port of this policy. In conformity with this plan, the white garrisons were ordered withdrawn from St. Lucia, Barbados and Jamaica in 1905.1 Port Royal, Jamaica, was no longer maintained as a naval base. Both that port and the coaling depot at St. Lucia were "reduced to cadres on which the expenditure in time of peace is small but which in time of war can be at once developed according to necessity." 2 The colonists received the new arrangement with no enthusiasm. The hurricane in Jamaica, which necessitated accepting aid from the American Navy, and the riots in St. Lucia, which the local police were unable to handle, were cited as evidences that the policy of the home Government in "deserting" the colonies was a mistake. They urged that the race question also would become acute as soon as the white ensign ceased to be a familiar sight in West Indian harbors. The party of the opposition in the House of Commons added its protest to the criticism of the new policy. But the British force in the region has not been increased.5 3 1 The Jamaica troops were not withdrawn. See Parl. Deb., Mar. 22, 1911, c. 495, reply of Mr. Acland. 2 Aspinall, A. E., op. cit., p. 396. Littleton, Secretary of State for the Quoting Right Hon. Alfred Parl. Deb., Mar. 22, 1911, c. 495, for discussion of removal of forces from St. Lucia and Barbados. 3 For discussion of this subject, see Mr. Bryce in Parl. Deb., May 17, 1905, c. 709-710. 4 See Sir Gilbert Parker, Parl. Deb., July 15, 1907, c. 1337-8; Mr. Newman, Parl. Deb., Mar. 22, 1911, c. 495, et seq.; Mr. Haddock, Parl. Deb., Feb. 22, 1912, c. 876; Mr. Sherley Benn, Parl. Deb., Mar. 20, 1912, c. 1933. 5 Parl. Deb., May 3, 1911, c. 413. However, late discussions in Parliament show that this standard is not likely to remain satisfactory to the British public in view of the conditions created by the opening of the Panama Canal. On March 20, 1912, Mr. Sherley Benn, speaking in the House of Commons, called the attention of the Admiralty to the fact that formerly it was planned to build the Panama Canal by private capital "and neither Great Britain nor America were to erect any fortifications along the canal. Unfortunately, private enterprise failed, and it was found necessary that the American government should complete the Panama Canal, and naturally and justly America must protect it." He pointed out that ships from New York and Canada to New Zealand and Australia, and from Canada to the East would go through the Canal. “As a natural result, we must expect that the trade from America and from Canada to the countries lying in the east must increase very largely and as long as we are one of the great carrying countries of the world, we must expect that our ships will trade from Canadian and American ports to the east using the Panama Canal. . . . Not only shall we have to defend our ships, but we shall have to defend our colonies lying between Bermuda and British Guiana. Those ships . . . will be very liable to attack by European countries if we should be at war with them, and America happens to be a neutral country." These statements indicate both the importance of the naval questions of the West Indies to Great Britain and the fact that the increase of British forces in the region cannot 1 1 Parl. Deb., Mar. 20, 1912, c. 1933. 1 be regarded as inconsistent with the interests of the United States. Though the actual naval representation of the Empire is likely to remain relatively small in times of peace so long as the policy of concentrating the forces in home waters is followed, the British Government will not fail to see the importance of assuring itself a naval base in America commensurate with the maritime interests the Navy will be called upon to protect. The warships in the West Indies may remain few, but the necessity of being prepared to accommodate large naval forces will not be overlooked. The location of the necessary naval base has for several years been a matter of consideration by the Admiralty. Heretofore, the ports of Jamaica and Trinidad have been spoken of with favor. Compared to these, Bermuda has an obvious advantage of position. It is now the base from which both the British vessels detailed for service in the northeast fisheries and those engaged in West Indian duties operate. It could be made a center from which to guard both Caribbean and Canadian interests. How little a naval establishment in Bermuda is to be considered inconsistent with American interests in the West Indies is evident from a survey of the ports which can be used as bases by the American warships. Among these would, of course, be counted the Gulf ports in the continental territory of the United States; but even leaving these out of consideration, the position 1 See speech by the Right Hon. A. J. Balfour in Committee of Supply, May 11, 1904, quoted by A. E. Aspinall, op. cit., p. 398. of the United States in the Caribbean is one of such advantage both on account of the number of bases and the character of their harbors that no other country is likely to be in a position to dispute American control. A glance at the map shows a long arc of islands stretching from Key West and Nassau to Port-ofSpain. All the chief ports capable of being used as naval bases, with the exception of those held by the larger European powers, are now either in the control of the United States or have been the subject of active negotiations looking toward their acquisition. Key West is already in our possession. Our arrangements with Cuba once gave us control of two ports, one toward the western, one near the eastern end of the island, to be used for naval purposes. Since our treaty with Cuba provides that she shall alienate no territory to a "foreign" Government the value of a base at the western end is slight, for Key West commands the center of the Straits of Florida and places us in almost as strong a position as we would occupy if possessed of an additional base there. Arrangements have been made by which the holdings at this point have been given up and larger areas have been acquired at Guantanamo— the base at the eastern end of the island. Construction work is practically completed. The base is equipped 'with fuel oil tanks and wharf, naval magazine, a radio station and other facilities to make it an effective naval station.' It gives the United States an unequaled position for the control of the Windward Passage separat 1 See Annual Report of the Navy Department, 1913, Washington, 1914, pp. 46, 121, 122, and Ibid., 1914, pp. 128, 133-134. ing Cuba from the Dominican Republic. East of the latter island lies Porto Rico, from which the United States can control the Mona Passage. Various proposals made by recent Administrations will, if carried through, make our position even more secure. Between Cuba and Porto Rico lies the troubled island of San Domingo with its two republics, each of which contains a harbor reputed to be of great desirability as a naval base. Mole St. Nicholas, in Haiti, the port which disputes with the harbor of St. Thomas the title of "the Gibraltar of the West Indies" overlooks the Windward Passage from the east, holding thus the opposite side of the strait commanded by Guantanamo. President Benjamin Harrison, under the influence of Secretary of State Blaine, once sought to secure control of the place for the United States.1 The advantage of its possession is obvious. During the negotiations for a fiscal protectorate in September, 1915, Secretary Lansing authorized the statement that we had not even asked for control of this point. It is understood, however, that the local government then in control had offered its possession and it is hardly to be supposed that the United States has no desire for the control of so commanding a position. Toward the eastern end of the island in the Dominican Republic lies Samana Bay, also at one time the subject of active negotiations by our Government in President Grant's Administration. It would enable 1 Douglass, Frederick, Haiti and the United States, North American Review, Vol. 153, pp. 337-45 and 450-59 (1891). 2 See Richardson, J. D., Messages and Papers of the Presi |