upon every church, whose walls had been pierced for muskets, and round which deep trenches had been dug as an additional means of defence. These sacred edifices represented the citadel of the position, and, filled as they were with men who had signalized themselves by robbery and crime, one was forcibly reminded of the words which say: "You have made my house a den of thieves."

Batabano itself was half destroyed. In the recent attack the town hall and all the rest of the public buildings were burned, and yet there were ample accommodations for the few families who lingered on.

The port, called Surgidero, is about three miles distant. It is an important place, as it is the point of embarkation for Cienfuegos and Santiago de Cuba. So far it had escaped the insurgents, but there was a band lurking in the jungle close at hand who made constant demonstrations during the night, and kept the military authorities busy.

Embankments and Breastworks.

The precautions which were adopted for defence are interesting. A narrow, shallow trench was excavated for nearly a mile and a half outside the little seaport to protect it on the land side. Behind this trench the earth was thrown up into a low embankment, strengthened with a wattle breastwork, and guarded along the entire line by no fewer than twelve forts. A gunboat was close in shore, and as a guide to direct her fire, lanterns on high posts were set close together a few paces beyond the trench. She had a good deal of practice, for one of the inhabitants said that he counted thirty-seven shells which she discharged one night. Like Mr. Winkle's shot, however, they proved to be merely homeless wanderers, finding, contrary to the proverb, no billet anywhere.

At the railway station, the platform was crowded with people. They were emigrants, flying with their families and household goods from the terror which reigned throughout the land. But it was not a fear of the insurgents which compelled them to leave their homes. The Spanish army was the cause. The alcalde of Jovellanos, in Ma tanzas province, said that there was no safety for any one outside of the large cities.

This man was a Spaniard and a loyal subject. He officiated as Mayor of Jovellanos for two years, and was prosperous and respected. After soldiers were quartered in the town, he said, life had become unbearable. They plundered his store, notwithstanding his position as Chief Magistrate, and robbed the inhabitants at will. A Spanish guerrilla force, under the command of Lieutenant Salvador Paula, saw ten laborers working in a field in the outskirts of Jovellanos. When challenged these men replied: "Viva España!" Yet they were immediately fired upon, though fortunately without any evil result to them. They were wise enough to fling themselves upon the ground, while an unfortunate Chinaman, who was feeding his horse close by, received a bullet in the leg. This poor creature limped up and showed the wound to Lieutenant Paula, who thereupon exclaimed: "O, you complain, do you? I will soon prevent your telling tales!" drew his machete and with one stroke cut off the Chinaman's head. This episode undoubtedly saved the workmen's lives.

Still Another Atrocity.

The guerrilleros, having gratified their taste for blood, departed, yet though the case, the Alcalde said, was reported to the commandant, General Prat, Paula and his gang were left unpunished.

Another atrocity was that of Colonel Vicuna, who, when marching with his column to the town, met three unarmed men upon the road. They were instantly arrested, and though there were no grounds for supposing them to be insurgents, Colonel Vicuna ordered them to be shot, a command which was carried out on the spot. Three days afterward the Alcalde read in the official reports in the newspapers that this very column had had an engagement with the insurgents near Jovellanos, and had killed three. The battle referred to was this cruel execution of inoffensive civilians.

Of a truth these official reports were merely useful as a record of what did not occur. No reliance can be placed in a single statement, unless it be the simple fact that something took place in a certain locality, while the circumstantial story and the result were complete fabrications. An account was given of an encounter near

Cardenas, where the Spaniards had one dead and four wounded. It was found subsequently that their losses amounted to sixty-two, of which no fewer than twenty-five had been killed.

In like manner the true account of the assault on Santa Clara is very different from that supplied from the Palace for publication. In a letter from an eye-witness of the whole affair, we find that the Cubans met with scarcely any opposition, and that General Bazan, so far from having ridden with his staff through the rain of bullets, sought refuge in the theatre until the enemy had retired. The insurgents patrolled the town all night long, and procured without difficulty the supplies which they required.

O

CHAPTER XIX.

The United States to the Rescue.

N the 10th of April, 1896, our State Department at Washing ton sent to Madrid an important official despatch hearing on Cuban affairs. It was signed by Secretary Olney, and addressed to Minister Taylor. In it was laid down the attitude of the Administration on the Cuban question. The despatch was a lengthy Its four principal points were:

one.

First. The President proposed that Spain accept mediation on the part of the United States, looking to a settlement of existing differences between the Spanish Government and the Cubans.

Second. It referred to the correspondence between the State Department and the Madrid authorities in 1870, in which Spain promised to inaugurate governmental reforms in Cuba, which promises, it was said, have not been fulfilled.

Third. That the present rebellion in Cuba is more serious and widespread than any which have arisen in recent years, and that the insurgents controlled practically all of Cuba except Havana and the near neighborhood.

Fourth. It assured Spain of the kindliest motives on the part of the United States in seeking to bring about a pacific condition of affairs in Cuba, and urged that the good offices of this country be accepted in the spirit proffered.

After the passage in the House of the Cuban resolutions the President and Secretary Olney were frequently in consultation in relation to the general affairs in Cuba and the wisest course for the United States to pursue in the matter. Few, if any, of the many friends of Cuba in Congress expected that the President would take steps in harmony with the provisions of the resolutions. The President decided that the question of recognizing a state of belligerency in

the Island was not seriously to be considered. In reaching this decision he followed the advice of Secretary Olney, which was based on the precedent established by President Grant in his first administration, upon the earnest recommendations of Secretary Fish.

Our Government Offers to Mediate.

It having been determined not to recognize belligerency in the Island, the point to be decided was what, if any, steps should be taken in the matter. The President and the Secretary of State agreed that some measures were necessary. As a result of several important conferences, the President finally concluded that mediation on the part of the United States should be suggested to Spain.

As far as known the President did not discuss the proposed course with any other member of the Cabinet than Mr. Olney. In international affairs it was the exception when he asked for the views of any other Cabinet Minister. In the case of Cuba he did not depart from his rule, but drew up not only the outline of Mr. Olney's note to Minister Taylor, but suggested many of the paragraphs, and some of the sentences.

The President viewed the condition of affairs in Cuba as deserving of serious consideration. He recognized that conditions existed which were most unfortunate, and which were injurious not only to Spain, but to the vast commerce between the United States and Cuba. He realized, however, that Spain and this country are on terms of amity, and thought that vigorous proceedings on the part of the United States would result in the object aimed at being lost. This might mean a rupture of the friendly relations between Spain and the United States. The President was opposed to the adoption of any such course.

He looked upon the recognizing of a state of belligerency in Cuba as unwise and unjustifiable under the circumstances, and as certain to irritate the Spanish people. For the present, at least, he was of the opinion that the best course was to propose the good offices of this Government, looking to a settlement of the serious differences between Spain and the Cuban insurgents.