of its own will, has arisen in arms, there remains no other solution but to triumph, it matters not what means are employed to accomplish it.

This people cannot hesitate between the wealth of Spain and the liberty of Cuba. Its greatest crime would be to stain the land with blood without effecting its purposes because of puerile scruples and fears which do not concur with the character of the men who are in the field, challenging the fury of an army which is one of the bravest in the world, but which in this war is without enthusiasm or faith, ill fed and unpaid. The war did not begin February 24; it is about to begin now.

The war had to be organized; it was necessary to calm and lead into the proper channels the revolutionary spirit always exaggerated in the beginning by wild enthusiasm. The struggle ought to begin in obedience to a plan and method more or less studied, as the result of the peculiarities of this war. This has already been done. Let Spain now send her soldiers to rivet the chains of her slaves; the children of this land are in the field, armed with the weapons of liberty. The struggle will be terrible, but success will crown the revolution and efforts of the oppressed.

MAXIMO GOMEZ,
General in Chief.

Such measures are severe, but they are by no means unusual in time of war. The step resulted in the general suppression of Cuban industry, and in widespread devastation. Productive industry was paralyzed and thousands of producers were deprived of employment. Many who doubtless would have remained at work had their work continued, in their idleness and its resultant poverty, joined the ranks of the insurgent army. Upon this feature rests the assertion of our opening chapter, that the successes of the revolution of 1895 were largely due to what may be called artificial conditions. Many who joined the Cuban army did so not so much from particular desire to join it,

or from motives of special patriotism, as because the conditions of the war left them nothing else to do.

That which is known as Oriente, the eastern section of the Island, was the birthplace of the revolt of 1895, as it had been of that of 1868. An interesting feature is offered in the fact that, to-day, many people of the central and western districts date occurrences from the "invasion." Incidents or events are said to have occurred before or after the "invasion." Inasmuch as the Spanish language is prone to accurate definition of shades of meaning, it is interesting to note their use of this word in this connection. If asked what was the "invasion" and who were the "invaders," they reply that it was the westward sweep of the insurgent forces under Gomez and Maceo. The "invaders" were their fellow country-men, and the "invasion" was the march of the army of liberation. A natural inference from this fact is that a large part of the Island was, originally, either in ignorance of the movement, or not in active sympathy with it. But the torch of the destroying insurrectos became a beacon light around which many rallied and became "invaders," or it became a brand whose burning drove them into the ranks of the army. It is hardly to be said that the Cuban revolt of 1895 was, in its essence, a great national uprising, although it came to be, as a result of the methods employed upon both sides of the line, a widely popular movement. It had at all times more supporters than participants.

Notwithstanding an enormous reinforcement of his troops, General Campos could make no headway against his opponents. His available force, consisting of regulars from Spain, and of local volunteers, is said to have numbered nearly 200,000 men at the close of 1895. The force opposed to him at any one time cannot with safety be estimated.

The best evidence would seem to indicate that General Gomez was the nominal commander of a regular army and an irregular force whose numbers might have been from 30,000 to 40,000. Figures thus used are, however, somewhat deceptive.

The general situation was not greatly unlike that of the South African war of a few years later. The larger force was a long way from Spain, its base of supplies and reinforcement; it had cities and lines of communication to protect and defend; and it was obliged to carry with it a considerable supply train for field operations at any distance from its central camps. It was also heavily cumbered with a military mechanism which is ill calculated to encounter such a force as that to which it was opposed. The smaller force was at home; it was active, mobile, unhampered by wagon trains; it lived on the country among a people in more or less active sympathy with it; was burdened with no military traditions, and with few military restrictions. It knew the movements of its opponents, and struck or moved away at will. With the issue doubtful, it rarely, if ever, stood for a pitched battle. These conditions develop a war which is to be worn out rather than fought out.

For the first time in Cuba's history, a revolution became national. The spirit of revolt and its activities extended from Cape Antonio on the west to Cape Maisi on the east. Havana was in a state of political ferment. Gomez was busily engaged in his work of rendering the Island a useless and expensive possession which Spain could not afford to maintain or retain. Martial law was proclaimed in the western districts. The City of Havana was the Spanish stronghold in the Island as well as the seat of government. The Spanish residents, the Reformists, and the few Cubans who remained loyal to Spain, were terrified by the presence

of General Gomez, with an insurgent army, within ten miles of the city. They lost confidence in General Campos and demanded his recall. The government at Madrid accepted his resignation, in January, 1896.

The successor of General Campos was Valeriano Weyler, known to the Cubans as "The Butcher." He had served in Cuba, first as Colonel and later as a Brigade Commander, during the Ten Years' War, and his military methods were not forgotten. Soon after his arrival, General Weyler put into effect a system which gave him a world-wide notoriety. He adopted the infamous system of reconcentration which, under his supervision, became a process of direct starvation of the Island people, men, women, and children.

The Cubans themselves really initiated the system of concentration as well as that of destruction. To clear the country in which the insurgents were operating, all Spaniards and Spanish sympathizers were ordered by the Cuban commanders to betake themselves to the cities and larger towns which were occupied by Spanish garrisons. Gomez also sought to force the Cuban people, especially the women and children and men who were incapable of bearing arms, into the recesses of the hills, where they might maintain themselves without danger of attack by or interference from the Spanish troops. Weyler retaliated and introduced a more effective and much less humane system. The original order of reconcentration was issued, Feb. 16, 1896, in the following terms:

"Don Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau, Marquis of Teneriffe, Governor and Captain General of Cuba, General in Chief of the Army, etc., desirous of warning the honest inhabitants of Cuba, and those loyal to the Spanish cause, and in conformity to the laws, does order and command:

Article I. All inhabitants of the district of Sancti Spiritus and

all the provinces of Puerto Principe and Santiago de Cuba will have to concentrate in places which are the headquarters of a division, a brigade, a column, or a troop, and will have to be provided with documentary proof of identity, within eight days of the publication of this proclamation in the municipalities.

Article II. To travel in the country in the radius covered by the columns in operation, it is absolutely indispensable to have a pass from the mayor, military commandants, or chiefs of detachments. Anyone lacking this will be detained and sent to headquarters of divisions or brigades, and thence to Havana, at my disposition, by the first possible means. Even if a pass is exhibited, which is suspected to be not authentic or granted by authority to persons with known sympathy toward the rebellion, or who show favor thereto, rigorous measures will result to those responsible.

Article III. All owners of commercial establishments in the country districts will vacate them, and the chiefs of columns will take such measures as the success of their operations dictates regarding such places which, while useless for the country's wealth, serve the enemy as hiding places in the woods and in the interior. Article IV. All passes hitherto issued hereby become null and void.

Article V. The military authorities will see to the immediate publication of this order.

VALERIANO WEYLER.

In his message of December, 1897, President McKinley said of this system: "It was not civilized warfare; it was extermination. The only peace it could beget was that of the wilderness and the grave." America was deluged with tales of appalling distress and misery. An appeal was issued for money and supplies for the relief of the suffering and the destitute. A Cuban relief committee was organized. A generous response was made to the appeal, and needed supplies, provisions, and medicines were forwarded