tion with the contract. If all the papers be signed they need not refer to one another, but all must refer to the contract. Parol evidence may be introduced to identify the papers, but not to connect them. The memorandum may be printed, made in pencil or stamped; it need not be delivered to the opposite party, nor need it be published. It is sufficient that a written memorandum was made and signed by the party to be charged. If lost its contents may be proved like those of any writing.' 103. Contracts to be Performed within One Year. The statute usually provides that no action shall be brought upon any agreement made, which by its terms is not to be or cannot be performed within one year from the date of the making thereof unless the agreement, or some sufficient memorandum of it, be in writing and duly signed. In construing this act the courts have held that if the contract can by any possibility be performed or completed within a year according to the intent of the parties, then it is not within the statute and is not required to be in writing. The mere expectation or supposition of the parties as to when the contract will be completed does not determine the intent. However unlikely or impossible it may appear that the contract will not be performed, if it be possible to perform it (not terminate it), it is not within the statute. When the performance within a year is impossible it must be in writing or there must be a written memorandum. Agreements to do an act more than a year hence; to continue to do an act or service or to refrain from doing it for a greater period than one year; to take a lease for more than one year or for a year, the same to begin at some future day; to serve or employ for more than a year or for a year, the service to begin at some later day; and all contracts in which it is evident that they cannot be performed according to the express intent of the parties within a year, are within the statute. An oral agreement to make annual payments in a contract which by its terms is to continue sixteen years is within the statute, and cannot be enforced; but it might be otherwise if the contract were completely performed by the debtor.* 3 The following instances will serve to show what agreements are not within the statute, and, if not subject to the restriction of other sections of the statute, need not be in writing: A verbal contract to construct a road or house within a year and twenty days from the date thereof was held valid, as it might be completed within the year. The same has been held of an agreement dated June 5, 1883, for the erection of a structure to be put up 18 Amer. & Eng. Ency. Law 710–728. 2 Warren Co. v. Halbrook, 118 N. Y. 586. 16 Amer. Repts. 788; Lockwood v. Barnes, 3 Hill 128; Jilson v. Gilbert, 26 Wis. 637; Doyle v. Dixon, 97 Mass. 208, 93 Amer. Dec. 80, and note; 8 Amer. & Eng. Ency. Law 686; Sarles v. Sharlow (Dak.), 37 N. W. Rep. 749 [1888], and note. 3 Jackson Iron Co. v. Negaunee C. Co. (C. C. A.), 65 Fed. Rep. 298. 4 Weatherford, etc., R. Co. v. Wood (Tex.), 29 S. W. Rep. 411. 'Jones v. Pouch, 41 Ohio St. 146 [1884]; part during the season of 1883 and part during the season of 1884;' and of an agreement to work a quarry and to divide the profits, no time being specified.' If the promise depend upon the happening of an event which may not happen within a long time, but which has happened within a year, the agreement is good and will sustain an action. A verbal contract to deliver ties, timber, etc., on the line of a railroad, to be inspected once a month, and, if received, to be paid for at current prices, the contract to continue until the contractor is notified to stop, is not within the statute;' and so also of an agreement to continue to supply materials as long as wanted. An oral agreement between a father and a son by which the son is to support his parents during their lives is not within the statute, as it may be performed within a year; but a verbal agreement whereby a railroad company undertakes to lay a switch for the use of a sawmill-owner, and to maintain it as long as he should need it, was held within the statute when it was expected and understood that he would need it for many years.' When it is expressly agreed that a contract is to be performed within one year, extension from the date of completion from time to time by parol for periods less than one year will not be effected by the statute of frauds." 104. Contracts Executed or Completed by Contractor.-If the contract is executed by one party it does not come within the statute of frauds. Therefore a contract to build a house for $2400;-$500 when the house is begun, $500 when the house is finished, and the residue in five yearly payments, with interest payable semi-annually, was held not within the statute, the contract having being wholly performed by the contractor within a year. The contract had been reduced to writing, but never signed. While this case may represent the general law, there are many cases to the contrary in Massachusetts," New York, Vermont, and other states. If, however, the contract has been fully performed and accepted by one party to the enrichment of the other party, such cases may be supported on the ground that a contract is implied by law to pay for the same, and the contract is good evidence of the value of the performance or work done. 105. Contracts for Employment Not to be Completed within a Year.Instances within the statute which are most likely to occur in the experi Rep. 241 [1888]; 8 Amer. & Eng. Ency. 7 Warner v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 147. 8 Donovan v. Richmond (Mich.), 28 N. W. Rep. 516; 8 Amer. & Eng. Ency. Law 688. Durfee v. O'Brien, 14 Atl. Rep. 857 [1888]: Haines v. Thompson, 19 N. Y. Sup. 184. 10 See 8 Amer & Eng. Ency. Law 692. ence of every engineer or architect are verbal contracts for employment by the year, which are usually made some time before the service begins. Such a contract, unless in writing, will not hold, and the employee may get his discharge any day and find himself without redress.' If the contract of employment as set forth in his written memorandum is incomplete, then the contract may fail. If, however, the service be by the year and has continued for one year, and as to the next year nothing has been said, a new implied contract may arise at the end of the first year's service, which the law will enforce though not in writing. The new contract implied by the law is a hiring from year to year, performed within a year, and therefore good. A verbal agreement for a future term to begin at once and not exceeding one year is not within the statute." A contract for one year, to commence when the employee secures release from present employment, was held not within the statute, when it was possible to secure the release on the date of contract, though in fact the release was not secured till later. A verbal contract for steady and permanent employment is not void or within the statute, as it may be at an end any time upon the death of the employee. If the contract by its terms contains an option allowing either party to terminate it within a year, it is not within the statute and need not be in writing.** If no definite time be agreed upon as to when the service shall terminate or how long it shall continue, it need not be in writing, but it were better to be in writing always.' Contracts not to be performed within a year must be signed by both parties. If not signed, part performance will not take it out of the operation of the statute in an action at law,' although it has been held a ground for relief in equity." 1 Milan v. Rio Grande, etc., R. (Tex.), 37 S. W. Rep. 165; Moody v. Jones (Tex.), 37 S. W. Rep. 379. 2 Smes v. Supt. (Mich.), 25 N. W. Rep. 485; Cullis v. Bothhamley, 7 W. R. 87; Lelande v. Aldrich (La.), 6 So. Rep. 28, 8 Amer. & Eng. Ency. Law 687, 14 Amer. & Eng. Ency. Law 765; Ball v. Stover, 31 N. Y. Supp. 781; Herman v. Littlefield (Cal.), 42 Pac. Rep. 443. 38 Amer. & Eng. Ency Law 687; Whiting . Ohlert (Mich.), 18 N. W. Rep. 219; Raynor v. Drew (Cal.), 13 Pac. Rep. 866 and note; Ward v. Mathews (Cal.), 14 Pac. Rep. 604; Sharkey . McDermoth (Mo.), 4 S. W. Rep. 107: Franklin Sugar Co. v. Taylor (Kans.). 15 Pac. Rep 586 [1888]. 4 Baltimore B. Co. v. Callahan (Md.), 33 Atl. Rep. 460. 5 Penn. Co. v. Dolan (Ind. App.), 32 N E. Rep. 802; Harrington v. Kansas C. C. Ry. Co., 1 Mo. App. 135, "at a monthly salary, so long as he shall do the work assigned him Carter W. Ld. Co. v. Kinlin (Neb.), 66 N. W. Rep. 536, so long as the works are kept running " 6 Blake. Voight (N. Y. A ̈p.), 31 N. E. Rep. 256 [1892]; but see contra Doyle v. Dixon, 97 Mass. 208; and see Dobson v. Collis, 1 H. & N. 81; and 8 Amer. & Eng. Ency. Law 692. 'Jagau v. Goetz (Com. Pl.), 32 N. Y. Supp. 144; Smalley v. Mitchell (Mich.), 68 N. W. Rep. 978. 8 Wilkinson v. Heavenrich (Mich.), 26 N. W. Rep. 139. 9 Wolke v. Fleming (Ind.), 2 N. E. Rep. 325; Henry v. Wells (Ark.), 3 S. W. Rep. 637. 10 Warner v. Texas & P. Ry. (C. C. A.), 54 Fed. Rep. 922. *See also Sec. 801, infra. 106. Contracts for an Interest in Lands.-The statutes usually require that any contract for the sale or transfer of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or any interest in or concerning them, shall be in writing, or that a sufficient memorandum shall be made in writing. This section has been held to apply to private sales, auction sales by administrators, executors, trustees, commissioners, and public officers, except judicial sales, and to exchanges of land. The statute applies to every agreement in regard to the title of lands, for the sale of equitable. title as well as the legal title, and in short to every agreement by which an interest in land is modified, increased, or diminished, even to agreements. for the possession of lands;' to agreements in regard to the use of a party wall; for the sale of bricks of a ruined house still standing on the land," or to prepare the plans of a building and to superintend the construction. thereof, in consideration of the conveyance of a certain lot." In some Whether a sale of growing timber or crops is an interest in lands is held differently in different states. It is usually determined by the evident. intention of the parties, if that can be gathered from the evidence, whether the sale is a sale of chattels made by cutting the growing timber or crops. or whether the buyer is to derive any benefit from the lands. states it must be in writing if it is a natural growth, i. e., not requiring cultivation as timber; while if it is for a crop that has been planted and cultivated like growing grain, potatoes, and root crops, then an oral con tract will suffice. A good general rule is that the agreement does not fall within the statute unless some interest in lands in the nature of a title, enforceable either in a court of law or equity, is sought to be obtained, created, or transferred to the party furnishing the consideration. Therefore improvements upon lands, distinct from the title or possession, are not such an interest in the land as to bring agreements therefor within the statute. A parol promise to pay for work or labor upon land, whether already done or to be done, has never been held to be within the statute." An agreement to pay one-half the cost of a party wall located half on the land of two coterminous owners was held not within the statute of frands." Agreements relating solely to the use to be made of lands are valid if not in writing. Such is an agreement not to use a building for a certain purpose, to keep up a fence, to remove a fence, or to use lands for the manufacture of bricks from clay found in it, the title of the property in the clay and wood to remain in the owner until paid for. An agreement not to 18 Amer. & Eng. Encv. Law 694-7. Rice. Roberts 24 Wis. 461. Meyers . Schemp, 67 Ill. 469; but see contra 8 Amer. & Eng. Enev. Law 698. 4 Koch. Williams (Wis ), 52 N. W. Rep. 257 $8 Amer. & Eng. Ency. Law 698-700. 68 Amer. & Eng. Ency. Law 701. Many cases cited in 29 Amer. & Eng. Ency. Law 860; Scales v. Wiley (Vt.), 33 Atl. Rep. 771. 748. Stult v. Sweezy (Neb.), 67 N. W. Rep. build within a certain number of feet from the street and an agreement to open a street have both been held to be within the statute;' but parol agreements between coterminous owners of lands fixing their boundaries, followed by possession, is valid and binding,' and an agreement to remove a fence has been held not within the statute. There are, however, decisions holding such oral agreements void. Usually the cases hold that the parties must occupy to the boundary for the full statutory period, which bars an action at law, though there are cases to the effect that possession for a shorter time will fix the boundary." The right to possession of land is such an interest in land as to require an agreement to deliver possession to be in writing." 107. Special Agreements Relating to Lands.-Agreements releasing pecuniary claims for damages to lands where they have been flowed by a mill-pond, or have been taken for public purposes, need not be in writing, for they are held not within the statute." Agreements to refund or discount the price if the quantity of land falls short have been held valid if not in writing, but an agreement to pay an additional sum if coal was found has been held within the statute." Where land has been conveyed an oral promise to pay therefor at a certain rate is not within the statute of frauds, and the stipulated amount may be recovered in an action at law.' 108. Contract Implied by Law to Pay for Benefits Conferred when there has been Enrichment.-Under any of the provisions of the statute, if a contractor has, in reliance upon an oral agreement and in accordance with its terms, made improvements which are a benefit to the other party estate, he may recover their value if the other party refuse to perform his part of the agreement. The recovery is not upon the oral agreement, but upon the contract implied by law and imposed upon the owner by law that he shall not enrich himself at the expense of one whom he has victimized. An attempt to make an oral contract between the parties, or the existence of such an undertaking, does not prevent the law from imposing a contract upon the party who has profited by his own wrong." The owner must have been enriched, for if the contract was entirely for the benefit of the contractor he cannot recover, and the profits he has received may be deducted. from the value of the improvements."1 * 18 Amer. & Eng. Ency. Law 703. 2 Archer v. Helin (Miss.). 11 So. Rep. 3. 3 Storms v. Snyder, 10 Johns. 109; and see 44 Wis. 96, 60 Wis. 310, 500. 4 White . Hopeman, 43 Mich. 267; Hagey v. Detweiler, 35 Pa. St. 409. 5 See Adverse Possession, 1 Amer. & Eng. Ency. Law 249–250. 6 Boyd v. Paul (Mo.), 28 S. W. Rep. 171. Smith v. Goulding, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 154. 88 Amer. & Eng. Ency. Law 704. Freed v. Richy (Pa.). 8 Atl. Rep. 626; Kickland v. Mensha W. W. Co. (Wis.), 31 N. W. Rep. 471; Huff e. Hall (Mich.), 23 N. W Rep. 88: Camp v. Moreman (Ky.), 2 S. W. Rep. 179: Railroad Co. v. English, 16 Pac. Rep. 82 [1887]. 108 Amer. & Eng. Ency. Law 661. Clement v. Durgin, 5 Greel. (Me.) 14; |