In order to fix responsibility on the Government of the United States under international law, the claimant Government must show, it would seem, that the provisions of the act of June 30, 1930, and the act of September 7, 1916, fall below international standards and that, as a matter of fact, Añorbes, under the application of those laws, has been denied justice at the hands of the United States.

It is submitted that Añorbes received not only the benefit of the same laws and the same redress for injury which the Government of the United States gives its own citizens but, under the act of June 30, 1930, which was passed for his special benefit, greater privileges than those accorded citizens of the United States who were similarly situated.

It is submitted, therefore, that a full measure of justice has been and is being accorded to the claimant in this case and that rather than having made "an odious distinction" against Añorbes, a special law was passed for his benefit which gave him greater privileges than those ordinarily accorded to citizens of the United States under similar circumstances.

It is submitted that in no sense of the term can it be said that Añorbes suffered a "denial of justice" at the hands of American authorities. Good faith is rightly attributable to the American authorities at every stage of the methods and procedure adopted and employed in dealing with Añorbes.

The following steps were taken by the authorities of the American Government in dealing with Añorbes' case. Under the terms of the law of May 30, 1908, as amended March 4, 1911, Añorbes was paid his regular compensation amounting to $601.67 during the entire period of his actual disability. Moreover, all of his medical and hospital expenses were paid for him.

He has been given continuous employment by the United States whenever he desired to work for it, so far as the record shows, from the termination of his disability to the present time.

Section 41 of the act of September 7, 1916, reads in part as follows:

66

That all Acts or parts of Acts inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed: Provided, however, That for injuries occurring prior to the passage of this Act compensation shall be paid under the law in force at the time of the passage of this Act: . . ."

It is clear, therefore, that Añorbes was not entitled to the benefits of the act of September 7, 1916. The act of June 30, 1930, Answer, annex 6, p. 25, however, extended to Añorbes the benefits of that law, retroactively, thus placing him in a specially favored position.

If at any time Añorbes should be unable in any calendar month to earn a rate of pay equal to that which he was receiving when he was injured, because of disabilities resulting from such injury, a claim for compensation on account of such pay loss may be filed by him with the Governor of the Panama Canal.

It is clear, therefore, that Añorbes is amply protected by the laws of the United States cited herein and, in addition, that those laws have been so administered as to accord him the fullest protection thereunder.

It seems obvious that these laws are not below international standards and that consequently there is no basis upon which to predicate a claim to international responsibility on the part of the United States in this case.

This is a claim on behalf of Juan Añorbes for 25,000

balboas. The claimant is a Panamanian by birth.

On October 23, 1911, Añorbes, then a winchman employed by the Division of Dredges of the Panama Canal at a salary of $50 per month, sustained a severe fracture of the right arm while cleaning an engine. This resulted in permanent partial disability. Under the compensation law then in force, he was given free hospital and medical treatment and a year's salary as compensation for his injury. Except for a few very brief interims he was employed by the United States Government from December, 1912, to April, 1915, and from January, 1924, to June, 1933, at rates of salary averaging substantially over $50 per month. By special act of Congress of June 30, 1930, there were extended to him, from that date, the benefits of the 1916 Compensation Act. He is thereby assured that if his earnings in future drop below $50 per month the deficiency will be made good under the statute.

The Commission holds that the United States is responsible for the injury to the claimant. He was ordered by his superiors to clean an engine, and those superiors allowed the engine to be put in motion while he was cleaning it. This, unexplained, is sufficient evidence of negligence. The United States is answerable therefor (see the opinion of this Commission in the claim of Juan Manzo, Registry No. 21).

The compensation of a year's salary originally awarded to the claimant seems clearly inadequate, in view of the seriousness of his injury. It is equally clear, however, that if, from the time of his injury, he had been entitled to the benefits of the system of compensation established by the 1916 act, which was made applicable to him by the special act of 1930, he would have been justly treated.

The Commission finds that the claimant has not been prejudiced by the fact that he did not receive the protection of the 1916 compensation law until 1930. During the period from his injury until the passage of the act of June 30, 1930, the Canal Zone authorities took pains

to provide him with employment. The amounts received by him from the United States alone during this period total only slightly less than what he would have received if he had gotten a regular monthly compensation of $50 during the entire time.

It is to be noted, moreover, that from 1915 to 1924 the claimant was not employed by the United States. The evidence shows that he was gainfully employed during at least part of that period, by the Government of Panama. And in that interval he was twice offered employment by the United States.

The Commission therefore feels that the facts show that the claimant, in net result, is as well off as he would have been if the present system of compensation had been available to him from the time of his injury. Since that present system is adequate and just, the claimant is not entitled to an award. In reaching this conclusion the Commission assumes that the claimant will in the future continue to enjoy the protection afforded by the 1916 act. The Commission decides that the claim is disallowed. Done at Washington, D.C., this 27th day of June, 1933. D. W. VAN HEECKEREN

See the Comment on the Juan Manzo claim, ante, p. 695.

CLAIM

on behalf of

COMPAÑÍA DE NAVEGACIÓN NACIONAL

DOCKET REGISTRY NO. 26

Syllabus

1. The conventions of 1903 and 1914 between the United States and Panama fix the boundary as between the territorial waters of the Republic of Panama and the Canal Zone but do not purport to fix the seaward limit of the territorial waters of the Canal Zone, which is left to the operation of international law.

2. The suggestion was made that a fortified island (Flamenco Island) belonging to the Canal Zone and guarding the entrance of the Canal, may of itself have a 3-mile marginal zone seaward. 3. The jurisdiction of the coastal state over the 3-mile marginal sea is clearly established in international law. Exceptions thereto must be established by "clear authority".

4. Sovereignty over the 3-mile zone of marginal seas is, by "clear preponderance of authority ", qualified by what is known as the "right of innocent passage" which forbids the sovereign from prohibiting the innocent passage through that zone of foreign merchant vessels.

5. There is "no clear preponderance of authority to the effect that such vessels [foreign merchant vessels] when passing through territorial waters are exempt from civil arrest ".

6. The rules pertaining to the extent of jurisdiction in harbors are recognized as different from those relating to other marginal

seas.

7. The finding of fact by the United States District Court for the Canal Zone regarding the place of arrest of a foreign vessel was accepted by the Commission as based upon a "preponderance of the evidence before the United States District Court ". 8. A judgment of the Supreme Court of Panama based upon service by publication only, was held not to be valid in the Canal Zone.