ship matches under different conditions, and it may happen that when Roberts returns to this country he will concede points to their champion, a proceeding which would be at least somewhat humorous. But, after all, the matter is of no great importance. While the two Robertses, father and son, have had the chief share in the development of the modern game, a most important part has been played by the principal firms who make the tables and other implements. In Kentfield's time Messrs Thurston worked cordially with him in search of improvements; later on Messrs Burroughes & Watts in a similar way co-operated with the younger Roberts; Messrs Cox & Yeman also, and other firms, have all contributed materially to the improved play and consequent gratification both of players and spectators at the close of the century. People are apt to forget how much they owe to those who are careful to provide the best accessories for their favourite game; and though, no doubt, perfection of manufacture and attention to business will command the usual success, yet it is well that the debt referred to should be otherwise recognised. There is also a vast improvement in modern rooms and furniture as compared with those of old days. Then, with the exception of a few private houses and clubs, billiard rooms were for the most part to be found in public-houses or in not altogether desirable surroundings. The rooms themselves were reeking with the products of combustion of bad gas and worse tobacco to an extent which made them positively unwholesome; now electric light and lofty rooms with tolerable ventilation are to be found in numberless private houses and clubs in town and country, whilst public matches can be arranged in various halls. Still, for this kind of play, a great deal remains to be done, because no hall which is now in use can be described as ideal. There should be at least two classes of halls: one to suit the average attendance when good play is expected, such, for instance, as is usual at the Egyptian Hall, Piccadilly; the other capable of holding, without discomfort, the crowds who go to any sensational game. In both cases ventilation, and ample space between table and spectators, should be provided. Art. IX. THE RELIEF OF KUMASSI. 1. Correspondence relating to the Ashanti War, 1900. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of His Majesty. March 1901. 2. Jours d'angoisse à Coumassie. Journal du missionnaire Fritz Ramseyer. Neuchatel: Delachaux et Niestlé, 1901. 3. The Siege of Kumassi. By Lady Hodgson. London: Pearson, 1901. 4. The Relief of Kumasi. By Captain Harold C. J. Biss, West African Frontier Force. London: Methuen, 1901. 5. The Ashanti Campaign of 1900. By Colonel Montanaro, R.A., and Captain Armitage, D.S.O. London: Sands, 1901. THE reference in His Majesty's first speech from the throne to the recent operations in Ashanti under Sir James Willcocks drew pointed attention to a series of brilliant actions carried out with complete success in the face of obstacles which, in ordinary times, would have been considered insurmountable. We cannot but think that the wording and spirit of the reference to this small but not unimportant campaign more accurately represent public feeling than the petty criticisms of the leaders of the Opposition. Why Lord Kimberley should have been 'amused' by the paragraph, or Sir H. Campbell Bannerman have considered it 'extraordinary,' we fail to understand. It was at least an attempt to do justice to a feat of arms and a triumph of military forethought and endurance which, but for the absorbing nature of the struggle in South Africa, would have attracted far more attention than the public, in such circumstances, has been able to bestow. After the bloodless expedition of 1895 it was supposed by all, save the few who had given special attention to West African affairs, that the Ashantis had accepted the inevitable, and would settle down in quiet and prosperity under British rule. How erroneous this impression was, the events of 1900 have shown. Repeated warnings had been sent to the Administration of the Gold Coast by their officials at Kumassi; and it is impossible to understand why they did not receive more attention. Whatever the reason was, the consequences of this neglect were most disastrous. Early in April 1900, reports of trouble in Kumassi were circulated at the coast, and were telegraphed home. By the beginning of May, events had so far developed that the investment of Kumassi by the rebels was officially admitted; and steps were taken to organise a relief expedition. The rising has been attributed to various causes; but the prominence given to the subject of the Golden Stool by certain members of Parliament, whose animosity towards the Colonial Secretary frequently outruns their discretion, is, in our opinion, out of all proportion to the facts. Lady Hodgson stigmatises as absolutely untrue the statement that the Governor demanded the stool as actual king of Ashanti. Why it should have been necessary to use such strong language, in face of the fact that the Governor officially † admits having made two futile attempts to secure the stool, we are unable to understand. The subject is referred to at length by a missionary, Mr Ramseyer, who was present during the palaver at which the incident occurred. He quotes the actual words used by the Governor: + 'Je suis au milieu de vous comme votre roi, et je suis votre roi; pourquoi ne suis-je pas assis aujourd'hui sur le trône à Ashanti, le trône d'or? Pourquoi en présence de cette grande assemblée faut-il que je me contente d'une chaise toute commune; est-ce bien? J'ai demandé qu'on me livrât le trône d'or, celui qui revient au Gouverneur anglais. Personne ne me l'a apporté : c'est mal, très mal.' This seems decisive, for it is needless to suppose that Mr Ramseyer could have deliberately misrepresented the Governor. At the same time, it is impossible to believe that these words were the immediate cause of the rising. They may have fired a train already laid, but certainly they did not begin the trouble. Long before the Governor had arrived at Kumassi, it was known that the Ashantis were anything but peacefully disposed. As to the origin of the rising, we are glad to be in agreement with Lady Hodgson, that the bloodlessness of the 1895 expedition was the principal cause of the rising of 1900, especially as on many other points in her narrative we find ourselves * 'Siege of Kumassi,' p. 81. + 'Correspondence relating to the Ashanti War, 1900,' pp. 18, 21. in absolute disagreement with her. Mr Chamberlain had little difficulty in disposing of the allegations as to unjustifiable interference with native customs and 'rights.' The customs were not such as any civilised Government could recognise, and the 'rights' were-to maintain these customs. It was certainly unfortunate that the Governor, when he resolved upon a drastic policy, had not arranged for a more powerful escort. The fact, however, that the Ashantis had submitted without a fight in 1895 was sufficient reason for them to appeal to arms whenever an opportunity arose; and the South African troubles gave the opportunity. Our chief interest, however, centres in the march of the relieving force, which ended in the rout of the Ashantis and the relief of Kumassi Fort, not a day too soon. On the 26th May, Sir James Willcocks landed at Cape Coast Castle, and found the state of affairs so bad that the task of relieving Kumassi seemed, in existing circumstances, impossible. From Prahsu to Kumassi, a distance of rather more than seventy miles, the main route was entirely in the possession of the Ashantis, with the exception of two isolated posts. The rains had already commenced, carrying away the bridges, and making the road -there was only one-so bad that in ordinary times it would have been considered impracticable. The Governor in Kumassi was calling for assistance; but the whole force available consisted of the two isolated posts mentioned above, and a small column of the Southern Nigerian Forces somewhere in the neighbourhood of the Prah. There was no staff; and, although troops were daily expected, none had arrived. Matters were rendered more difficult by the behaviour of the coast natives, than whom a more despicable race probably does not exist. When called upon to furnish carriers, they raised every possible excuse, in many cases refusing bluntly to supply them; and when at last some were obtained, the great majority consisted of worn out women or immature children. The coast native regards the white man merely as a means of protection against his ancient enemies, the Ashantis, and entirely fails to recognise any corresponding obligation on his side. To most of these natives, Ashanti is a country of * Speech in the House of Commons, March 18th, 1901. which, beyond hearsay, they are entirely ignorant; and the profound dread of the unknown which is common to them all is increased tenfold by the gruesome traditions of former barbarities. The native disinclination to provide carriers had been well known for many years. In anticipation of trouble, a Labour Ordinance had been passed by which headmen of villages, in case of necessity, were obliged to provide a certain number of capable carriers at fixed rates; but the Governor's signature was necessary to make the ordinance effective; and this, in the circumstances, could not be obtained. Early in June a small column of rather less than four hundred men of the West African Frontier Force arrived at Cape Coast, having marched from Nigeria to Lagos, and thence taken ship. The ill fortune which dogged the advance at every stage still continued, for on arrival at Cape Coast Castle the surf was so bad that no boats could go out; and it was not until the following day that, with considerable difficulty, the troops and stores were landed at Elmina, about eight miles westward, where a reef of rock, behind which the surf boats can run, affords a slight shelter. On the night of June 4th, Sir James, or as he then was, Colonel Willcocks, despite the insufficiency of men and of supplies, decided to advance to the Prah and make his forward base at Prahsu. This had the result of giving confidence to the carriers working up to the Prah, who knew there would be a force covering them from any aggression on the part of the Ashantis; it had also the advantage of removing the men from the unhealthy surroundings of Cape Coast Castle. On reaching Prahsu the position was found to be as follows. The entire force consisted approximately of six hundred men, of whom two hundred and ninety were at Bekwai and Esumeja, under Captain Hall; twenty at Kwissa, under Lieutenant Slater; and three hundred odd under Colonel Carter near the Prah. There was a small fortified rest-house under a British non-commissioned officer at Fumsu. With the exception of the troops at Bekwai and Esumeja, who were supporting the loyal king of Bekwai, these various detachments, for want of a directing plan, were doing practically nothing. It was of the utmost importance, therefore, to establish concerted action between them. Difficulties were enhanced by an |