81

of the dissatisfaction and undertook to show that they were without foundation. This answer, of course, was ineffectual. In 1864, Representative Ward, on behalf of the House Committee on Commerce, again took up the subject, presenting a report in which he outlined a new policy with reference to Canada. This policy was, in substance, that the President be authorized to give notice to the government of Great Britain that it was the intention of the United States to terminate the reciprocity treaty unless a new convention satisfactory to both governments should be concluded. The question was brought to debate by a joint resolution reported by the Committee on Commerce and embodying its recommendations. Representative Arnold, of Illinois, sought to amend the resolution by the insertion of a clause stating that the President should use his judgment regarding the abrogation of the treaty in the event that the attempt to negotiate a new one should fail. Morrill, of Vermont, then also a member of the House, attempted the introduction of a further amendment by substituting a resolution providing for unconditional abrogation of the treaty. 2 Neither of these extreme standpoints was adopted; and, on December 13, 1864, the House passed the original resolution of the Committee on Commerce by a vote of 85 to 57, forty members not voting. 33 This resolution was received by the Senate on the following day (December 14), and was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, 34 a step which was supposed to indicate that the question was considered a political rather than a commercial matter. This committee shortly after reported an amended form of the resolution. It provided for the unconditional abrogation of the treaty, and passed the Senate January 12, 1865, by a vote of 33 to 8.35 The amended resolution was then returned to

p. 8.

#1 Reports of Committees, 38th Congress, 1st session, 1863-64, No. 39, Vol. 1, 82 Congressional Globe, 38th Congress, 1st session, 1863-64, p. 2455, also p. 2364. 3 Ibid., 2d session, Part I., p. 32.

34 Ibid., 38th Congress, ad session, p. 34.

as Ibid., p. 277.

86

the House and the amendment was concurred in on the 16th of January, 1865. As finally framed, the resolution stated that:

*

"It is no longer for the interest of the United States to continue the same [the treaty] in force" * * and that "notice be given of the termination of the reciprocity treaty, according to the provisions therein contained for the termination of the same.'

Thus framed the resolution was approved by the President January 18, 1865 38 and our relations with Canada came to a close March 17, 1866.

It seems astonishing that Canada should have permitted so valuable a commercial arrangement to slip from her grasp without a determined effort to retain its benefits. The danger does not seem to have been fully realized until it was too late to take effective action. Great Britain, especially, seems to have been indifferent to the interests of Canada in the whole matter. According to Mr. E. W. Watkin " the ministry was guilty of the most culpable negligence. Speaking in the British House of Commons on this subject in February, 1865, Mr. Watkin said:

"A treaty of amity and commerce between Great Britain and the United States of America, known as the 'reciprocity treaty,' has been allowed to expire with the expiry of the twelve months' notice given on the 17th March, 1865, by the government at Washington under the authority of the Senate. * * No explanation has been given to Parliament, nor has a single paper of any kind been laid upon the table of the House of Her Majesty's government * * * but it has been

*

** allowed to expire * * owing mainly to the culpable negligence and maladroit management of those who have had charge of British interests." "

'According to Mr. Watkin, "the results of trade had been

se Ibid., p. 291.

37 Ibid., p. 277.

38 U. S. Statutes at Large, 38th Congress, 2d session, Vol. 13, p. 566. For debates in Congress on this whole question see Congressional Globe, 38th Congress, 1st session, part III., pp. 2333-38, 2364-71, 2452-6, 2476-84, 2502-09, and 2d session, 1865-6, part I., pp. 204-13, 226-34.

30 "Canada and the States," London, 1887.

40 Ibid., pp. 382-89.

so happy that a total annual interchange of commodities of a value of nearly £10,000,000 a year in amount between the British provinces and the United States" existed. The treaty might have been revised and extended, he thought, before the causes of irritation had led to such intense feeling.

Action looking to the prolongation of the treaty came, however, when it was too late. The twelve months' notice aroused the Canadians to a realizing sense of what they were about to lose and a movement was set on foot to secure an extension. January 24, 1866, a delegation, including A. T. Galt, the Canadian Minister of Finance, W. P. Howland, the Postmaster General of Canada, A. J. Smith, Attorney General of New Brunswick, and W. A. Henry, Attorney General of Nova Scotia, came to Washington, and remained until February 6, vainly attempting to negotiate a new treaty. Through the Secretary of the Treasury proposals were made to the Ways and Means Committee of Congress and counter-proposals concerning duties on Canadian products were submitted to the delegates, but the terms offered were such as to make negotiations absolutely impossible. The Canadian delegates returned home in disgust, and the only result of their visit was the introduction of a bill in Congress during March, 1866, in which it was provided that a new treaty should be offered to Canada. The bill failed of passage, but even had it gone through Congress the offer thereby made would never have been accepted, for its terms were so unfair that Canada could not have dreamed of accepting them.

It was undoubtedly true that the people of the United States considered the advantages accruing to Canada under the treaty to be vastly superior to those obtained by themselves through it. The annexation movement was still far from dead, and directly after the conclusion of the negotiations had been announced, it was displayed in several ridiculous ways. The prediction was very generally made that within two years Canada would be compelled to ask for

admission to the United States. At a meeting of delegates representing boards of trade and commercial organizations of the United States and Canada, which came together at Detroit July 11-14, 1865, Mr. Potter, then United States Consul at Montreal, expressed the prevailing opinion very baldly in the following words:

"Now we are ready to give you in Canada the most perfect reciprocity. We will give you complete free trade, but we ask you to come and share with us the responsibilities of our own government. * * * I believe that I express the general feeling of those who are the most friendly to the United States in Canada when I say it is not the policy of our government * *to continue this treaty and I believe that in two years from the abrogation of the reciprocity treaty the people of Canada themselves will apply for admission to the United States." " In much the same strain a Western newspaper 42 remarked a little later that:

*

"The Canadians will soon discover that free trade and smuggling will not compensate them for the loss of the reciprocity treaty. They will stay out in the cold for a few years, and try all sorts of expedients, but in the end will be constrained to knock for admission into the great Republic. Potter was right when he predicted that the abrogation of the treaty would cause annexation."

This political reason, however, cannot fully account for the abrogation of the agreement. In such cases, results are often produced by entirely antagonistic influences and in this instance a force precisely opposite to the desire for annexation was working strongly in conjunction with it to produce the same effect. This was the hatred of Canada and the wish to weaken our relations with that country. The conduct of the Southern party in England had aroused strong indignation in the Northern states, and it would seem that to this must be largely attributed our action in giving notice. According to Goldwin Smith.43

"To the anger which the behavior of a party in England had ex

41 Ibid., p. 422.

42 Chicago Tribune, January 6, 1866.

48 "Canada and the Canadian Question," London and New York, 1891, p. 141.

cited in America, Canada owes the loss of the reciprocity treaty. ** If Great Britain can, with justice, say that she has paid heavily for the defense of Canada, Canada can with equal justice reply that she has paid heavily in the way of commercial sacrifice for the policy of Great Britain."

Much the same view was taken by Charles Francis Adams, then Minister to Great Britain, who wrote on February 2, 1865, to Secretary Seward" that in his opinion:

"All these measures (for abrogation) were the result rather of a strong political feeling than of any commercial considerations."

The same opinion is entertained by others, 45 and this testimony is of great importance because of the claim now frequently made that the Canadian treaty was very disadvantageous to us commercially.

The most thorough review of the working of the Canadian treaty that has been made, in all probability, was furnished by Mr. E. H. Derby, who was appointed by Secretary McCulloch to investigate it. His report was rendered in 1866 and not only contained a review of the working of the treaty, but outlined a policy for the future. As to the reliability of the report, a fair estimate has been quoted by Mr. Watkin, in the work already referred to. Mr. Watkin says:

46

"Mr. Derby's report contains much that is sensational, and many curious admissions, but its general tenor is strongly in favor of a new treaty, regard being had to the revenue necessities of the United States; i.c., that articles admitted into the United States from Canada should pay a duty equivalent to the internal revenue tax on the same articles charged in the States. This is just as if Great Britain said that brandy from France coming into England should pay a duty equivalent to the English excise duty upon spirits, which would be quite fair."

Probably the best idea of the result of Mr. Derby's investigations can be gathered from the policy outlined by him for the renewal of the treaty. He suggested twelve features

44 House Executive Documents, 39th Congress, 1st session, Vol. 1, part I (Diplomatic), p. 111.

45 See, for example, Foster, "A Century of American Diplomacy," Boston and New York, 1901, p. 339.

46 Canada and the States," p. 405.