in said Island, under a Constitution which, either as a part thereof or in any ordinance appended thereto, shall define the future relations of the United States with Cuba, substantially as follows:

“(1) That the Government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or other compact with any foreign Power or Powers which will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any manner authorize or permit any foreign Power or Powers to obtain by colonization or for military or naval purposes, or otherwise, lodgment in or control over any portion of said Island.

“(2) That said Government shall not assume or contract any public debt, to pay the interest upon which and to make reasonable sinking-fund provision for the ultimate discharge of which, the ordinary revenues of the Island, after defraying the current expenses of government, shall be inadequate.

"(3) That the Government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the Government of Cuba.

"(4) That all acts of the United States in Cuba during its military occupation thereof are ratified and validated, and all lawful rights acquired thereunder shall be maintained and protected.

"(5) That the Government of Cuba will execute, and as far as necessary extend, the plans already devised or other plans to be mutually agreed upon, for the sanitation of the cities of the Island, to the end that a recurrence of epidemic and infectious diseases may be prevented, thereby assuring protection to the people and commerce of Cuba, as well as to the commerce of the Southern ports of the United States and the people residing therein.

"(6) That the Isle of Pines shall be omitted from the proposed Constitutional boundaries of Cuba, the title thereto left to future adjustment by treaty.

"(7) That to enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its

own defence, the Government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the United States.

"(8) That by way of further assurance the Government of Cuba will embody the foregoing provisions in a permanent treaty with the United States."

Notwithstanding the fact that the Cubans had every reason to anticipate some such step, there is no question that the adoption of this measure produced widespread dismay among them. The first impulse was submission through sheer hopelessness of opposition to the power of the United States. From this they soon recovered and began that protracted struggle which ended in reluctant acceptance by the Constitutional Convention. Nor was the struggle and the protest which followed confined to Cuba and the Cuban Convention. The American press was filled with a vigorous controversy. The originators of the bill were forced to become its defenders, and the best that can be said of the defence is that it was illogical. Not a few who, at the time, asserted that the provisions of the bill were a guarantee of Cuban independence, were obliged, later, to admit its limitation of Cuban independence, and its establishment of an indefinite sort of American suzerainty over the Island of Cuba. It became necessary for the defenders of the bill to explain its meaning in terms for which its opponents could find no basis in its phraseology.

The argument of the supporters of the bill rested, in some cases, solely in political partisanship. In others, it was based upon a groundless belief that the peace which had existed for nearly three years in the Island, was due to the presence of the American troops, and that a state of anarchy would follow the withdrawal of the United States forces.

In an article in the Independent, Senator Platt stated that "In no instance has it been necessary to call upon our troops to repress disorder, but it has been because of their presence there that the necessity has not existed." While it may be admitted that the presence of an armed force was desirable during the chaotic period of the first six months of the year 1899, the general tenor of Mr. Platt's comment is as inaccurate as it is unjust to the Cubans, who had shown no more disposition toward turbulence or disorder than had the people of any State in the Union.

Again, in the World's Work, Senator Platt expressed a similar opinion. He said: "With no army to repress disorder, it is certainly within the limit of reasonable probability that the revolutionary and turbulent party may attempt the destruction or confiscation of Spanish and Cuban property which the new government would be utterly powerless to prevent." It is most unfortunate that Senator Platt and those who followed his line of reasoning, and supported his bill, should have been so lacking in competent information regarding the Island and its people. To those who knew, all this was mere bugaboo, baseless and unwarranted. There had not been for two years prior to the period of this discussion any sign of either “revolutionary or turbulent party," and the American authorities were doing no little boasting with regard to the thorough efficiency of both the municipal police and the Rural Guard of the Island. These together made an armed force of, approximately, 2,500 men for the suppression of disorder. The great need of the Island was not troops to maintain order, but industrial prosperity which would enable people to live without taking that which was not their own, or to indulge in rioting or strife as a result of hunger and distress. The argument of potential menace to the peace of the Island, and the necessity

for Cuban recognition of the right of the United States to interfere in insular affairs, was without justification, unless the attitude of the United States toward Cuba in commercial affairs produced a condition of distress of which anarchy and disorder came as the legitimate children.

The argument in favor of the Platt Amendment was based upon an hypothesis, and developed in policy and in politics. Its opponents grounded their arguments upon a moral principle of national righteousness and good faith. Some of those arguments and opinions may be quoted, as follows:

"To impose any terms upon Cuba is a violation of the pledge given to the world when the United States went to her assistance." Baltimore American. (Rep.)

"If this scheme, in defiant violation of our solemn national pledge and every consideration of equity and wise public policy, shall be successful, the United States will stand disgraced among the nations." - Columbia (S. C.) State. (Dem.)

"Having said that the people were 'free and independent,' and that of right they ought to be so, let us not descend to pettifogging Let us not dictate to the 'free and independent' in any particular. Let us pursue the straight and narrow path of common honesty." Chicago Times-Herald.

now.

"If a nation is dishonored when it breaks faith, coolly, openly, and for the sake of material advantage, then the United States stands before the world dishonored." - Philadelphia North American. (Rep.)

"The resolutions are an act of bad faith toward a weak people, who must either yield or revolt."- Chicago Journal. (Rep.)

"It is easy enough to find excuses for breaking a national promise when the desire to break it is strong. But there is no excuse which could lessen the odium of broken faith."- Buffalo Express. (Rep.)

These quotations are fairly illustrative of a vast mass of similar matter which appeared in all parts of the United States. The outburst was confined to no particular party.

Many eminent public men, of both parties, voiced regret, indignation, and protest against the measure. Its supporters expressed their opinions with equal vigor. The leading organs of the administration, though they asserted the necessity for American supervision of Cuban affairs, and insisted upon Cuba's official and constitutional acknowledgment of the right of the United States to exercise such supervision, still insisted that the Platt Amendment in no way modified or abridged the independence of Cuba.

The news of the passage of the Platt Amendment was received in the Island with something of consternation and no little of indignation. In its issue of March 2, La Patria (Havana), the leading organ of the ultra-radicals, stated the situation with accuracy, as follows:

"The action of the United States respecting Cuba continues to be the theme of conversation in all circles, and there is no occasion to hide the fact that a great majority have received it with displeasure and judge it harshly."

The so-called Conservative element, a small minority of the population, expressed approval. Some urged its acceptance, though bitterly opposed to it, as the lesser of two evils. The alternative of acceptance was a continuance of the military government which was regarded as unwarrantedly autocratic and too indifferent to Cuba's greatest welfare. Opposition to the measure strengthened with the passing days, but there is no doubt that much of the public manifestation of disapproval was 'arranged" by political leaders.

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From all over the Island there came telegrams of indignation and dissatisfaction. Mass-meetings and parades shouted "Viva Independencia!" "Abajo la Enmienda Platt!" ("Down with the Platt Amendment!") The in