The big fellows of this lobby numbered the best the larger corporations could command.104 The appearance of a vice-president of a transcontinental railroad, or of a chief counsel, or of a department chief, was not at all unusual. Constantly on the ground, of course, were the mere watchers of legislation, the smaller attorneys, the claquers.

The vice-presidents, the department chiefs, the general managers, and other betitled notables of public service corporations who appeared at Sacramento to promote the schemes of the big privilege-seekers, no doubt appeared very big fellows to the clustering small fry. They may, too, have been able to impress legislators with a sense of their bigness, their superiority and their importance. But as a matter of fact, the biggest of them fell, with the most insignificant claquer on duty in barroom and lobby, under the general designation of clerks.105

104 In addition to the lobby representing large aggregations of Eastern capital, such as the Railroads, Power Companies, Insurance Companies and the like, was the lobby for or against purely State matters, as were contemplated in such measures as the Redlight Abatement act, measures affecting hours of labor, the so-called "Blue Sky" bill, the Anti-Prizefight bills, saloon closing bills, etc.

105 This fact is now generally recognized and is matter of common observation. The San Francisco Examiner, for example, in commenting upon the naming of Jesse W. Lilienthal to be president of the United Railroads, said:

"The United Railroads is a subsidiary corporation of the United Railroads Development Company, which is a holding company, and legally not under the control of the State as a public utility. No matter who the local president may be, it is well understood In business circles that the final and absolute word of authority comes from New York and Pittsburg, and it is feared that no matter how good Mr. Lilienthal's intentions may be, the actual management of the property, by the same men who have owned It for nine years, will be the same kind of management they have always provided.

"The sudden announcement of a change of heart made by these Eastern capitalists who have so long disregarded all the rights of this city will be looked upon as a deathbed confession of fright,

As clerks, the most generously titled of them were at Sacramento to carry out orders received from nonresident superiors. Those superiors had fixed policies for their California clerks to carry out. The betitled clerks were at Sacramento to carry out those policies, regardless of consequences to State or to individual. They might know their work to be against the best interests of their State; even to be against the best interests of the aggregation of wealth that fees them. But they had no voice in shaping the policies. As clerks they had received their orders. As clerks, they proceeded, with the fear of the penalty of failure urging, to obey.

This blind obedience was no new experience with them. They are accustomed to follow instructions, not only against their inclinations, but against their better judgment.

When, for example, in 1908 freight rates to Pacific Coast points were arbitrarily raised $10,000,000 a year, the bulk of the increased burden falling upon California, local railroad officials were held to have advised against it. The additional burden approached the back-breaking point. The advice was ignored, however, and local railroad officials proceeded to the collection of the additional toll.

When the Stetson Railroad Regulation bill was before the 1909 Senate, it was known local railroad

a sort of sop to Satan in the shape of coming municipal ownership. It is an almost comical election dodge, and it is a matter of regret to hundreds of Mr. Lilienthal's devoted friends that he should be selected to pull the fat out of the fire-for it is pretty generally believed among the well-informed that the Eastern Interests would sacrifice Mr. Lilienthal in the future without minute's hesitation if they won their point at the polls next Tuesday by the use of his respected name.'

a

officials advised that the very reasonable measure be not opposed. But suddenly their support of the measure failed and the powerful influence of the Southern Pacific Company was thrown against the Stetson bill.

The 1909 Stetson bill was defeated. But in 1911, the farther-reaching Railroad Regulation law, under which the present State Railroad Commission is acting, was passed. The Eastern policy-makers no doubt see now that it would have been better for their properties had they, in 1909, taken their resident clerks' advice.

When in 1905, to use another example, word came from New York that Gillett was to be made Governor of California, the local "bosses," whom, in those days, Californians were apt to look upon as all powerful, questioned the wisdom of the selection. But they were employed to obey. They obeyed. The scandal of the Santa Cruz convention followed. But Gillett was nominated. The "bosses" could not get a majority vote 106 for him, but manipulation insured his election by a plurality in spite of the scandal of the nominating convention. None will say but that the head clerks of the political organization, then dominant in California, did surprisingly effective work, even against their better judgment, in manipulating for Gillett's election. But the Santa Cruz convention was the beginning of the end of the Southern Pacific "machine" in California. The clerkly representatives of Eastern exploiters probably realized that it would be. There is a point beyond which

106 At the 1906 election, 311,975 votes were cast for Governor. Of this vote Gillett received 125,887; other candidates for Governor received 186,088. But Gillett received the highest vote of any of the other candidates, Bell, his closest opponent receiving only 117,645. Gillett was elected over Bell by a plurality of 8,242. He received 30,101 votes less than a majority.

Californians will not be driven. But the local clerks, wiser than their non-resident policy-makers, were overruled.

With such facts before us, it is readily understood why promises and agreements made by this or that vicepresident of this or that railroad or power company or other public service corporation are valueless. Such officials make their promises, knowing that they can be fulfilled; knowing that the State or community affected will profit by their fulfilment; knowing that their company will profit also. But their non-resident principals, moved by whim or fancy, or themselves coerced, repudiate the promise of their resident clerks, and the clerks are powerless to prevent.

This was very well indicated by the increase of the Western Pacific 100-hour deciduous fruit-train service between Sacramento and Chicago from 100 to 140 hours.

California representatives of the Western Pacific stated when that road was building, that the time of deciduous fruit shipments from Sacramento to Chicago should be reduced to 100 hours.

The enormous importance of this to California cannot be over-estimated. Such a service would be worth millions to the State. Incidentally, the railroads would profit also.

When the Western Pacific was completed the 100hour, Sacramento-Chicago service was actually given, showing that such service is possible. But almost immediately it was discontinued.

At a recent hearing before the State Railroad Com

mission 107 testimony 108 was brought out which indicates very clearly why it was discontinued.

Eastern representatives of the Southern Pacific Company brought pressure to bear upon the Western Pacific to have it stopped. In California, Southern Pacific officials protested against it. The 100-hour service was not continued.

Thus, the Southern Pacific Company not only fails to furnish the fast fruit-train service which that corporation's officials admit it could if it would, but exerts

107 Before the Railroad Commission of the State of California, Application 409 "In the matter of the application of Central Pacific Railway Company, Southern Pacific Railroad Company and Southern Pacific Company for authorization to make a lease of a certain railroad, to make a sale of a certain railroad, to make a contract for the joint use and possession of a certain railroad, to make a contract for running or trackage rights over a certain railroad, and to make a contract for the joint use of certain railroad terminals."

108 The testimony of Charles H. Schlacks. Mr. Schlacks testified as follows:

Q. Has your company ever attempted to better its service with a view to competition-I refer particularly to the fast fruit train. Was there an occasion when your corporation ran a train at a speed that gave a shorter number of hours between California points and the Missouri River?

A. At the commencement of our operation in 1910, and in July of that year, we entered into the deciduous fruit traffic and I think moved the first train in something like 100 hours to Chicago from Sacramento.

Q. Was any pressure subsequently brought to bear upon your corporation to have it cease the service that it was rendering with regard to the transcontinental shipments of fruit?

A. There were protests made against the fast time inaugurated by the Western Pacific.

Q. It already appears here that Messrs. Kuhn, Loeb & Co. are the bankers, so-called, of the Union Pacific Railroad Company. State whether or not any such protest came from Messrs. Kuhn, Loeb & Co.

A. The protest from the bankers of the Southern and Union Pacific was made to our president in New York.

Q.

Did any protest come from the Southern Pacific?

A. I think there were two officers that protested here.

Q.

What officers?

A. I think the then assistant general manager and the vicepresident in charge of traffic.

COMMISSIONER ESHELMAN:

What was the outcome of this,

what was the result, did you take off your 100-hour train? A. Well, our service, as far as the Western Pacific is concerned, remained about the same, but that of our connections