view to accepting the contract if such conditions were found to be satisfactory. She found them satisfactory, and was appointed directress by a decree of May 13, 1918. She accepted the appointment June 10 of that year. No contract was signed. However, for the months of June and July 1918, the claimant received $200 monthly, plus subsistence, conformably with the offer made by the Panamanian Consul in New York.

On July 30, 1918, the claimant was summarily dismissed by the Panamanian Secretary of Public Instruction. The explanation given for this abrupt action was that Miss Brown had written a letter to the Secretary criticizing his order that all schools in Panama were to observe a day of "mourning", to signalize local sentiment toward the supervision of the Panamanian elections by the United States. Miss Brown complained that this order was "anti-pedagogical", and tended to bring troublous political questions to a school, which, in her opinion, should be "a small world foreign to these agitations". The Government of Panama contended that the dismissal was justified in sound discretion and for reasons of national dignity. The Panamanian Government did not pay the transportation of Miss Brown back to the United States, and as a result of her dismissal she was unable to procure other employment for more than a year.

The Government of Panama denied that a contract had been concluded between the claimant and the Government, and alleged that the appointment and acceptance was revocable at the will of either party. The Agent for the United States contended that all the elements of a contract were present in accordance with Panamanian law, viz, subject matter, consideration, meeting of the minds, and willingness to perform, and that the appointment and acceptance actually evidenced a binding agreement. Moreover, it was contended that the claimant was entitled to notice and hearing under Panamanian law; and that the action of the Secretary of Public Instruction was so unreasonable and unjust that an award should be made on behalf of the claimant even in the absence of a definite contract.

EXTRACTS FROM MEMORANDUM OF UNITED STATES

I. THERE WAS A CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CLAIMANT, AGNES EWING BROWN, AND THE GOVERNMENT OF PANAMA.

In the spring of 1918 claimant was offered a contract for 5 years at $2,400 per annum, with living and traveling expenses. Memorial, p. 3, annex 3. Claimant was urged by the Secretary of Public Instruction of Panama and

the American Minister to accept the offer. The Panamanian Government paid her transportation from the United States to that country, Memorial, pp. 4, 5, 45. She sailed for Panama in May 1918, in pursuance of these negotiations. After her arrival there the President of the Republic of Panama, by Decree No. 60 of May 13, 1918, appointed her Directress of the Girls' Normal School, which appointment she officially accepted on June 10, 1918. Memorial, pp. 5, 25–26.

It is obvious from these facts that there was a contract between the claimant and the Government of Panama, because all elements of a valid contract were present, including writing. These elements according to article 1112 of the Civil Code of Panama are: (1) Consensus of the parties, (2) certain object forming the basis of the contract, (3) consideration. All of these elements were present. The consensus of the parties is found in the appointment by Decree No. 60 of May 13, 1918, and claimant's acceptance by executing the Acto de Posesión. Memorial, pp. 25-26. The certain object of the contract was the rendering of services as Directress of the Girls' Normal School for one full year. This is the obvious interpretation of an agreement for services as directress of a school, especially under the circumstances of this case. In this connection, the Commission is invited to note that the Government of Panama admits that the contractual relationship between claimant and Panama envisaged serv

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ices for one year as is shown by the following quotation from the Answer of Panama:

“ "Miss Brown maintains, and it is true, that her annual salary amounted to $2,400" (p. 4).

The consideration mentioned in the code readily appears in the salary agreed upon by the Government of Panama to be paid and actually paid by it for a brief period and the services to be rendered by the claimant.

The Government of Panama admits that President Valdés expressed to claimant his pleasure at her acceptance of the contract. Memorial of United States, pp. 5, 16; Answer of Panama, pars. V and VI.

The only defense advanced by Panama on this point is that there was no such written contract between the parties as could be enforced, under article 1103 of the Civil Code. Answer of Panama, pp. 4, 5. The Agent of the United State is confident that, in view of the circumstances of this case as above briefly outlined, this ultratechnical contention of the Panamanian Government will not find sanction in the minds of the Commission, especially since such a strained construction appears to be supported by no authority whatever.

II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF PANAMA CONTAINS NO PROVISION AUTHORIZING THE TERMINATION OF THE CONTRACT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PRESENT CASE.

(Memorial of United States, p. 6; Brief of United States, pp. 3-7.)

The unjust and precipitate action of the Secretary of Public Instruction, in the view of the American Minister, "grew out of political friction between Andreve and Preciado" and was "the result of 'littleness' on the part of Andreve", etc. Memorial, p. 45. In any event such action constituted a clear violation of article 414 of the Administrative Code of Panama, official edition of 1917. Brief, pp. 5, 6. The Government of Panama relies upon article 629, section 18, of the Administrative Code, on the theory that this article vested the Executive with autocratic

power to terminate any contract of appointment in his discretion. Answer of Panama, p. 3. But article 629, section 18, read in its entirety, provides that this power can be exercised "except where the Constitution or the laws provide that they (employees) are not subject to free removal". Brief, p. 6. Article 414 of the Administrative Code must therefore be considered as a term implicit in the contract and also one of the laws contemplated by section 18 of article 629. Article 414 provides:

"No employee of the Department of Public Instruction shall be discharged from his position on account of his political ideas." Brief, p. 6.

That claimant was discharged because of her political ideas is shown clearly by the following paragraph of the Reply Brief of the Panamanian Government:

"Miss Brown's dismissal from the position of Directress of the Girls' Normal School was not only necessary but indispensable for the sake of national dignity."

There is clearly, therefore, no ground for the contention of the Government of Panama that the claimant " subject to discretionary removal by the Executive". Answer of Panama, p. 1. The Executive may have violated the contract on that erroneous assumption, and without regard to the provisions of the Administrative Code above cited. Such contract violation was not, however, any the less an injury to private rights because of that circumstance.

EXTRACTS FROM BRIEF OF UNITED STATES

It is questionable whether it was within the absolute power of the Executive of Panama to discharge the claimant without a hearing and without cause, and whether such discharge was not, therefore, a violation of her rights under Panamanian law.

The Administrative Code of Panama, official edition 1917, provides as follows:

"ARTICLE 414. The teachers and directors of schools who are mentioned in the preceding article, shall be removed from their positions when due to incompetence, due to contagious chronic diseases or diseases which incapacitate a person for the service, due to having given themselves up to some vice; or on account of having been neglectful in the performance of their duties, they should not continue holding their positions. In case of serious and notorious faults, they may be suspended temporarily by the respective Supervisor of Public Instruction, who shall report the matter to the Department for final determination. No employee of the Department of Public Instruction shall be discharged from his position on account of his political ideas and such employees are exempted from the obligation to hold onerous positions or offices and from all personal taxes."

"ARTICLE 423. The Technical Assistant, the Supervisors of Public Instruction and the Directors, Assistant Directors, Professors and Teachers of schools and colleges, as well as the administrative personnel thereof, are absolutely prohibited from taking part in political fights or disputes and in electoral struggles, they not being bound to hold electoral public offices.

"The foregoing does not prevent them from being able to entertain such political ideas as they deem proper, nor from making use of their electoral rights at the opportune moment."

"ARTICLE 629. As supreme administrative authority, it devolves upon the President of the Republic:

"... 18. To remove employees at his discretion, except where the Constitution or the laws provide that they are not subject to free removal (de libre remoción)."

The underscored [italicized] provisions of the code quoted above, it is submitted, are of sufficient weight to have justified the expectation that the claimant should be given a notice and a hearing before discharge, and it is believed that such a hearing would have made unnecessary the unjust and precipitate action of the Panamanian authorities.

The letter which led to Miss Brown's summary discharge was, at most, disrespectful. Memorial of Panama,

annex 8.