tion, indicated very clearly the existence of a belief that the trust was entitled to the maintenance of its "vested right" in differential protection.

Moreover, the Louisiana planting interest developed tremendous strength, practically holding, on account of the narrow Democratic majority in the Senate, the key to the situation. Although it was reported that they had sold out to the refining interests, in return for their support in behalf of a duty on sugar, loud outcries were often heard from the Louisianians and those associated with them, concerning the grinding character of the refining monopoly, but all action was subordinate to the sole determination to push a tariff on raw sugar through the Senate. It was not unnatural that the Louisiana interests and their allies should try to make out the vicious character of the refining trust, while at the same time they were contending that the tariff advantages it enjoyed were nothing extraordinary.

A certain number of men were even found who apologized for the existence of the bounty, maintaining that it was the best way to give such protection to the domestic grower as might be needed. Thus Senator Peffer argued, on the 25th of April, that:

"Our home production is now about one pound in eleven of our consumption [of sugar], so that the whole tariff tax comes upon us.

* *If we are to protect the sugar industry at all we can do it much cheaper by bounty than by duty, and hence in order that we might procure free sugar, knowing that it was impracticable to remove the duty unless we had a bounty for a few years, I favored the placing of a bounty upon domestic sugar for ten years."

Sufficient has been said to indicate the character of the different parties in the Senate which had joined to defeat the sugar provisions as they came from the House. No analysis of the debates on the floor can ever tell the real truth concerning the fierce struggle which went on in the effort to

24 Ibid., Appendix, pp. 683-4

THE

ERSITY

OF

ABANDONMENT OF RECIPROCIT

251

reconcile the wishes of the trust with some outward show of decency and propriety. As soon as the bargain had been struck, and contracts had been made for the required number of votes, the debates came to a close. The party of reform was stupified, almost stunned by the astonishing blow it had received.

It is important to note, for the sake of the main discussion of this chapter, that it was in the action of the Senate, as just outlined, that the real defeat of reciprocity occurred, since it was here that the duty was reimposed on raw sugar, contrary to any suggestions originating in the lower chamber; and it was in this manner that ground for breaking the reciprocity treaties was furnished to the foreign countries with which they had been negotiated. The story of the sugar schedule in the Senate was very pointedly put, after the measure had been sent back to the House of Representatives, by Mr. Hall, of Minnesota, August 13, 1894.

Mr. Hall said:

"In its [the Wilson bill's] path also stood the great sugar trust, with its accumulated millions, and its army of trained and conscienceless lobbyists. Senator Sherman is my authority for the statement that this trust came into existence upon the enactment of the McKinley law. Free raw sugar, encouraged by a heavy bounty, and a tariff of sixtenths of a cent per pound upon refined sugar, gave to the trust its life, its opportunities, and its power. By closing our markets to the competing refiners of other nations it compelled our people to purchase of the home combination at prices limited only by the wants of the consumers and the cupidity of the seller. * * * So the sugar trust, side by side with the Democratic protectionist and the Republican obstructionist, lay in ambush to assassinate the 'Star-eyed Goddess of Reform.'

"The story of the progress of this bill through the Senate is the most remarkable chapter in the history of American legislation. I speak not of the suspicions which are abroad among men. I do not wish to affirm, I have not the temerity to deny, the unwholesome rumors which have floated to us from the other end of this Capitol. I speak only of those events which are well known and indisputable.

"Days passed into weeks, weeks ripened into months, the business

of the country grew stagnant, factories lay idle, men stood unemployed, our industries were paralyzed-all awaiting a settlement of the tariff question. Yet nothing was done. Legislation was held up. Some mighty, but invisible power blocked all progress. Parliamentary obstruction played its hand in the game. A distinguished Senator, with a Naval record, led the skirmish line of the blockaders. The successors of Webster and Sumner stood waist-deep in garrulous delay. The prolonged eloquence of Pennsylvania's favorite son and master fell in a muffled monotone upon the slumbering pages and agonized clerks of that august body. * * Suddenly, in the twinkling of an eye, all was changed. The filibustering stopped, the talkers grew silent, the ten-days' speech came to an end, the kickers ceased to kick, the obstructionists ceased to obstruct, * * * when it was announced that the trust was satisfied with the sugar schedule."

Having considered the history of the sugar schedule in Congress, we may now review the action and debates concerning reciprocity as such. Owing to the radical transformation wrought in the sugar schedule, the debates on reciprocity naturally assumed a different color in the House from that which was given to them after the bill had entered the Senate, and after it had become apparent that a sugar schedule was to be inserted. There was no time up to the moment when the Wilson bill left the House of Representatives when complaint could have been made against it, on the ground that it actually destroyed the reciprocity treaties. As we have seen, it retained coffee, tea and hides on the free list, and added many other commodities, including wool, thus carrying still further the notion of opening markets and encouraging trade with the South American countries. It also retained, continuously, raw sugar on the free list, so that there was not an instant when the real foundations of existing reciprocity were jeopardized by the bill.

After the measure had entered the Senate and it became apparent either that the recommendations of the Finance Committee, reimposing a duty on raw sugar or some similar change, would be adopted, the new aspect of the situation

25 Ibid., Appendix, p. 1145.

had the effect of a direct assault, not upon reciprocity as such, but upon the main condition which rendered its working practically effective in our intercourse with foreign countries. It was this outcome, therefore, that gave a very different character to the reciprocity debate in the Senate from that which it assumed in the House of Representatives.

The House debate, of course, opened with an effort on the part of Republicans to maintain the claim that reciprocity, as laid down in the McKinley Act, had been a great boon to the United States, and that it was in danger of being sacrificed by the unscrupulous men who were presuming to tamper with a God-given tariff. Thus Mr. Mahon remarked, shortly after the bill was presented to the House:

"One of the greatest achievements of the Republican party was accomplished during the closing days of the 51st Congress, by the adoption of Section 3 of the McKinley tariff law. I refer to the reciprocity clause. The measure now under consideration will repeal the same, and with its repeal all of the advantages secured in the trade markets of the countries we have made treaties with will be destroyed. * From all the facts obtainable as to the benefits derived from this measure in the short time it has been in existence, I believe it to be the best law in relation to our trade and commerce ever enacted by the American Congress."

On the other hand, a number of men boldly expressed themselves in opposition to the whole idea of McKinley reciprocity. Their antagonism was largely based upon the claim that it was a sham, professing to do what it actually did not do, and that by pretending to aid the American farmer while doing him no good, and extending its benefits only to the manufacturer, if to any one, it amounted to nothing more than a hypocritical pretense.

To this indictment it was, of course, difficult to reply with success. It was usually met by general and vague talk about the struggle for foreign markets and the need of promoting the interests abroad of the American producer (whether farmer

20 Ibid., p. 681.

or manufacturer was usually not stated). Of this kind of haziness Representative McCleary's argument was a fair example. Mr. McCleary came from Minnesota and numbered among his constituents a good many of the wheat-raisers and flour-millers who, as we have seen, had largely profited by McKinley reciprocity. Mr. McCleary was, therefore, able to make some argument concerning the benefits derived by this class from the operation of the "reciprocity principle." Speaking on the 31st of January, during the early debate on the measure, he said:

"In our struggle for foreign markets, Mr. Chairman, we must bear in mind that nearly all the great nations of the world have adopted the protective system, and we must keep ourselves in a position to grant favors if we would receive any. * * * Protection and reciprocity are complementary terms. They are two forces whose resultant is commercial triumph. * * * We recognize the fact that this free use of our markets is an exceedingly valuable consideration to the countries exporting these articles, and the act [McKinley] wisely provides a way whereby we may secure proper reciprocal advantages.

"This illustrates very clearly one difference between free trade and reciprocity. The former gives away items of great value without requiring anything in return; the latter demands a quid pro

quo.

"Our trade with Cuba increased, as shown by the Statistical Abstract, from an average of less than $12,000,000 annually for many years to nearly $18,000,000 in 1892, and over $24,000,000 in 1893. By contrast, the exports of Great Britain to Cuba fell from over fourteen and a half million dollars in 1890 to less than twelve and a half millions in 1891, and then to $8,390,855 in 1892. During this time the exports from France to Cuba fell from nearly 12,000,000 francs in 1890 to less than 5,000,000 in 1892. That is, while the sales of Great Britain to Cuba fell off over forty per cent., and those of France nearly sixty per cent., ours increased more than 100 per cent. In other words, sir, by means of our reciprocity treaty we have been acquiring the Cuban market."

9927

In the course of much that was aside from the real issue, Mr. McCleary made one point with some degree of force.

27 Ibid., Appendix, Part II., p. 825.