Again, in the Perez case, Docket No. 79, he said:

"The Mexican Department (of Foreign Affairs) emptied the contents of its waste baskets on the Commission, just as the U.S. State Department sent every scrap of paper with Mexico' marked on it, to the same reservoir of defunct claims."

It is important, of course, that every claimant's legitimate rights be properly determined. Experience has shown, however, that in practically every general arbitration some of the most persistent and most vehement claimants are those whose claims are shown by examination to be unfounded, either in fact or in law. There is no basis, either in reason or in justice, why claims of this class should be carried through the expensive process of international arbitration merely to satisfy the unjustified pretensions of individual claimants and to obtain a formal judgment rejecting their claims.

In this instance, therefore, all the claims were carefully studied and analyzed in advance, and those in which it appeared clear that awards for damages would be unprocurable were rejected and not submitted to the Commission. That resulted in great economy of both time and money. Nor did that process prove to be so difficult or disagreeable as might be anticipated by some. Out of a total of 133 claims, 40 were rejected in this manner without pleadings and, as is important to note, each rejection was accomplished with the consent or acquiescence of the respective claimant or his attorney. Except for this innovation of procedure the cost of the arbitration would doubtless have exceeded, by from one third to one half, the amount actually expended therefor. As a matter of fact, the observance of the former procedure would have made impossible, in this case, a successful conclusion of the arbitration under the two existing conventions. And it can be confidently stated that no claim which had any prospect of being allowed by the Commission was rejected in this manner.1

It is strongly recommended that a similar procedure be adopted in future cases.

The second expedient adopted by the Agency in this instance seems, of course, the only logical and sensible method of procedure. Unfortunately, however, that has not always been the practice in the past. And in this connection it is perhaps not entirely irrelevant to note that an agent, especially designated from private life to conduct an arbitration, whose emoluments cease with the termination of his work, may have less incentive to expedite the work of arbitration by the combination of cases, wherever such combination is possible, than one whose designation as agent constitutes merely the assignment of an additional task and who, at the close of the arbitration, continues his regular employment in the same general field without reference to any discontinuance of emoluments.

It is significant that in this instance a total of 93 claims of American citizens which were submitted to arbitration were encompassed by 15 sets of pleadings, or an average of six claims to each case. Eleven cases were pleaded individually. Two sets of pleadings covered four claims each, one set included 18 cases and one set 56. That procedure should be adopted wherever possible in future arbitrations. It is a more rapid, less expensive, and, on the whole, a much more satisfactory method than that of pleading each case separately.

In pursuance of the third expedient, the Agency of the United States proposed to the Panamanian Government, through the Department of State, on January 22, 1931, a plan of procedure contemplating the least possible number of pleadings in each case, consisting simply of memorial and answer in which the evidence and issues of fact and law would be clarified, followed by a brief and reply brief in which such issues would be fully developed. It was proposed at the same time that 60 days be allowed for each pleading after the filing of the respective memorials, and that the two Governments establish the joint secre

tariat as soon as ratifications of the convention were exchanged, in order that the development of pleadings might proceed before the first meeting of the Commission and some of the cases be prepared for its consideration at the time of its first meeting. Only in that way could its full year of existence be conserved for actual adjudication work. The Panamanian Government at first accepted this proposal, in principle, but subsequently found it inconvenient to proceed in accordance therewith so far as concerned the establishment of the joint secretariat and the development of cases prior to the first meeting of the Commission. As a consequence, that which the Agency had undertaken to avoid proved unavoidable, namely, the meeting of the Commission on April 1, 1932, with but one year allowed for its entire work, but with no cases pleaded, with the method of procedure still to be determined by rules yet to be adopted by the Commission, and, consequently, with no work for the Commission to perform during the succeeding 6 months or one half of the entire period of its existence under the Convention, while the first case was being developed.

At the time of the first meeting of the Commission, the Agency of the United States presented, for its consideration, a complete draft of proposed rules, based upon those used in 10 prior arbitrations, but so combined and modified as to meet the exigencies of the existing situation so far as could be foreseen. The Commission, without objection or proposed amendment by either the Commissioner or Agent appointed by Panama, adopted this draft in toto and promulgated it on April 1, 1932, as the rules of the Commission. These rules served, without amendment, throughout the entire arbitration.'

Inasmuch as, under the new rules, no case was likely to be matured for adjudication for a period of 6 months after the first meeting, the Commission adjourned, after formal organization, to meet on October 3, 1932, thereby disposing of half of the entire period of its existence without a single

adjudication. The Agency was able to arrange that the normal expense of maintaining the Commission should cease during this period of its inaction, and thus effected an economy to the United States of approximately $12,000. In ordinary circumstances, under a similar convention, that would probably be impossible and a considerable and unnecessary expense would be incurred.

Having anticipated the difficulties which would result if both Governments awaited the first meeting of the Commission before proceeding with their preparatory work, this Agency had advanced its cases as rapidly as possible toward initial pleadings and, as a consequence, was able to file the first memorial of claim 10 days after the first meeting of the Commission.

The memorials in the 15 American cases pleaded (after the elimination and combinations above mentioned) were filed at approximately regular intervals averaging 9 days, so that the subsequent pleadings of both Governments in each case might be handled with a maximum of convenience and a minimum of confusion. This staggering process resulted in the filing of the last memorial of the United States on the last date allowed therefor, by the convention and the rules of the Commission, namely, on August 22, 1932.

Up until that date, however, the Panamanian Government had filed no claims against the United States although it had given notice that several such claims were to be filed, and although the Department of State had, at the instance of the American Agency, called its attention to the approaching expiration of the period for filing. On the last date allowed therefor, August 22, the Agent for Panama filed memorials in six of its claims with the joint secretariat in Washington and memorials in the remaining five cases with the American Legation in Panama. This threw upon the United States the obligation of filing 11 answers within 60 days and, if the rules were to be observed, a like obligation on Panama with respect to the briefs, and then again on the United States in the cases of

the reply briefs. Such congestion is by all means to be avoided if possible. The schedule which appears on page 854, post, shows how these pleadings were handled by the Agency of the United States.

When the Commission reconvened on November 21, 1932 (instead of on October 3 as proposed), only the first two and the fifth cases filed by the United States were ready for adjudication. The last pleading of the Panamanian Government in cases nos. 3 and 4 had not been filed.

The Commission, contrary to extended arguments by the American Agent, decided to dispense with oral arguments, at least in the cases already matured, and ordered the simultaneous filing of memoranda by the two Agents in lieu of oral arguments, in spite of the fact that the defendant Government had just filed its reply brief in each case and, presumably, had nothing further to advance in the absence of any subsequent pleading of the United States to answer. Such memoranda were filed in cases nos. 1 and 2 on November 28. The Panamanian Government in these memoranda proceeded to advance arguments hitherto undisclosed and which, since the memoranda of the two Governments were required to be filed simultaneously, the United States never had an opportunity to meet. It was such possibilities as that which had occasioned the objection of the American Agent to the proposed procedure of simultaneously filing memoranda in lieu of oral arguments. Meanwhile, however, the Presiding Commissioner, Dr. Miguel Cruchaga Tocornal, had been called by the Government of Chile to become Minister for Foreign Affairs and promptly resigned, before any cases were decided.

Both Agents and the Commission had by that time reached the conclusion that it would be impossible to complete the arbitral work within the time allowed by the convention, namely, before April 1, 1933, even if the Commission could have proceeded uninterruptedly. With the resignation of Dr. Cruchaga the two Governments were definitely confronted with the necessity of choosing a new