are competent officials in Vienna or Rome are lost among the tortuous political pathways of Bangkok, Teheran, and Pekin. Never shall we hold our own in Asia until an Asiatic Department is formed, under the charge of an experienced minister of Cabinet rank, with an independent diplomatic staff, trained in the methods, and speaking fluently the languages, of the East. Then an Afghan Legation would be not only welcomed in London but considered as an imperial necessity; the apathy, ignorance, and vacillation born of ignorance, which now overshadow our whole Eastern policy, would disappear; Japan and Afghanistan would be acknowledged as allies to be bound to us with links of steel; and the independence of Persia might still be secured.

Before closing this article a few words may be said on some other works specially connected with the Amir, his character, and his administration. Neither the public nor the critics are willing to accept, without some independent corroboration, the naturally favourable account of his own achievements given by any person, however distinguished. Of the industrial and administrative improvement at Kabul we have sufficient testimony; but very few Englishmen have had the opportunity of visiting the more distant parts of the country. The book of Colonel Charles Yate on Khurasan and Sistan is consequently welcome, for although it is principally concerned with Persia, where for some time Colonel Yate was ConsulGeneral at Meshed, yet he travelled to his post from India by Kandahar and Herat, and was astonished at the improvement effected in the eight years which had elapsed since he had passed over the same route with the Boundary Commission in 1884. Kandahar had been improved in many ways; roads had been laid out and avenues planted; while the change in Herat was more noticeable still.

'In 1885,' he writes, 'the greater part of the houses in the city were uninhabited and mostly in ruins; while, as to citizens, scarcely a soul was to be seen, and had it not been for the garrison the place would have been like a city of the dead. In 1893 I found it much more flourishing and vastly improved in every way. The houses formerly in ruins had been rebuilt, and there was said to be a civil population of some three thousand families, in addition to the troops resi

dent in the town, while the cultivation and population in the valley outside appeared to have also considerably increased.'

This account is proof of good government; and, in the eight years which have since passed, the improvement is likely to have been considerable. Colonel Yate, who had ample opportunities of talking with Afghan officers and men, is of opinion that the Afghan army is imbued with a feeling friendly to the British, and that this feeling is gaining ground more and more every year, not only in the army, but amongst the people of the country generally. The soldiers were anxious to avenge their defeat at Panjdeh on the Russians. They expressed their reliance on British aid in what they considered to be the coming struggle, and said they were confident of victory. The Amir in his autobiography expresses the same confidence; and it is not likely that in his lifetime, at all events, there will be either a Russian railway station or a Russian garrison in the city of Herat.

Mr Bruce's book on 'The Forward Policy' is mainly autobiographical. It is a detailed and interesting account of his 'thirty-five years' work amongst the tribes on our North-Western frontier of India,' from 1862 to 1898; but it must be confessed that it adds little of importance to what has already been told in the memoir of Sir R. Sandeman and elsewhere. Mr Bruce has little to say about the Amir, except in relation to certain disturbances among the Waziris and other tribes in 1892, supposed to have been caused by agents from Kabul. But Mr Bruce does not attempt to prove that these envoys acted under a commission from the Amir; and, after all, if their action is in any way to be laid at his door, it is not surprising that he should have tried to score a point in view of the approaching delimitation of his frontier, a delimitation in which he naturally wished to lose as little power as possible over tribes which had once owned allegiance to his ancestors.

The only other book requiring mention is a tale of the Hazâra War by Miss Lillias Hamilton, who was for some years court physician to the Amir, and who had unusual opportunities of studying the life and characteristics of the people. Her novel, 'A Vizier's Daughter,' is written with both force and charm, and gives an excellent account

of domestic life both in the wild Hazâra hills and in Kabul, where, in spite of material progress, life seems anything but happy, in an atmosphere of anxiety and suspicion. The machinery of civilisation cannot be started without a good deal of dust and heat and noise.

In conclusion, we would recommend the fascinating autobiography of the Amir to the attention of the Shah of Persia and his astute and accomplished Prime Minister, the Sadr Azam, Ali Asghar Khan. It is well that both sovereign and minister should know what the Amir of Afghanistan thinks of Russian ambition, policy, and methods, and compare his experience with their own. They would perhaps remark that it gives them no pleasure to figure as the example for all Moslem princes of the danger of not resisting Russian advances; and that if England had only assisted them, as she could have done without risk, by setting their finances in order and granting them a loan on undoubted security, the Russians would not now be increasing the number of their officers at Teheran and taking the revenues under foreign control. And they would speak the truth. The only compensation for the apathy and timidity of the Foreign Office in Persia is found in the fact that every fresh Russian encroachment on Persia strengthens the resolve of the Amir of Afghanistan to resist to the death their entry, under any pretext, into his dominions, relying, in the first place, on the courage and trained strength of his people, and secondly, on the solemnly recorded promise of the British Government to protect him against foreign aggression, a promise which cannot be cancelled or evaded by England without disaster and dishonour.

Art. VIII.-ARMY REFORM.

1. The Times' History of the War in South Africa. Edited by L. S. Amery. Vol. I. London: Sampson Low, 1900. 2. The South African War. By Major S. L. Norris. London: John Murray, 1900.

3. The War Office, the Army, and the Empire. By H. O. Arnold-Forster, M.P. London: Cassell, 1900.

4. An Absent-Minded War. By a British Officer. London: John Milne, 1900.

5. Fifteen Years of Army Reform. By an Officer. Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1884 (new ed. 1898).

6. Army Reorganisation. Reprinted from Blackwood's Magazine.' Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1900.

(1.) Military Defects.

THE South African War has given cause for grave reflections. On the one hand, the amazing lack of political and military foresight displayed is calculated to arouse gloomy forebodings as to the future of an Empire whose statesmen proved thus deficient at a critical time; on the other hand, a military system, built up in thirty years of constant change and unceasing controversy, has plainly shown itself to be organically unsuited to the requirements of war.

The campaign in South Africa succeeded a period during which contests with semi-civilised or savage peoples were frequent. The Algerian and Mexican experiences of the French army prior to 1870 found a parallel in our many small wars, and the results were similar. Military reputations were too easily won; the higher study of war was neglected; generalship was not severely tested; nor was organisation, in the modern sense, demanded. War of this description came to be regarded by the British officer as a specially exciting form of sport, which entailed no intellectual preparation, and which was eagerly sought after because it held out the sure promise of decorations and rapid promotion. Minor failures were not closely regarded, or were quickly obscured by ultimate success; and the nation, accustomed to offensive warfare, came to believe that our army was organised on this basis. Meanwhile estimates grew, and the numerical statements of armed strength with which they were accompanied appeared unreasonably large in the eyes of some economists.

Many circumstances thus combined to promote illusions which the South African War has rudely dispelled. In one respect the situation in 1899 strikingly resembled that of 1854. The nature and extent of the military requirements were in both cases lamentably underestimated.

'The fact must not be concealed,' wrote Lord Raglan to the Duke of Newcastle (August 3rd, 1854), 'that neither the English nor the French Admirals have been able to obtain any intelligence on which they can rely with respect to the army which the Russians may destine for operations in the field, or to the number of men allotted for the defence of Sebastopol; and Marshal St Arnaud and myself are equally deficient in information upon these all-important questions.'

Since that time, Intelligence Departments have been invented; and accurate estimates of the fighting strength and the armaments of the Boers were obtained. The War Office, however, unlike the institutions which administer all effective armies, maintains no branch charged with the duty of studying the requirements of probable wars; and officials immersed in details cannot be expected to advise the Cabinet in matters of vital importance. If the growing armaments of the Boers conveyed no warning, it was at least necessary to contemplate war from the moment when the petition of the Uitlanders was received. Months later the War Office had not even discovered that mounted troops would be a most essential requirement. At a critical period, therefore, the Cabinet was without competent military advice; and for this grave defect, entailing the most serious consequences, the faulty constitution of the War Office is directly responsible. Matters having drifted into a dangerous position, and Natal being evidently menaced with invasion, it was tardily decided to send about 10,000 troops to South Africa. This reinforcement was clearly insufficient; but out of a nominal total of about 109,000 troops in the United Kingdom, only a weak infantry battalion, and three field batteries, made up to strength by a wholesale drafting of men and horses, could be provided. The military system thus proved incapable of fulfilling the requirement most certain to arise in such a crisis; and it became evident that our organisation was not designed for offensive war.

Two days before the issue of the Boer ultimatum, the