faithful-and this when there was no longer any worldly advantage to be gained by faithfulness. 'I have made courtiers, not friends,' he said; but, after all, in what relation stand Montholon and Bertrand to him, if not in that of the truest and bravest of friends? His mask of cynicism is lifted by such facts.

On his public character the course of history has pronounced sentence. He failed and brought ruin upon his country, yet, as we have seen, largely through causes which he could not wholly control-most of all, perhaps, the very greatness of his genius, which, whatever the status of France, must always have rendered him dangerous to the neighbouring Powers. He stimulated the very forces which were to be most fatal to France-the sense of nationality in Italy and Germany, and the growth of the colonial Empire of England. But it was his work to clear the ground for the new edifices of the century. In this sense he was, to use Lord Rosebery's phrase, the scavenger of God.' His iron impact made Germany what she has become in our time; and everywhere on the Continent his was eventually a revivifying influence. Nothing, where he had passed, was as it was before.

Was he a good man? asks Lord Rosebery, dubiously: and he answers, though reluctantly, in the affirmative. Morally good, as the saints have understood the phrase, he was not. But he was unmoral rather than immoral, and unmoral because of his unhappy environment. He grew up in an age when religion and morality were making shipwreck in the Revolutionary excesses; and it is small wonder that he was Pagan at heart in his earliest days. Lord Rosebery has traced in his character the development of that spirit which the Greeks called üßpis, and for which we have no precise English equivalent. But he adds that Napoleon, until he chose to make a demigod of himself. . . was kind, generous, and affectionate; at any rate . . . he was certainly not the reverse.' Even so measured a panegyric may surprise his detractors; but the latest evidence on Napoleon's character convinces us that Lord Rosebery errs, if in any direction, upon the safe side.

Art. X.-THE SETTLEMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA.

1. Boer Politics. By Yves Guyot. Translated from the French. London: John Murray, 1900.

2. The Settlement after the War in South Africa. By M. J. Farrelly, LL.D. London: Macmillan, 1900.

3. The Renascence of South Africa. By A. R. Colquhoun. London: Hurst and Blackett, 1900.

4. British Africa. (British Empire Series, Vol. II.) London: Kegan Paul, 1899.

5. Farming Industries of Cape Colony. By Robert Wallace. London: P. S. King and Son, 1896.

6. Report of the Inspector of Water Drills for 1897. Cape of Good Hope Department of Agriculture. [G. 30—'98.] 7. Special Report on Colonial Irrigation and Hydrographic Survey. Cape of Good Hope Public Works Department. [G. 76-'99.]

8. Vigilance Papers. I-X. Cape Town: South African Vigilance Committee, 1900.

9. Reports of the Nederlandsche Zuid-Afrikaansche Spoorweg-Maatschappij. Published in the 'Staats-Courant,'

Pretoria.

10. Reports of the Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines. A. Barsdorf and Co., Wool Exchange, London.

(I.) State Finance and Industrial Enterprise. INDUSTRIAL and commercial expansion in South Africa must depend so materially upon the policy of the British Government that no intelligent discussion of the subject is possible without first determining the sum, if any, which that country will be called upon to contribute towards the cost of the war. Can we arrive at any general principles which will aid in the solution of this question? The investigation may be divided into two parts-firstly, considerations of justice or equity; secondly, financial resources and expedients.

Was the war undertaken to defend Imperial or local interests? If the former, it is obviously the duty of Great Britain to meet the outlay out of the Imperial Exchequer; if the latter, then South Africa ought in time to refund the whole cost with interest; if both, then the problem is to

NOTE. The two sections of this article are by different authors.

determine the proportions chargeable to each. That the position of Great Britain in South Africa was challenged by the two Republics is now acknowledged upon all sides; and that the possession at least of the Cape is vital to the Empire needs no profound study of geography to appreciate. Was the war waged to remedy the Uitlanders' grievances, or to wrest the rich gold-fields from the Transvaal, or to defend our general rights as paramount Power, from which the loss or retention of the Cape is certainly inseparable?

There is no difficulty in answering this question. Mr Kruger's ultimatum was the natural outcome of a succession of events which made a struggle for supremacy inevitable. Upon this ground the bill should be entirely paid by this country. But there are other considerations. We have occupied the territory of the Boer Republics, and we have taken possession of what their Governments have left us as State property. We step, in fact, into their shoes, and we are entitled to make the most we can out of the assets that accrue to us. There is a vast difference between turning these to the most profitable account, and making the inhabitants of the country feel the iron heel of the conqueror. Had we restored the Transvaal and the Orange Free State to the Boers, we should have been justified in exacting an indemnity; but, as we have annexed those States, our position is altered. It may be urged that, since the inhabitants would have had to pay an indemnity had Presidents Kruger and Steyn been reinstated, they may with equal justice be made to pay now. But, in that case, the citizens would have had the State property to draw on for the indemnity, whereas now it has become an Imperial asset.

There are strong grounds, however, which warrant our placing a share of the cost of the war on the taxpayers of the Transvaal. The Uitlanders are to be freed from indignities and oppression; the waste of treasure, amounting approximately to 2,000,000l. per annum, in secret service, armaments, &c., will cease; the restrictive policy that obtained under the Kruger régime, which crippled industrial and mining operations with a view to limiting the foreign population, will disappear; and the fullest development of the resources of the country will be encouraged. But the contribution to be paid in consideraVol. 193.-No. 385,

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tion of these benefits must not be such as to injure prosperity. The aim of the British Government should be to foster trade, not only that the new colonies may prosper, but also to increase the export trade of this country. To hinder this would be commercial and political folly. Any participation in the cost of the war must be so adjusted as to leave the population of the Transvaal under at least as good if not better conditions than those which existed during the Republic, or discontent of a most dangerous order will be the result, involving not only the Dutch but our own kinsmen.

But if, on these grounds, the Transvaal may be expected to contribute, why not also the Orange River Colony and the other colonies? The Imperial army was for many months engaged in repelling the invader from the Cape Colony and Natal, while these districts, together with the Orange River Colony, will profit, like the Transvaal, by the improvement of trade. If the individual in the Transvaal is to bear his share of the burden, why not also the individual in the other parts of South Africa ? The question of the relative richness of the different communities may affect the proportion of the respective contributions, but it cannot affect the principle.

In the next place, assuming the cost of the war to be 100,000,000l. (an amount which is a mere guess, as operations are still proceeding), what proportion of that amount arises from the unprepared state of this country? Is South Africa to be saddled with any share of the expenditure traceable directly to War Office bungling and lack of foresight? The whole question is so complex, and the issues at stake so vital, that no hasty decision should be arrived at. The gravest consequences might follow any ill-considered legislation, fixing a specific sum as the share of the burden to be borne by the various provinces of South Africa. Either a Royal Commission or a carefully chosen Committee of the House of Commons should be appointed to examine thoroughly and report upon the subject; and its deliberations should be aided by the best expert financial testimony obtainable, by means of which a basis can probably be found at once satisfactory to the Imperial Government and to those who will have to pay. It is not a case for hasty adjustment, or for the arbitrary assessment of any definite sum, small or large, to please

the taxpaying electors at home, but is a problem that should be approached with infinite care.

The agricultural portions of the Transvaal and the Orange River Colonies are suffering grievously from the war, and the only source from which any considerable amount can be drawn is the Witwatersrand. That good government, the cancellation of monopolies, the better management of railways, &c., will result in placing the mining industry upon a much higher profit-earning basis than it enjoyed under President Kruger is certain; and the Imperial Government, having brought this change about, may fairly claim a proportion of the benefit as a matter of business, but not on political grounds. A considerable sum will be needed, when peace is restored, to assist the Boers themselves. A great number of their farms, probably a majority, are mortgaged; and as they are depleted of stock, and in many cases the homesteads are destroyed, capital will be needed for a fresh start. The value of the Boer homestead in the Transvaal rarely exceeds 1007., so that the destruction due to the war is of far less consequence than would be supposed by those who have in mind the farm-buildings usually met with in this country. Safeguards for the payment of interest and redemption of the loans can and must be devised; but assuming these precautions to have been taken, it is obviously the duty of the State to encourage the Dutch landowners to cultivate their farms and restock them, as well as to settle British farmer emigrants in the country, Such action will tend to obliterate the bitterness which the war must leave behind, and help to educate the Boer to be a loyal citizen of the Empire, which, having vanquished him, ministers to his needs.

For the benefit of South Africa the agricultural, pastoral, and other industries should be restarted as soon as possible. It may be found essential in some instances to grant State aid, as a temporary measure and as a matter of good policy, but it should be given with a sparing hand, and, apart from Englishmen, only to those Boers who declare their readiness to settle down as loyal subjects of the Crown. It is neither just nor politic that Boer refugees and the families of the men who are actually fighting against us should be well fed and cared for at the expense of this country, whilst British refugees are