She complained in that letter of the "anti-pedagogical" nature of Señor Andreve's proclamation of "mourning" because of American supervision of Panamanian elections. She stated, however, that she did not know the "platform" of any political party in Panama and disclaimed any desire to know it. She defended the supervision, but that can scarcely be considered as engaging in a "political dispute" or in an "electoral struggle" within the terms of the Administrative Code.

The arbitrary nature of the summary dismissal of Miss Brown, considered in the light of these facts, is the more apparent; and it is believed that it will now be conceded by the Panamanian Government that there was inflicted upon her, in this manner, an unnecessary and inexcusable injustice which the Panamanian Government will now desire to rectify. Brief, pp. 5–9.

EXTRACTS FROM BRIEF OF PANAMA

I admit Miss Brown's qualifications, but I deny emphatically the causes which give rise to the claim.

The latter was based on the allegation that Miss Brown held the position under contract. I contended that there was no contract but that she held a public position subject to discretionary appointment and removal by the President of the Republic.

The Agent of the United States of America admits that Miss Brown, in writing to the Secretary of Public Instruction, used disrespectful terms "voicing a protest"; but he extenuates such attitude by alleging the nervous condition in which she was on account of illness.

Miss Brown's dismissal from the position of Directress of the Girls' Normal School was not only necessary but indispensable for the sake of national dignity.

The claim was based upon the allegation that there was a contract between the parties; but it has been established that there was none. Miss Brown was at liberty to leave her position at any time that she deemed desirable. On its part, the Panamanian Government could dismiss her when it saw fit to do so, without the necessity of giving explanations. (Art. 629, sec. 18, of the Administrative Code.)

After the completion of the pleadings provided for in the rules of procedure, the Agents by consent of the Commission filed Memoranda in lieu of oral arguments.

This claim is made against the Republic of Panama by the United States of America, on behalf of Agnes Ewing Brown.

Miss Brown was at all material times, and is now, an American citizen.

During the year 1912-1913 she filled the position of Directress of the Girls' Normal School in Panamá City. The recollection of the services then rendered by her induced the President of the Republic of Panama in the spring of 1918, to make her, through the intermediary of the Consul General of the Republic at New York, an offer of reappointment in that position. The conditions offered were: The salary to be $2,400 per year, with an additional allowance of $840 per year for living expenses; the term of the contract to be for 5 years; claimant to be required to live in the school building; first-class passage to Panama and return fare from Panama to New York to be paid by Panama.

For different reasons the claimant hesitated to accept this offer. Meanwhile, the then Panamanian Secretary of Instruction, Señor Preciado, asked the American Minister in Panama to urge her to accept, which the Minister did by cablegram sent on May 1, 1918.

Miss Brown sailed for Panama in that month. Her passage was paid for by the Panamanian Government, but no contract had been signed. She was appointed by Presidential Decree nr. 60 of May 13, 1918, signed by President Valdés, and officially accepted her appointment on June 10, 1918.

In the month of July certain correspondence took place between the Secretary of Instruction, Señor Andreve, and the directress, which led to her being dismissed by Presidential Decree nr. 116 of July 30, 1918, signed by President Urriola. The claimant alleges that this dismissal was without just cause and in violation of a contract and without any breach thereof on her part.

She claims $5,000 for injury to reputation; $16,200 for salary and living allowance for 5 years, from which sum she deducts $540 being two months salary and living allowance received for the months [of] June and July 1918, and $4,900 earned by her otherwise, leaving a sum of $10,760; and $106 for cost of transportation from Panama to New York; making a total of $15,866.

A contract has not been produced and the defendant Government denies the alleged contractual relations.

In her affidavit of November 24, 1931, the claimant states: That she was offered a written contract; that she informed the Consul General of Panama at New York that she would accept the contract, if she found the living conditions in the school building desirable; that upon arrival in Panama she found them such; that she received her official appointment and accepted it. She further states that when she was received by President Valdés she communicated to him her satisfaction of the living conditions and her acceptance of the contract and that he expressed his pleasure thereat.

In the absence of other evidence and against the denial of the defendant Government these statements cannɔt prove that the alleged contract did materialize; moreover in a letter to the editor, published in the Panama Weekly News, and put in evidence by the defendant Government, the claimant mentioned on August 15, 1918, that she had been offered a contract but had refused to accept it.

In the course of the pleadings the American Agent argued that at any rate a contract for one year was entered into by the claimant being appointed on an annual salary and accepting such appointment. There is however nothing to show that Miss Brown's position as Directress of the Girls' Normal School at Panama was governed by other conditions than those resulting from the appointment in the usual form, which she accepted.

It has further been contended on behalf of the claimant that anyhow her dismissal disregarded her rights under that appointment, as she was not subject to discretionary removal under art. 629 sub 18 of the Administrative Code, but was in the class of employees which can only be dismissed for the reasons given in art. 414 of that code. Miss Brown's correspondence however makes it clear, that she was engaged in a political controversy in violation of art. 423, and was subject to removal therefor under art. 424. The claim must be disallowed.

Done at Washington, D.C., the 22nd day of May, 1933.

D. W. VAN HEECKEREN

Presiding Commissioner ELIHU ROOT, Jr.

Commissioner

H. F. ALFARO

Commissioner

COMMENT

The Tribunal in this case acted virtually as a municipal court, applying local law as between two parties to an allegedly breached contract. What was considered to be

a strict interpretation and application of such local law was made, and it was apparently not considered that there was any occasion in this case for the application of the "principles of . justice and equity", although the claimant had been induced by the defendant Government to go to a foreign country, although she had discharged her duties satisfactorily, and although she had been summarily discharged and left without employment, income, or return transportation, because of the expression to her superior officer of certain views regarding school matters which were considered to be prohibitively political in character. This Decision indicates concurrence of the Tribunal with the views expressed in the Comments on the Decision in the last preceding case to the effect that arbitral conventions allow no latitude with respect to the strict application of law when such recognizable law exists for a particular case and that resort by the Tribunal to general "principles of . . . justice and equity" is allowable only in the absence of clearly recognizable principles of law.

An unusual feature of this Decision is the weight given, apparently as a determining influence, to a newspaper article purporting to quote statements of the claimant. The defendant Government put in no evidence to establish that the newspaper article in question was an authentic reproduction of any statement ever made by the claimant. In the absence of proofs of authenticity of the statements contained in the newspaper article, it could scarcely be considered as "evidence". Moreover, even if such authenticity had been proved, the statement referred to could have been literally correct without having any bearing on the question at issue, since the claimant had been tendered a contract before going to Panama and had declined it, but had subsequently entered into relations of a contractual character with the Panamanian Government. The sentence of the newspaper article to which reference was made by the Commission, apparently did refer to the