Difference between the Dialectic & Synthetic Method. 185

of thinking is a synthetical act embracing two opposites, and that it is the sole province of philosophy to discover and explain how this synthesis is possible; that is, how it happens that we must in every act of our mind hold two opposites, in part related and in part opposed to each other.

The problem of philosophy, therefore, is altogether, as Kant very correctly had stated before, to discover the absolute ground of all synthetical judgments.

Now this absolute final ground Fichte-as before him Kant states to be this: the Ego, or an absolutely active self-conscious activity, could not be an Ego, could not be selfconscious of itself as such absolute activity, if there did not appear in every act of its self-consciousness also a non-Ego; the reason being this: an absolute activity could never become conscious of itself if it were not checked in its activity, and thus, as it were, thrown back into itself with what would now be a consciousness of both itself and a check. Now, having once named itself as absolute activity by the name Ego, it could certainly not look upon the check of that activity as also Ego, but would rather have to look upon and name it its opposite, non-Ego.

Coming thus to consciousness, it would, therefore, find as its primitive nature and act, as indeed that which constituted its nature and act, a synthesis of non-Ego and Ego; and this primitive and original synthesis could not otherwise than manifest itself in every other one of its acts.

What must be noticed here is the statement, that neither can the Ego be explained from the non-Ego, nor the non-Ego from the Ego; that neither is analytically contained in the other as part of it, but that both are in fact complete and utter opposites; that is, must be so conceived, and cannot be conceived otherwise. Their union, the union of the thesis of a pure Ego and the antithesis of a checking non-Ego, results in the synthesis of a self-conscious Ego; that is, of a rational absolute mind in a material limited body, or, more accurately expressed, in a system of such rational individuals, each one of which, as such a synthetic unity, is that very trinity which theologians by a fallacy of reasoning apply to the conception of the totality of the Egohood and call it the triune God.

Hegel's proceeding differs from the above synthetic in this,

that he does not concede, or at least does not seem to concede, this partly absolute oppositedness of the two elements of the synthesis; and looks only to their relatedness. Thus he does not say, that immediately together with the conception of Being another entirely opposite, though also related, conception of non-Being is joined when we think Becoming; but he says, or seems to say, that the conception of Being involves as one of its parts the conception of non-Being; that the latter conception can, therefore, be analytically gathered from the first; though, if he does so mean, it is not possible to see how Being could change into Becoming, since the element of non-Being would not alter the character of Being at all, and Being, after non-Being had been pointed out as one of its characteristics, would still remain simply Being and nothing else. If Hegel does not so mean, he has chosen a most unfortunate way of expressing himself; but his own averment in his History of Philosophy would, as we have said, seem to suggest that he did not so mean. If he did so mean, however, then there is a difference and a most vital one between Fichte's synthetic and Hegel's dialectic method, a difference which will now be apparent to every one.

It may be mentioned in passing, as perhaps of interest to those who have read Trendelenburg's criticism of Hegel's method in this Journal, that Trendelenburg's objection to the dialectic method-that it surreptitiously takes and applies the contemplation of local motion from empirical consciousnessis simply absurd. Local motion occurs between two bodies in space, and the conception of local motion can be applied, of course, to nothing else. Trendelenburg's criticism, therefore, implies that he considers the conceptions of Being aud non-Being--which are alluded to by Hegel as moving in a dialectic way-as things in space; and one is tempted to ask him, whether he considers them of globular or triangular form, &c. The absurdity is clear. It is not from local motion that the general conception of motion issues; indeed, the very reverse is the case, the activity of thinking, being the primitive source of the conception of movement. And even in common language we thus speak of thoughts as moving, &c. Hegel is thus perfectly justified, and introduces no surreptitiously obtained conception when he speaks of a dialectic

movement as the equivalent for the sequence of certain conceptions in thinking. It is a strange evidence of the general superficiality of "thinkers" that such things should require notice; stranger still that this evident absurdity should have been considered by Trendelenburg a wonderful discovery, overthrowing the gigantic fabric of Hegel's Logic! But these continual misapprehensions and disputes make it all the more clear, how necessary for the exactness of a pure science is a system of signs to replace words, and leave it a matter of deep regret that Leibnitz, who had such a system projected, did not carry out his design, he being of all the great minds of science beyond doubt most peculiarly gifted to have given it best shape. The real objection, as already suggested, to the word "movement" in that famous paragraph of the Logic is this, that Hegel speaks as if the conceptions of Being and non-Being moved. Now, mere conceptions as they are, they of course cannot, in proper use of language, be said to move; but the thinking of them is, in all language, quite properly called a moving from one to the other. The question, however, whether Hegel meant this or not, does not involve any unauthorized making use of the conception of local motion, but simply the point, above discussed, whether Hegel meant his dialectic method to be the same as Fichte's synthetical method or not.

BOOK NOTICES

The Dialogues of Plato, translated into English, with Analyses and Introductions, by B. Jowett, M.A.. Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Oxford. 4 vols. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1871.

This reprint, which costs the student just one half the price of the original English edition, should be in every library, public or private. Moreover, every one should read it; many people own a copy of Plato, but how few read and understand him! Professor Jowett has spared no pains to make a free translation—one that seems vernacular English. It has immense advantages in this respect over any former translation. We commend the work to all interested in Philosophy. Let them read Emerson's essay on Plato in the "Representative Men," then Hegel's lecture on Plato in Vol. IV. of this Journal, and then read Jowett's translation, and study his Introductions.

Die Rechtsstellung des Weibes innerhalb der Ehe. Ein Vortrag von Max Eberhardt. Chicago: Meminger & Shick. 1871.

Friedrich Ueberweg, von A. Lange. [Eine Gedächtnissrede.] Berlin: Ernst Siegfried, Mittler & Sohn. 1871. [Sent us by Dr. Collyns Simon.]

The Journal of Psychological Medicine: A Quarterly Review of Diseases of the Nervous System, Medical Jurisprudence, and Anthropology. Edited by Wm. A. Hammond, M.D. Vol. 5, No. 4. October, 1871. New York: D. Appleton & Co.

This number contains among other articles an elaborate one entitled, “Medico-Legal Notes on the Case of Edward H. Ruloff; with Observations upon, and Measurements of, his Cranium, Brain, &c.; by Geo. Burr, M.D." In another. entitled A Letter to the Editor on some Recent Contributions to Mental Science, Medical Jurisprudence, and Anthropology; by Geo. E. Day, F.R.S.," is given a very interesting account of Huxley's recent lecture on Bishop Berkeley. Das Verhältniss von Schule und Staat. Hamburg, 1871. [Sent us by Dr. A. G. Todtenhaupt.]

Ueber die Grundung eines Wissenschaftlichen Volks-lehrer-Seminars unabhängig von Kirche und Staat. Ein Gegenvorschlag gegen die beabsichtigte Grundung einer Hamburgischen Akademie, von A. G. Todtenhaupt.

Schule und Staat. Aus dem Französischen des Professor Tiberghien in Brüssel; üebersetzt, von J. H. Hamburg: Wilhelm Jowien. 1871. [Sent also by Dr. A. G. T.

Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Phil. Kritik. LIX Bandes, erstes und zweites Hefte. Halle: C. E. M. Pfeffer. 1871.

Contents of No. 1: I. Philosophizing-Extract from a Speech by Prelate G. Mehring. II. Contributions to the History and Criticism of Philosophy, noticed by Dr. Arthur Richter. III. Logic, or Science of Knowing with respect to the relation between Philosophy and Theology; its Outlines presented by Rudolph Seydel, D.Phil., &c.; reviewed by Prof. Dr. v. Reichlin-Meldegg. IV. Logic and Metaphysics, by Prof. Dr. Leonhard Rabus: Part 1st-Theory of Knowledge, History of Logic, System of Logic, together with a Chronological Survey of the Literature of Logic, and an Alphabetical Index to its Contents; reviewed by Dr. Reichlin-Meldegg. V. The Complete Logic: A Book for Schools and Students. compiled from the stand-point of Natural Science, and intended for a criticism of previous books on Logic, &c.; by Prof. Dr. J. Hoppe; reviewed by Dr. Reichlin-Meldegg. VI. Psychologie Naturelle: A Study upon the Treatment of Aliens and Criminals; by Dr. Prosper Despine; reviewed by F. A. v. Hartsen. VII. Speculative Anthropology looked at from a Christian-Philosophical Standpoint; by Dr. Carl Werner; reviewed by Prof. Dr. Sengler. VIII. The Doctrine of Berkeley: A short final reply to T. Collyns Simon, LL.D.; by Prof. Leberweg. IX. Correction of Certain Statements in Ulrici's Defence; by Dr. R. Hoppe. X. Correction of the Foregoing "Corrections"; by Dr. Ulrici. Beiträge zur Kenntniss des Amerikanischen Schulwesens [Review of the St. Louis School Report continued through five numbers of the Gemeinnützige Wochenschrift, published at Würzburg, Germany], by Prof. L. Grasberger. Bulletin of the Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters, Nos. 4 & 5 (Feb. and July, 1871); published by the Academy, at Madison, Wis.

Contents: I. List of Officers of the Academy. II. Executive Proceedings of the Fourth Meeting. III. Scientific Communications presented at the Fourth Meeting. IV. Executive Proceedings at the Fifth Meeting. V. Scientific Communications presented at the Fifth Meeting. [Sent us by Dr. J. W. Hoyt, President of the Academy.]

Jahres Bericht über die Dorotheenstaedtische Real-Schule. 1870 and 1871.

The Report for 1870 contains, besides the school advertisement, a learned article by Dr. F. Frederichs, principal of the school, on Berkeley's Idealism. This is followed in the Report for 1871 by a discussion of the Phenomenal Idealism of Berkeley and of Kant, a contribution also by Dr. Frederichs. These articles belong to the wide-spread movement occasioned by the translation of Berkeley's chief work by Dr. Ueberweg and the polemical articles of Dr. Collyns Simon, of which we have spoken in vol. v., p. 283, of this Journal.

La Filosofia della Scuole Italiane. Anno ii., vol. iii., disp. 1, 2 & 3; vol. iv., disp. 1 & 2. Firenze: M. Cellini. 1871.

Contents No. 1-I. Acts of the Literary and Philosophical Society: (a) The Future of Metaphysical Speculation; (6) Letter on the same topic. II. The Incapacity of the Human Will, and other Hypotheses of the Materialists (T. Collyns Simon, LL.D.), being a Letter to Dr. Herzen, author of Physiological Analysis of the Free Human Will. III. Ethics of Positive Philosophy: Speculations on the Intention, the Moral Good, and the Useful (Prof. G. Barzellotti). IV. Philosophical and Literary Notice on Bergmann's First Principles of a Theory of Consciousness (Prof. Luigi Ferri).

Contents No. 2-I. Acts of the Literary and Philosophical Society: (a) Act of approval of three MSS.; (b) Influence of Philosophy on the German National Spirit (Dr. Giuseppe Desours, of Tournay). II. Philosophical Conversations (Prof. F. Bonatelli). III. Incapacity of the Human Will, and other Hypotheses of the Materialists (T. Collyns Simon, LL.D.) IV. Analysis and Criticism of New Works; Literary and Philosophical Notices (Prof. Luigi Ferri).

Contents No. 3-I. Acts of the Literary and Philosophical Society: (a) Philosophical themes; (b) Literary themes; (c) The Philosophy of Religion—(1) The Infinite its own Limit, (2) The Conception of Life applied to God. (3) Reconsideration of the Conception of the Infinite, (4) The Real Relation of the Creator to the Created, (5) General Treatment of the Divine Attributes, (6) Conclusion. II. Incapacity of the Human Will, and other Hypotheses of the Materialists (T. Collyns Simon, LL.D.) III. The Circle of Science (Profs. Bonatelli and Mamiani). IV. Analysis and Critical Notices of New Works; Literary and Philosophical Notices. V. Index to vol. iii.

Vol. IV., No. 1- Contents: I. Summary of Acts of the Society for the Promotion of Philosophy and Letters. II. Philosophical Conversations. III. Letter of T. Collyns Simon to Dr. Herzen on the "Limitations of the Human Will, and other Hypotheses of Materialists." IV. Theory of Relation: (a) Reid's Doctrine and its Insufficiency; (b) Theories of contemporaneous English Psychologists; (c) The Facts of Perception newly Examined; (d) Other Distinctions solving the Difficulty and confirming the New Doctrine; (e) Objections Answered; (ƒ) Facts of Reception. V. Ethics of Positive Philosophy (continued); VI. Analysis of New Works. VII. Philosophical and Literary Notices.

No. 2-Contents: I. Summary of Acts of Philosophical Society. II. Human Cognition. III. Notes on the Article on Relation and Perception. IV. Influence of Philosophy on the German National Spirit. V. Theory of the Objectivity of the Idea, by Count Terenzio Mamiani. VI. Analysis and Criticism of New Works.

WORKS OF C. A. WERTHER, DR. PHIL.

1. Die Kräfte der Unorganische Natur in ihrer Einheit und Entwickelung. Dessau, 1852.

2. Was ist Lebenskraft? Versuch einer Antwort auf diese Frage. Dessau, 1854.