Second Department, October, 1913. [Vol. 158. employ any one to support it without the mother's consent. The argument on the other hand is that the duty of support is not to be evaded by the misconduct of the father which resulted in his loss of custody. (See 2 Bish. Mar., Div. & Sep. 1223, and cases cited.) But the decree in this case is not silent, for it contains a provision for the "maintenance” of this infant child by the mother, as well as for her " custody and control" of it. Irrespective of any bargain between the parties, I assume that the court was moved for good reasons to make such an affirmative provision. And I cannot assume that the custody of this infant was thus awarded for the reason that the mother stood ready to maintain it, because such an award was made to the innocent party, as was natural. The paramount consideration is the suitable maintenance of the child in accord with its station in life. Both parents are charged with such maintenance; primarily that duty is cast upon the father, as he generally has "more ample means." (Furman v. Van Sise, 56 N. Y. 435.) But as this decree has cast maintenance upon the mother, I see no present reason to disturb its provisions, unless the mother is now unable to afford proper maintenance. She represents her present inability so to do. The defendant admits his present ability, but denies the plaintiff's inability. I think that with an eye single to the good of the child the learned Special Term should have informed itself as to the ability of the plaintiff, for, if her inability exists, its refusal to charge the defendant with the duty worked injury to the infant. The defendant asserts his willingness to support the child, provided its care and custody be committed to a specified third person, who apparently would be a proper custodian if neither the mother nor the father should be considered. But the duty of maintenance may be required of the defendant irrespective of any such condition. If the plaintiff be an improper person as custodian, in view of her morals, or if the present surroundings of this child are adverse to its decent tutelage, there is a remedy, for, as I have said, the chief consideration is the welfare of the infant. If the defendant be charged with maintenance, then, so long as the infant is in any other custody than that of the defendant, there should be made such restrictions as insure App. Div.] Second Department, October, 1913. that all moneys furnished by the defendant should be applied exclusively to the infant, and not misapplied by any person directly or indirectly. The order must be reversed, without costs, and the application is remitted to the Special Term. BURR, THOMAS, CARR and RICH, JJ., concurred. Order reversed, without costs, and application remitted to the Special Term. CATHERINE BEST, Respondent, v. NEW YORK CITY WATERFRONT COMPANY, Appellant, Impleaded with OCEAN AND BAY FRONT IMPROVEMENT COMPANY and Others, Defendants. Second Department, October 24, 1913. Mortgage-foreclosure -payment of moneys into court by defendant interpleader. after answer Where, in a suit to foreclose a bond and mortgage, brought by an assignee, the owner of the property answered, denying the assignment and default in complying with the terms of the mortgage, and in the meantime the executor of the mortgagor, upon his own application, was allowed to intervene as a party defendant, and in his answer asked that the assignment be set aside as fraudulent, the court should, in pursuance of its general equity powers, allow the defendant to withdraw its answer and to pay into court the amount of the bond and mortgage, with interest. Section 820 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing for interpleader at any time before answer, does not control under the circumstances. APPEAL by the defendant, New York City Waterfront Company, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Kings County Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Queens on the 23d day of May, 1913. J. Lewis Parks, Jr. [Eph. A. Karelsen with him on the brief], for the appellant. Edward G. Nelson, for the respondent. CARR, J.: This is an action brought to foreclose a mortgage on real estate situated in Queens county. The mortgage in question Second Department, October, 1913. [Vol. 158. was made by one Allen to one Josiah S. Packard for the purpose of securing the payment of the sum of $8,500, dated May 18, 1903, and payable on May 18, 1905, with interest thereon at the rate of five per cent, payable semi-annually on the first days of November and May in each and every year. The plaintiff in her complaint claimed ownership of said bond and mortgage by virtue of an assignment thereof to her by one Ambrose Packard as executor of the last will and testament of Josiah Packard, deceased. The property covered by the mortgage is now owned by the New York City Waterfront Company. It answered the complaint of the plaintiff by denying the assignment of said mortgage to the plaintiff and her ownership thereof and by likewise denying the allegations in said complaint as to a default in the compliance with the terms of said mortgage as to the payment of semi-annual interest. It served an amended answer repeating the denials set forth in the original answer. In the meantime Ambrose Packard, as executor of the last will of Josiah Packard, deceased, made an application to this court at Special Term to be brought into the action as a party defendant and an order was entered accordingly. A supplemental summons and complaint was issued against said Packard as executor and he answered, asking affirmative relief that the assignment of the mortgage, as set forth in the complaint, should be set aside as fraudulent and that the plaintiff should be directed to deliver over to him the bond and mortgage in question. Thereupon the defendant, the New York City Waterfront Company, applied at Special Term for an order permitting it to withdraw its answers and to pay into court the amount of the bond and mortgage with the accrued interest and to be discharged from all liability to either claimant of the bond and mortgage, and that on making said payment into court the mortgage should be marked discharged of record and the notice of lis pendens canceled. This motion was denied at Special Term, and from an order made accordingly, the defendant the New York City Waterfront Company appeals to this court. It appears from the motion papers that this defendant no longer disputes the validity of the bond and mortgage nor default in compliance with its terms, and that the entry of the App. Div.] Second Department, October, 1913. defendant Packard into the action was not due to collusion between it and him and that it has no further interest in the present controversy than to pay the indebtedness due on said bond and mortgage to whomever may be legally entitled to it. If the defendant's answer be withdrawn, then nothing further is to be litigated in this action except the question of the ownership of the bond and mortgage, and that question would concern only the rival claimants, both of whom are already parties to the action. Why, then, should the appellant be compelled to await the determination of that controversy against its will and to its great prejudice? The respondent defends the order of the Special Term on the ground that the application of the appellant is in its nature an application for interpleader under section 820 of the Code of Civil Procedure and cannot be granted under said section when the defendant has already answered the complaint. I think section 820 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not control under the circumstances of this case. The appellant did not seek an interpleader to bring in a new party defendant in substitution for itself. The new party had come in of his own motion by order of court, from which no appeal was taken. The action is governed by equitable rules, and it seems to me that the court should have allowed the withdrawal of the answer and the deposit of the money in court under proper conditions, in pursuance of its general equity powers, unless such permission would unnecessarily prejudice the plaintiff. The fact that the appellant has answered, denying the plaintiff's title to the bond and mortgage, is explained on the ground that it had received notice before answering of a hostile claim by the defendant Packard. Doubtless it should have then sought interpleader before answering. But, strictly speaking, it is not seeking interpleader now. No precedents as to similar facts are cited to us. We think the court had power to grant the appellant's motion and should have done so in the exercise of discretion. The order should be reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and motion granted, on condition that the appellant pay into the court, to await the determination of this action, the amount due on the bond and mortgage, together Second Department, October, 1913. [Vol. 158. with interest accrued to the date of said deposit, and at the same time pay to the plaintiff her taxable costs and disbursements. JENKS, P. J., THOMAS, RICH and PUTNAM, JJ., concurred. Order reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and motion granted, on condition that appellant pay into the court, to await the determination of this action, the amount due on the bond and mortgage, together with interest accrued to the date of said deposit, and at the same time pay to plaintiff her taxable costs and disbursements. HYMAN BLUMENTHAL, Appellant, v. BROOKLYN UNION ELEVATED RAILROAD COMPANY and THE LONG ISLAND RAILROAD COMPANY, Respondents. Second Department, October 31, 1913. Railroad-injury to passenger from electrical disturbance on car liability of separate companies operating a through route — evidence. Action by a passenger against two railway companies owning separate routes, so connected as to make a through route, to recover for personal injuries sustained by fire resulting from an electrical disturbance on the car, which occurred either upon a track owned in common by the two companies, or upon part of the track owned by one of the companies. Held, that the electrical disturbance was sufficient evidence of negligence to demand evidence of proper care on the part of the defendants; that a judgment dismissing the complaint as to one of them should be reversed and a new trial granted; that a verdict in favor of the other defendant upon the issues submitted was not against the weight of evidence. APPEAL by the plaintiff, Hyman Blumenthal, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant Brooklyn Union Elevated Railroad Company, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Kings on the 28th day of March, 1912, upon the verdict of a jury, and also from an order entered in said clerk's office on the 3d day of April, 1912, denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial made upon the minutes. Appeal by the plaintiff, Hyman Blumenthal, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant The |