Mr. Heman H. Field and Mr. George W. Korte for defendant in error, submitted. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court. Raymond, the plaintiff in error, sued the Railway Company, a foreign corporation doing business in Washington, to recover damages resulting from injuries sustained by him while in its employ. The petition alleged that the defendant operated an interstate commerce railroad between Chicago and Seattle and that for the purpose of shortening its main line and making more efficient and expeditious its freight and passenger service, was engaged in cutting a tunnel through the mountain between Horrick's Spur and Rockdale in Washington. It was averred that plaintiff was employed by the defendant in the tunnel as a laborer and that while he was at work his pick struck a charge of dynamite which through the defendant's negligence had not been removed and that from the explosion which followed he has sustained serious injuries. The defendant's answer contained a general denial and alleged that at the time and place of the accident the railroad and Raymond were not engaged in interstate commerce, since the tunnel was only partially bored and hence not in use as an instrumentality of interstate commerce. It was further alleged that the court was without jurisdiction to hear the cause because of the provisions of the Washington Workmen's Compensation Act (Chapter 74, Laws of 1911) with whose requirements the defendant had fully complied. The reply of the plaintiff admitted the facts alleged in the answer but denied that they constituted defenses to the action. The trial court entered a judgment for the defendant on the pleadings, and this writ of error is prosecuted to a judgment of the court below affirming such action. 233 Fed. Rep. 239. Considering the suit as based upon the Federal Employers' Liability Act, it is certain under recent decisions of this court, whatever doubt may have existed in the minds of some at the time the judgment below was rendered, that under the facts as alleged Raymond and the Railway Company were not engaged in interstate commerce at the time the injuries were suffered, and consequently no cause of action was alleged under the act. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. Co. v. Yurkonis, 238 U. S. 439; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co. v. Harrington, 241 U. S. 177; Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Nash, 242 U. S. 619. It is also certain that if the petition be treated as alleging a cause of action under the common law, the court below was without authority to afford relief, as that result could only be attained under the local law in accordance with the provisions of the Washington Workmen's Compensation Act, which has this day been decided to be not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. Mountain Timber Company v. Washington, post, 219. And this result is controlling even although it be conceded that the railroad company was in a general sense engaged in interstate commerce, since it has been also this day decided that that fact does not prevent the operation of a state workmen's compensation act. New York Central R. R. Co. v. White, post, 188. Affirmed. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF SELLING ET AL., A SPECIAL COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF DETROIT, v. RADFORD. PETITION TO DISBAR. No. 21, Original. Submitted November 20, 1916.-Order made March 6, 1917. Only by the action of this court may one who has secured admission to its bar be disbarred from practicing before it. The character and scope of the investigation to be made on a prayer for disbarment, before sanction is given to it, must depend upon the character of the acts of misconduct charged, the place of their commission and the nature of the proof relied upon to establish them. While membership of the bar of a state court of last resort and fair private and professional character are both prerequisite to admission to the bar of this court, loss of the first, after admission here, cannot, without more, affect the standing of the member. Fair private and professional character, however, are continuing essentials, and their loss by wrongful personal and professional conduct, wherever committed, is adequate reason for disbarment. An order of the highest court of a State disbarring a member of its bar upon charges of personal and professional misconduct, this court has no authority to reëxamine and reverse in the capacity of a court of review. Such an order of the state court, although not binding on this court as a thing adjudged, so operates, while unreversed, against the private and professional character of the member as to constrain this court to exclude him from its bar also, unless, upon intrinsic consideration of the state record, this court shall (1) find that the state procedure was wanting in due process, (2) come to a clear conviction that the proof of facts relied on by the state court to establish want of fair character was so infirm that acceptance of the state court's conclusion thereon as a finality would be inconsistent with this court's duty, or (3) discover some other grave and sufficient reason why this court could not disbar consistently with its duty not to take that action unless constrained under the principles of right and justice to do so. Ex parte Tillinghast, 4 Pet. 108, distinguished. 243 U.S. Opinion of the Court. THE facts are stated in the opinion. The Solicitor General on behalf of the petitioners. Mr. Thomas A. E. Weadock and Mr. Harrison Geer for respondent. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court. George W. Radford was admitted to practice in the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan on the fifteenth day of June, 1876. About ten years thereafter, on March 18, 1886, upon the representation that he had been for the three years preceding a member of the Bar of the highest court of the State of Michigan and upon the further assurance, both conformably with Rule 2 of this court, that his private and professional character appeared to be fair, he was permitted to become a member of the Bar of this court. Represented by the Solicitor General of the United States, the petitioners as a committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of Detroit, specially appointed for that purpose, seek to procure an order striking Radford from the roll of the members of the Bar of this court on the ground of his personal unworthiness to continue as a member of such Bar. And in coming to consider their request, we understand their sense of pain at being called on to discharge the duty which they unselfishly perform. The original petition filed for that purpose alleged that in a suit brought in a designated court of original jurisdiction in Michigan for the purpose of disbarring Radford for professional misconduct amounting to moral wrong, he had, after notice and full hearing, been found to have committed the wrongful acts complained of and had been disbarred and that such judgment had been approved by the Supreme Court of Michigan in a proceeding by certiorari taken to consider the same. Annexed to the petition was a copy of the opinion and order of disbarment entered by the court of original jurisdiction, as well as a copy of the opinion and order of the Supreme Court of the State in the certiorari proceeding, the same being reported in 168 Michigan, 474. It was alleged in the petition that notwithstanding the fact that Radford had by the final action of the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan been stricken from the rolls of the courts in that State for the reasons previously stated, he had continued in the City of Detroit to hold himself out as a practicing lawyer entitled to respect and confidence as such because of the fact that he continued to be a member of the Bar of this court, unaffected by the order of disbarment by the courts of the State. After reciting the unseemly condition produced by these circumstances and the disrespect for the state courts which was naturally implied, the prayer was for a rule to show cause and for the awarding, on the return to such rule, of the order of disbarment which was sought. An answer was made to the rule to show cause and a brief filed in support of the same, as to which we think it suffices to say for our present purposes that both the answer and the brief take a much wider range than is permissible and rely upon much that is here irrelevant, not to say in some respects improper to be considered, as the prayer for the enforcement of the judgment of the court of last resort of Michigan is not to be converted into a trial of the courts of that State or of the members of the Detroit Bar Association on behalf of which the petition was filed. Beyond all question, when admission to the Bar of this court is secured, that right may not be taken away except by the action of this court. While this is true, it is also true that the character and scope of the investigation to |