remarks were made by Senators Allison, White and others, who merely reiterated in substance what they had already said when the topic was under discussion at first.27 In the House, likewise the debate was of little consequence. The revised reciprocity clause went through without further change, and made its appearance as sections three and four of the Dingley Act.

The passage of the Dingley Act found us face to face with difficult tariff conditions in France, Germany and other continental countries. For a long time our tariff policy had proved deeply distasteful to Europeans who held that since they afforded a market for our agricultural products, a certain obligation was imposed upon us to suffer their manufactured goods to enter this country without any excessive restrictions or impediments. In consequence of the general dissatisfaction with American methods and American commercial policy, general conditions had grown up which rendered it more and more difficult for us to break into the markets fenced off by highly protective duties.28

In Chapter I it was shown how, after 1890, a new tariff system had begun to make large headway in Europe. This was the so-called "maximum and minimum system" which is now to be found in France, Russia, Spain, Greece and Norway. On this side of the ocean it has also been adopted

27 Ibid., p. 2797.

28 The situation which was produced by the passage of the Dingley bill was well stated by Mr. Kasson at a later date in the following words. (Papers relating to reciprocity with France, 56th Congress, 1st session. Executive N. printed in confidence for use of the Senate, p. 1.)

"After the passage of the Dingley bill the State Department sent copies of it to our various legations and embassies abroad for communication to the various governments to which they were accredited. No more than this had been done at the time the President charged me with the duty of negotiating these conventions and these foreign governments seemed to have given no attention to it.

"The condition of commercial feeling in Europe, as I found very soon after undertaking these duties, was exceedingly hostile to the United States. The Dingley bill had produced an effect all over the continent of Europe of exasperation throughout the commercial world, and among the governments as well, to such an extent that one high officer-the Premier of the Austro-Hungarian Government-had openly proposed a union of official action against the United States commerce as their only means of protecting their own commercial interests. In that state of feeling, at first, there seemed no disposition anywhere on the continent of Europe or in the Governments of South America to take any steps under the reciprocity clauses of the bill.'

by Brazil. The French system had gone into effect January 11, 1896, its fundamental idea being the grant of authority to the legislature to establish certain limits within which tariff rates might be shifted according to the judgment of the Executive authority, but below which no reduction should be permitted. In other words, it was designed by this system to guarantee to the French producer a certain maximum rate to be enforced by the Executive in case no concessions to French goods were made by foreign countries, the difference between the minimum and maximum rates serving as a margin within which bargaining could take place for the purpose of buying or brow-beating other countries into suitable commercial agreements. The difference between the two rates is at present about twenty-five per cent. In other words, the minimum duty on a given article might be seventyfive per cent. ad valorem, while the maximum would be 100 per cent. At the time of the passage of the act, the Executive received authority to grant a minimum tariff to all countries which had given French commodities the treatment accorded to the most favored nation. Inasmuch as practically all the countries had already adopted this policy, the only ones subjected to the maximum tariff were Portugal and the United States, and even in our own case the full burden of the maximum was not thrown upon us. Enough, however, was done in this direction to subject our commerce to an exceedingly unpleasant discrimination.

Distinguished from this tariff method appeared a plan pursued by Germany. As France now constitutes the leader of a group of European states pursuing the same tariff policy, so Germany stands at the head of another group with an independent system of its own. In this group are included Germany, Austria, Italy, Switzerland and Belgium, which, late in 1891, entered into agreements whereby the commercial treaty system of the middle European states was formed. A system of commercial treaties was entered into with the object of

uniting this group of treaties into a sort of customs union. The new arrangement was to last for twelve years, and the system of treaties was known as the "December treaties." In this way Germany placed her foreign commercial policy upon a strictly treaty basis, leaving it to her executive officers to make as good bargains in her behalf as they conveniently could, subsequently ratifying the treaties through the legislative body. Under the German system of agreements, therefore, it was clear that the United States would be shut out from the enjoyment of any "most favored nation" provisions which it did not itself grant, while under the French we were forced to bargain as best we could for trade concessions.

Shortly after the passage of the Dingley Act it became apparent that President McKinley intended to urge forward the work of negotiating reciprocity treaties as rapidly as might be practicable. It was evident from the outset that some special machinery would be helpful, if not necessary, in case the negotiations were to be pushed with success in many quarters. Therefore, it was deemed best by President McKinley to appoint a "reciprocity commission." Mr. McKinley had already taken up the "commission idea," which had been the favorite suggestion of certain political economists for a good while past, and had used it to good effect in more than one way. In the case of the Dingley reciprocity section, however, it would seem that the commission was not intended to postpone action and mislead public opinion, but was designed to facilitate the actual work of investigating the tariffs of other countries, and the negotiation of treaties for the purpose of improving our relations with such countries. Pursuant to this idea President McKinley, acting upon the general power vested in him, and not upon any authority particularly delegated by Congress, appointed the Hon. John A. Kasson, of Iowa, a Special Commissioner for the negotiation of reciprocity treaties. Offices and a suitable personnel, known as the Reciprocity Commission, were established in the Department of State. The

appointment was made on the 13th of October, 1897, and Mr. Kasson continued in charge of the work until March 4, 1901, when he resigned, his resignation becoming effective on the 19th of the following April. The commission, however, still continued its work, so far as there was anything for it to do, under the direction of the Secretary of State.

Why it was that Mr. Kasson no longer continued in charge of the Commission will be seen at a later point.29

As we have seen, three kinds of reciprocity had been provided for under the Dingley Act. With European countries it was possible to negotiate and to directly proclaim treaties founded upon concessions to them in argols or crude tartar or wine lees, brandies, still wines, paintings, statuary, and one or two other articles. With the South American countries (or of any others having similar productions) it was possible

20 The Washington Post, October 15, 1897, gave an interesting account of the appointment of the reciprocity Commission:

*

*

"The President has decided to appoint a special commissioner, with plenary powers, to carry into effect the reciprocity provisions of sections 3 and 4 of the tariff act, approved July 24, 1897. It was found upon making an investigation of the matter that the regular force of the Department of State is at present so overcrowded with pressing business, that serious delay in carrying out the expressed wish of Congress would inevitably follow, if, in addition to the usual routine work of the department, its officers were required to perform the special examinations and negotiations essential to carry forward the will of Congress as expressed in the sections above referred to. Moreover the pressure for early and consistent_action in the arrangement of measures of reciprocity has been very great from foreign countries, as well as from our own citizens. In view of these facts, the President has designated the Hon. John A. Kasson, of Iowa, as such Special Commissioner, with Mr. Chapman Coleman, of Kentucky, as Secretary, and Mr. John Ball Osborne, of Scranton, Pa., as Assistant Secretary. Mr. Kasson was Minister to Austria from June 11, 1877, to May, 1881; Minister to Germany from July 4, 1884, to March, 1885. He was also one of the Commissioners to represent the government of the United States at the conference held in Berlin concerning Samoan affairs and is one of the signatories of the Berlin General Act, concluded June 14th, 1889. He was then commissioned as Special Envoy Extraor dinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, his commission bearing date March 18, 1889. Preceding his diplomatic service, Mr. Kasson was for many years a member of the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives, and in that place became thoroughly familiar with all aspects of the tariff question, and the debates on that subject.

*

"Mr. Coleman has also been connected with the diplomatic service of this government. For a number of years he was Secretary of the United States Embassy at Berlin, where he entered the service as Second Secretary. He is a deep student of economic questions, and a linguist of more than average ability. He was strongly recommended to the President for appointment as Consul-General at Berlin. Because of his experience he is expected to render valuable service to Mr. Kasson in dealing with these important negotiations.

"Mr. Osborne hails, as has been stated, from Scranton, Pa., and has also studied the subjects that will necessarily arise in considering the questions cov. ered by sections 3 and 4 of the tariff law. His father, it is understood, is a warm personal friend of the President, but is neither directly nor collaterally connected with him."

to negotiate and proclaim treaties based on concessions in tea, coffee, and tonka and vanilla beans. Beyond these it was necessary that reciprocity treaties should have the consent of Congress. Pursuant to the authority vested in the President under section 3, which included the first two kinds of reciprocity already specified, treaties were negotiated and proclaimed with France, Portugal, Germany and Italy. Later, an arrangement which came about in an exceptional way, was entered into with Switzerland. No agreements were made and proclaimed under the second paragraph of section 3, intended to apply to the South American countries. Only in the case of Portugal, whose agreement included the Azores and Madeira Islands, were there any stipulations with regard to the tropical products intended as a basis for reciprocity with South American or other tropical or semi-tropical countries. Of the treaties negotiated under section 4, and requiring special ratification by the Senate, more will be said later.

A comparatively brief review will suffice to furnish the essential facts concerning the treaties of the first kind, negotiated with European countries under section 3 of the act. The treaty with France was proclaimed by President McKinley on May 30, 1898, and became operative on June 1st of the same year.30 In return for the concessions on argols, brandies, still wines, paintings, etc., provided for in the act, we gained the minimum rate of duty under the French maximum. and minimum system on canned meats, fresh and dried fruits, common lumber, lard and a few other commodities. This minimum rate implied a reduction in duty on the articles in question, varying from fifteen to twenty per cent. With Germany, a commercial agreement was entered into whereby, in return for the concessions provided for in the act, we were given certain advantages under the conventional tariff of the country. The treaty was proclaimed by the President July

31

30 "United States Statutes at Large," 56th Congress, 1899-1901, Vol. 30, pp. 1775-76, or App. 31 Ibid., Vol. 31, pp. 1978-79.