pointed out that American business men were not wholly to blame since "their European rivals are entrenched in the markets of the southern countries by the experience of a century. They have built up their trade by the establishment of agencies and local branches of their home establishments, by strict compliance with the tastes and arbitrary requirements of consumers, by furnishing lines of communication and transportation, by establishing banking facilities and systems of credit, by personal acquaintance and frequent contact with their customers." President Harrison also made the recommendation which naturally followed from the inquiries of the Pan-American Congress, and which had so long been reckoned a part of the reciprocity policy. This was the demand for artificial stimulus to transportation connections with South America, and to international banking agencies which should make it easier to pay money in South America. "Before the full results of the reciprocity arrangements can be realized, we must provide the means of transacting our own business, independent of the ships and banks and capital of our commercial rivals," wrote the President. Mr. Harrison, in fact, was able

น