CHAPTER V

THE MONROE DOCTRINE-FOURTH PERIOD IN ITS HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT

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URING the administration of President McKinley the United States took control of the Philippine Islands and Porto Rico, and, by the Platt amendment, placed certain limitations on Cuba. These acts were regarded by many persons as modifying in some way the Monroe Doctrine. It was argued, if the United States had reversed its traditional policy with reference to the Eastern Hemisphere by acquiring interest there, it must necessarily recede from its policy in the Western Hemisphere, known as the Monroe Doctrine, in virtue of which European nations were forbidden to acquire territorial interest here. This argument is not sound in logic. That a government may change its policy with reference to one hemisphere does not mean that it must change it with reference to the other. The administration of Theodore Roosevelt, however, has added considerable to the literature, if not to the actual history, of the Monroe Doctrine.

Unfortunately, American presidents and their secretaries of State are, as a class, men who have travelled but little; at any rate, their knowledge of the Latin-American dictatorships is very superficial. It would seem, with reference to these countries in which the United States is supposed to have such a direct and peculiar interest, that the American Secretary of State should be a man who had resided in some of them for at least three or four years, and should have a good working knowledge of the Spanish language and of the laws, history, and general conditions prevailing there. The semi-occasional executive pronunciamentos concerning the sacred Monroe Doctrine might then be entitled to a second reading. In the absence of this definite knowledge presidential expressions on the Monroe Doctrine are usually made up of little else than glittering generalities and platitudes.

I. PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S VIEWS OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE President Roosevelt declared that, as we could not under the Monroe Doctrine allow European nations to take possession of LatinAmerican territory, so we could not allow the Latin-American nations

so to conduct themselves as to make such action on the part of the European nations necessary. Those words look well in print, and would receive the thundering applause of an audience. But what do they mean? They mean either that it is our duty to establish civilized governments where there are now semi-barbarous governments, that is, that it is our duty to see that foreigners are protected in their lives and property in Venezuela and the other lands of darkness; or they mean nothing! If they mean the former, they import the destruction of barbarism and the establishing of civilization in the Western Hemisphere; they signify a greater reformation and a stronger upward impetus to progress than has been recorded in the history of modern times; they indicate that Roosevelt's name will lead all the rest as a benefactor of mankind.

But is it true? Do Mr. Roosevelt's words mean what they say? Has the government of the United States, under Roosevelt, protected its own citizens in Latin America? Has it defended their lives, their liberty, or their property? Mr. Roosevelt has distinctly stated that he would not undertake to defend the rights of our citizens growing out of contracts with the Latin-American countries. How absurd, then, is it to talk in such grandiloquent terms about the United States preventing the Latin-American countries from making it necessary for the European governments to interfere for the protection of their citizens! If the government of the United States will not protect its own citizens—and it admits frankly that it will not-why make any pretence of performing greater and more wonderful feats ?

One action of President Roosevelt which will go to make a part of the history of the Monroe Doctrine is worthy of consideration. It relates to Santo Domingo, concerning which a message was sent by the President to the Senate in February, 1905. For years prior to this, Santo Domingo had been the scene of interminable bloodshed and virtual social dissolution. A three-cornered revolution had prevailed between the forces of Morales, Jimenez, and Gil y Wos. At times there were three governments; at other times none. Finally Morales, gaining substantial control of the warring factions, and finding his government confronted with serious problems at home and abroad, had the good sense to appeal to the United States for practical support. President Roosevelt endeavored to straighten matters out, but he was hampered in a serious manner by the inaction of the United States Senate in failing to ratify the protocol which he submitted to it. In his message to the Senate the President stated that conditions had been growing steadily worse in Santo Domingo for several years, owing to revolutions, and to the improvident management of the government, and that certain foreign countries were talking of taking possession of the custom houses, in order to satisfy the claims of their citizens.

Santo Domingo had violated many contracts and concessions,

thereby giving ground for such foreign interference, which, however, would be inimical to the interests of the United States.

Continuing, the President says:

"The conditions in the Dominican Republic not only constitute a menace to our relations with other foreign nations, but they also concern the prosperity of the people of the island, as well as the security of American interests, and they are intimately associated with the interests of the South Atlantic and Gulf States, the normal expansion of whose commerce lies in that direction. At one time, and that only a year ago, three revolutions were in progress in the island at the same time.

"It is impossible to state with anything like approximate accuracy the present population of the Dominican Republic. In the report of the Commission appointed by Grant in 1871, the population was estimated at not over 150,000 souls, but according to "The Statesman's Year Book,' for 1904, the estimated population in 1888 is given as 610,000. The bureau of the American Republics considers this the best estimate of the present population of the Republic. As shown by the unanimous report of the Grant Commission, the public debt of the Dominican Republic, including claims, was $1,656,831.59. The total revenues were $772,684.751. The public indebtedness of the Dominican Republic, not including all claims, was on September 12 last, as the Department of State is advised, $32,280,000; the estimated revenues under the Dominican management of custom houses were $1,850,000; the proposed budget for current administration was $1,300,000, leaving only $550,000 to pay foreign and liquidated obligations, and payments on these latter will amount during the ensuing year to $1,700,000 besides $900,000 of arrearages of payments overdue, amounting in all to $2,600,000. It is therefore impossible under existing conditions, which are chronic, and with the estimated yearly revenues of the Republic, which during the last decade have averaged approximately $1,600,000, to defray the ordinary expenses of the government and to meet its obligations.

"The Dominican debt owed to European creditors is about $22,000,000, and of this sum over $18,000,000 is more or less formally recognized. The representatives of European governments have several times approached the Secretary of State setting forth the wrongs and intolerable delays to which they have been subjected at the hands of the successive governments of Santo Domingo in the collection of their just claims, and intimating that unless the Dominican government should receive some assistance from the United States in the way of regulating its finances, the creditor governments in Europe would be forced to resort to more effective measures of compulsion to secure the satisfaction of their claims.

"If the United States government declines to take action and other foreign governments resort to action to secure payment of their claims, the latter would be entitled, according to the decision of The Hague Tribunal in the Venezuelan cases, to the preferential payment of their claims; and this would absorb all the Dominican revenues, and would be a virtual sacrifice of American claims and interest in the island. If, moreover, any such action should be taken by them, the only method to enable them to secure the payment of their claims would be to take possession of the custom houses, and, considering the state of the Dominican finances, this would mean a definite and very possibly permanent occupation of Dominican territory, for no period could

be set to the time which would be necessarily required for the payment of their obligations and unliquidated claims.

"The United States government could not interfere to prevent such seizure and occupation of Dominican territory without either itself proposing some feasible alternative in the way of action or else virtually saying to European governments that they would not be allowed to collect their claims. This would be an unfortunate attitude for the government of the United States to be forced to maintain at present. It cannot, with propriety, say that it will protect its own citizens and interests, on the one hand, and yet, on the other hand, refuse to allow other governments to protect their citizens and interests.

II. OUTCOME OF THE SANTO DOMINGO CASE

In the protocol submitted by the President it was provided that the United States should attempt the adjustment of all the obligations of the Dominican government, foreign as well as domestic, including the determination of the reasonableness and validity of the claims. To this end the United States was to take charge of the custom houses, giving to the government of Santo Domingo not less than 45 per cent of the total amount collected, applying the remaining 55 per cent to the payment of outstanding claims. The events which led to the submission of this protocol by the President are thus described by Jacob B. Hollander, in the "American Journal of International Law," April, 1907, pp. 287 et seq.:

"The recent history of Santo Domingo may be conveniently dated from the energetic movement to effect its annexation to the United States in 1869– 1870. The amazing political experiences of the Republic in the thirty-five years which succeeded the annexation movement can only be described as a miserable sequence of revolution and anarchy, interrupted by ruthless and blood-stained dictatorships. From 1871 to 1882 Cabral, Baez, Gonzalez, and Luperon alternated in control, their struggles being marked by uprising, ravage, and bloodshed, and terminating invariably in social demoralization and economic ruin. It was during this decade that the most vicious rules of the game of revolution as it is played in San Domingo won acceptance. In 1882 Ulises Heureaux came to the fore in Dominican politics, and the next seventeen years form the story of his uncontrolled dominance. For a time his creatures were installed in the presidency to preserve a semblance of constitutional form, but throughout he was absolute Dictator. Heureaux's rule was not even a benevolent despotism. Brutal cruelty, insatiable greed, moral degeneracy, were the man's personal characteristics, and they shaped his political conduct and his administrative activity. If San Domingo was at peace during Heureaux's time, it was the peace of merciless terrorism, not the quiet of civil government.

"A seeming well-being prevailed, but it was attained by bartering the resources of the country in prodigal concessions and by discounting the future in reckless debt accumulation. With Heureaux's assassination in 1899 came the deluge, and the next five years constitute a climax even in the history of Latin-American politics. Figuero, Vasquez, Jimenez, Vasquez again, Gil y

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Wos, and Morales successively occupied the presidential chair, each attaining it by much the same means and holding it by as uncertain tenure. The ordinary crimes of the political decalogue became commonplace. The country was laid waste, the people crushed to hopelessness, the treasury left to stew in utter bankruptcy, and a host of creditors, foreign and domestic, after tightening their hold upon the future became more and more insistent in the present.

The United States Senate failed to ratify the protocol of February 15, 1905. An interim arrangement was made by the President with Santo Domingo, along similar lines, which served in a measure to preserve the revenues of the dictatorship until the ratification of a new protocol, which was signed by the representatives of the two governments on February 8, 1907, and ratified by the United States Senate on the 15th of the same month.

This protocol recites that foreign creditors have agreed to accept $12,407,000 for debts and claims amounting to $21,184,000 face value; that holders of internal debts will take $645,827 for claims of $2,028,258 face value, and that other claimants of the same class will receive about $2,400,000; making the total of liquidated claims about $17,000,000. A part of the plan contemplated the issuance of $20,000,000 of 5 per cent bonds, redeemable in ten years, the proceeds to be applied to the payment of the aforesaid claims. Under this protocol the United States will control the administration of the custom houses, and thus one of the main incentives to revolution the hope of seizing the revenues of the government — will be cut off. There yet remains the privilege of looting the property of foreigners as the reward of revolution, and it cannot therefore be said that peace is in any wise assured, but conditions, at all events, are certain to improve.

III. PRESENT ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

As the Monroe Doctrine is a President-made doctrine, it becomes important to analyze carefully the position which is taken on this subject by the latest Chief Executive of the United States. We have quoted from Mr. Roosevelt's message on the Santo Domingo problem; now let us see what is his position on the broader question.

In an address before the Chautauqua Assembly in August, 1905, President Roosevelt defined his policy in the following language:

"To-day I wish to speak to you on one feature of our national foreign policy and one feature of our national domestic policy.

"The Monroe Doctrine is not a part of international law. But it is the fundamental feature of our entire foreign policy so far as the Western Hemisphere is concerned, and it has more and more been meeting with recognition abroad. The reason why it is meeting with this recognition is because we have not allowed it to become fossilized, but have adapted our construction