the window-sill a band of grimy, joyous sparrows twittered and preened themselves. In the middle of the room stood Loder. His coat was off, and round about him on chairs and floor lay an array of waistcoats, gloves, and ties. For a space Chilcote stood in the doorway staring at him; then his lips parted and he took a step forward. "Loder- " he said anxiously. "Loder, what are you going to do?” Loder turned. His shoulders were stiff, his face alight with energy. "I'm going back," he said, "to unravel the tangle you have made!" (To be continued.) WALPOLE'S HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIVE YEARS.' THOSE who grudge the time required for the study of ancient history, may readily welcome a book giving an authentic account of events and transactions which have occurred during or immediately before the lives of the vast majority now in existence. Political memories are proverbially short, and those who watched with interest the events of the period (1856-1870) under review in the the two volumes recently published of this work, will gladly renew that interest under the guidance of Sir Spencer Walpole, who, as his father's private secretary and a close student of authentic records, has had exceptional facilities for gaining knowledge and insight. The period is short, from the close of the Crimean War, which crippled one great European Power, to the surrender at Sedan, which for a time ruined and almost effaced another. During that period United Italy rose on the ruins of Austria, and United Germany on those of France; while Russia recruited her strength and Great Britain vanquished the great Indian Mutiny, developed her commerce and finances, and reformed her Parliament. Add to this that the period comprises the great American Civil War, and the abortive and tragic attempt of France to establish a Mexican empire, in defiance of the Monroe doctrine, and it will be readily admitted that it is a period of dramatic grandeur, on which any new light which may be thrown by the historian is of exceptional interest. The political personalities in England are of less interest historically than they were at the time. Sir Spencer Walpole is no great admirer of Lord Palmerston. Of Disraeli he candidly says that he does not think he behaved well to his father, who was Home Secretary during nearly the full time of Lord Derby's three Administrations, and he adopts a good deal of that prejudice against which Disraeli always had to struggle. Of Gladstone he has unqualified admiration; and as he is in these volumes limited to Gladstone's financial successes during Lord Palmerston's second Administration, and to the first year or two of what was undoubtedly his most successful most successful Premiership, we need not stop to criticise it. Perhaps the most noteworthy of the author's personal criticisms is that which he makes on octogenarian Premiers. genarian Premiers. He points out that from 1762 to 1852, from the fall of the Duke of Newcastle to the accession of Lord Aberdeen, there were only three Premiers who had 1 The History of Twenty-five Years.' By Sir Spencer Walpole, K.C.B. Two vols., 1856-1870. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1904. passed the age of sixty. They at the time of the Orsini were all peers. It was univer- explosion in 1858 and the sally conceded, even in times of consequent fall of his Adfar less stress and stringency ministration; and, second, his than at present, that after conduct of of the the Schleswigsixty a man could not stand Holstein dispute. the double strain of being Prime Minister and Leader of the House of Commons. Lord Palmerston was the first exception. And in his first Ministry there were defects of manner, temper, and memory which history does not disdain to note. At the close of his second Ministry he was eightyone, and died in office. At a later period, not included in these volumes, a still more flagrant instance occurred, and the House of Commons was led during the longest session of its history by a Premier of eighty-three, whose faculties were all on the decline, but who nevertheless wielded an authority which proved fatal to his party. Lord Palmerston of course must be judged by his foreign policy. In his first Administration he left Sir Richard Bethell to conduct the work of legislation, in his second he left it mostly to Mr Gladstone. His own influence in the country and in Parliament was mostly felt as a restraining one. All parties by tacit consent postponed heroic reforms till after his death. Politics themselves became senile in deference to a senile Premier,-a wise alternative to an activity which could only be mischievous. The two points of personal interest about Lord Palmerston which this book clears up are, first, his conduct Upon the first every one remembers that Lord Palmerston, who at the dissolution of 1857 had been established in power by an overwhelming majority, was turned out of office in February 1858 by a majority of 19 for not having answered Count Walewski's despatch accusing England of having given hospitality to assassins and protection to criminals, and of indirectly countenancing "assassination, elevated to a doctrine, preached openly, practised in repeated attempts, the most recent of which has struck Europe with amazement." Lord Clarendon sent no answer to this despatch, but contented himself with saying to the French Ambassador that he had already requested from the AttorneyGeneral an early opinion on the state of the law. The House of Commons refused to amend the law until the despatch had been answered and public opinion ratified the dismissal of the Minister. History may be said to ratify that public opinion when it discovers that Lord Clarendon might have repelled the charge of protecting criminals by pointing out that the Commissioner of the English police had actually warned the Préfet de Police in Paris of Orsini having left England with the intention of going by way of Belgium to Paris and there ; attempting the Emperor's life. A more conclusive answer could not have been given, and it ought not to have been with held. The incident is a very remarkable and not very creditable one in Lord Palmerston's life, but on no principle of historical justice can it be allowed to outweigh his successful prosecution of the Crimean War and repression of the Indian Mutiny. With regard to the Schleswig-Holstein affair, it formed an unfortunate close to Lord Palmerston's career. He had been a great Foreign Minister in his day, but he was now to pay the penalty of lingering on the stage too long. In July 1863 he made his memorable declaration that if any violent attempt was made to interfere with the independence of Denmark, Denmark would not stand alone in its resistance. Bismarck, however, had recently become Prime Minister of Prussia, and had just consolidated his friendship with Russia over the Polish question, and was determined to win the harbour of Kiel. He was a new man, little known to or appreciated by Lord Palmerston, who also failed to perceive the budding greatness of Prussia. The result was that Bismarck, who had imbibed a contempt for England at that time, owing, as he said, to her recent cession of the Ionian Islands, proceeded steadily with his designs, and by a series of manoeuvres, partly diplomatic and partly military, and aided by Russia, deprived Denmark first of Schleswig and then of Holstein. Kiel fell into the hands of the Germans, while Russia looked on approvingly, and while France and England were adroitly estranged from one another. Yet, as Sir Spencer Walpole points out, if Denmark was not to be left alone to defend herself against attack, common prudence suggested an understanding between England and France; if she was to be left in the lurch, the threat should have been explained, and she should not have been encouraged to resist. Neither course was taken. France was irritated by the refusal of a congress proposed by her, and Denmark was encouraged by England to resist, at all events as far as Schleswig was concerned. Bismarck was now embarked upon that career which subsequently became so famous. He showed no hesitation. The Prussian and Austrian armies crossed the Eider in the early part of 1864, and soon occupied the whole of Schleswig. They entered Jutland, across the border of Denmark proper, contrary to orders both from Vienna and Berlin; but the position, once occupied, was retained on the advice of Von Moltké. England protested, and Bismarck explained, but did not retreat. He said that the occupation had been without his orders, but that the troops could not now be withdrawn. France had wisely kept out of this imbroglio, since England would not promise to back joint diplomatic remonstrance with military action. So this country had to choose between submitting to the humiliation put upon her and entering upon war with the two great German Powers. Lord Palmerston was anxious to send the fleet to the Baltic, but the Cabinet overruled him. No amount of bluster would conceal the non-fulfilment of the rash pledge of 1863. The whole transaction, while it closed Lord Palmerston's career in something very like political shame, showed that the veteran statesman of eighty, with his new policy of meddle and muddle, was no match for the determined adventurer who had now achieved the first decisive success of a policy of blood and iron. These are two blots on Lord Palmerston's fame, which, however, is bright enough to bear some blemishes. If Bismarck outwitted and baffled him, he maintained his ground against Napoleon with more success. Perhaps if the annexation of Savoy and Nice had not inspired him with such profound distrust of, and almost hostility to, the Emperor, the latter might have been dissuaded from his Mexican expedition, and a war might have resulted over Schleswig-Holstein which would have been disastrous to all concerned. Sir Spencer Walpole gives an extremely interesting account of the mode in which Napoleon - "that embodiment of misunderstood incapacity," as Bismarck called him, according to M. Klaczko, that "muddle-headed fellow," according to Sir Spencer Walpole's quotation of the same authority-was made a cat's paw of by Count Cavour in the matter of Italian independence and unity, the credit for their final consummation passing eventually to the British Minister. The Orsini outrage led to the meeting at Plombières between the Count and Napoleon, from whose Ministers it was kept carefully concealed. It reads like a consultation between a statesman and a conspirator. The statesman was eager to free his country from Austria, and then gradually unite it. The conspirator, recently escaped from the vengeance of his former confederates, and nervous as to his future, was eager to commit France to the enterprise, behind the backs of his Ministers. He promised Cavour, on his own responsibility, to support Piedmont with his whole strength in a war with Austria, and actually asked him to devise a pretext for rupture. pledged himself to drive the Austrians from Italy, convert Piedmont into a kingdom of Upper Italy, Central Italy to form another State, the two Sicilies a third; the Pope to be consoled with Rome and its neighbourhood. Savoy and Nice were to reward France for her exertions. He The peace of Villafranca was concluded between Napoleon and Austria, apart from Cavour and his king, both sides being equally afraid of Russian intervention. The programme of Plombières was not carried out, and accordingly Napoleon waived at that time his claim to Savoy and Nice. The King of Piedmont, who |