Power,-LEISURE, the happy, if wellused privilege, of appropriating, at the choice of their own discretion, according to the best, highest, purest, wisest suggestion of their heart and understanding, the measures of the swift span of mortal existence,-of stamping on hour, day, month, and year, as it fleets by, acts of selfchosen virtuous endeavour, bright labours of useful and yet noble thought,-meditation, clothed in Fancy's hues, and yet instinct with feelings the deepest and most solemn: POWER,-not that only which is command over the actions, the obedience, the service, the will, the happiness, the welfare and virtue of others, but power also for themselves inwardly, -power which is the command over all the means of knowledge, of living instruction as it is best given,-access to all the treasure-houses, use of the accumulated wealth of learning, science and art, which seas divide not, which shores remove not from the sufficient object of its sufficient desire to which not only all volumes of all languages, but the Book of Nature and Life is equally with them outspread, the cities and manners of men open to be seen and known, -and the sages of the earth, whereever they breathe to meditate wisdom, can be sought as companions and friends of those we speak, who to whatever rank, to whatever fortune they may have been born, to the highest, to the lowest, to the amplest and most flowing, or to the narrowest and most constraining, are yet all called by the gifts indulged to their spirit, to intellectual riches and rank-of those who thus estated, and taking their easier or more difficult way to the possession of their heritage, become the teachers and lights of the world, -become its separated, it may be said, consecrated order, and priesthood of knowledge.

Now, we maintain, that in speaking of such minds we have, in fact, treated the only question, or, we should rather say, the only portion of a very extended question, on which there is room for doubt. For, it may be doubted, on the whole of his constitution and condition possibly, what is the proper way for man to attain well-being and well-doing. But this being once determined, then, whether the proper way for one portion of

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mankind to seek well-being and welldoing, is, or is not, the proper way for another portion of the same species to seek the same results, can, we apprehend, be none. They are the same nature, the same soul, on the same earth,-under the same God, the same author, disposer, ruler, guide. They are from one origin-for one end. Let it be granted, then, that this solemn Being of Intellect and Will, capable of Happiness and Misery, of Knowledge and Ignorance, of Good and Evil,-that is, of moral good and evil; and who, capable in all parts of his constitution alike of either of these alternatives, is yet called to one and not to another, is called to Happiness and Moral Good, called therewith, and thereby, and therefore to Knowledge also, and as little to Ignorance as he is to Misery or Guilt-that these Three are in connexion and harmony, and reciprocal dependence, and those Three-then we hold that these are words without meaning, or they are truths of the whole race, of that nature which is identical in one and in another throughout the habitations of the globe. It is a question not partial but universal; not superficial but profound; not of a division of the surface but central; emanating in every direction alike, and radiating to the whole circumference. What proposal of a doubt, pray, would it be to say, does natural love, as of the mother to her child, produce, in some orders, a moral purity and elevation of thoughts and wishes, in others vitiate and depress them? Does it produce in some hearts effusion of tenderness and sympathy, softening and opening them? Does it harden others and steep them in gall? Is one soul created under one law, one system of laws-another under another? Does the beating of the heart propel the blood in one living frame, and does that blood convey with it heat and life? And does the same mighty pulse in another shut up the healthful circulation, or send in its place a stream of ice and death? Does this atom of matter fall by gravity? And have we to seek some other law to account for the fall of this next?These are truly the questions we ask, when we enquire, whether in one human being, or class of human beings,

intellect is given as a power friendly to morality, a power made rightly to influence the will, which must therefore receive its food, knowledge, that it may perform its ministry: Whether in another it exists as a power dangerous and hurtful to morality, acting injuriously upon the will, from which therefore its celestial food is to be withheld?

Let it be thought what kind of contradiction any other conclusion would be in practice-what sort of prospect a nation would present, that should divide itself into the struggle, that should attempt in this manner to pull asunder its higher and its lower portions, and thus intellectually to dismember itself; of which the higher orders should seek with the utmost passion and avidity, and the utmost ambition of all their powers, light to themselves, and at the same time endeavour to maintain the darkness of the lower? How could they attempt it? How could they wall in the overflowing waters? If there were initiations in science, in temples guarded with fearful ceremonies and vows, there might be some hope to keep the secret of knowledge. But our temples are open. Our books are not written in a sacred Brahminical language, unknown to the vulgar, the patrimony of the holy caste. They are not written in hieroglyphic characters, of which the secret and sacred key is covered beneath the mantle of the priests. They are in a language which all speak, in letters which are no longer a mystery. The world of knowledge is thrown open; and the question is not with those who have it, whether they will impart, but with those who have it not, whether they will receive?

If it were possible to confine it, where should the line be drawn? Are our orders so distinguished that we can define, this shall be the right of one; this of another; we will carry down this part of knowledge thus low, and this thus low, and no lower? Far from it. It is the beauty of our social state, that all its various ranks, although essentially distinct, yet all seem to blend into each other, constituting, in their union, an harmonious whole. We give to wealth its due tribute of respect, when gained by honourable means, and employed

for useful ends. We do not withhold from the inheritors of a noble name, any of those feelings with which imagination delights reverently to invest the history of an illustrious house, and if he be not unworthy of his lofty lineage, each successive representative of an ancient family. We have reason to respect the nobility and the gentry of our native land; for they of old have been distinguished by a proud and fearless patriotism. But we venerate virtue we admire genius-we respect intellect, from whatever nook "its fulgent head starbright appears"

and as it is, after all, by mind alone that the high-born can maintain their right unquestioned to those feelings with which we are willing to regard them and their high estate; so by mind alone can the peasant lift himself up to the level of the peer, and gain to himself a name that shall rank in the roll with the proudest names that grace the ancestral glories of even a regal race. It is plain, that there is but one line we can draw, that which encompasses all. Thus, then, if it might be a question, whether the walks of knowledge should be abandoned altogether, and ploughed up, it can be none, who shall go into them. What practical question, therefore, can we ask? Not, whether we shall withhold, but whether we shall seek to impart. Not what we shall keep back, but what we shall be most diligent to extend. If we shall seek to impart? In the first place, Yes, because we believe that knowledge is good for the human soul; and we desire, we who may be somewhat or far higher in society, we who may have some or great influence, power, deliberation for others, to diffuse Good. We wish it, in charity to those less favoured than we are. We wish it, in patriotism, that the solid welfare of our country may be built as wide as its shores. We wish it, in self-interest, that we may not feel the reaction upon our selves of forlorn vice, the untamed and fierce ignorance of those among whom our lot is cast. If we shall seek to impart? Yes. That we may bind all together in one bond; that we may be one brotherhood. To impart? Yes. That we may receive. That chill penury may no longer repress or freeze-that in open day

founded on knowledge or ignorance of human nature and its most momentous concerns.

That Education we then hold to be comparatively of little worth, which is entirely an Education of Intellect, and not at all of Will. What is all the evil of life but a disordered will? What other ignorance so mischievous-so fatal, as the ignorance of the will disturbed and darkened? From that disturbance and darkness, what dreadful passions rise up, not only to destroy all peace and all virtue in the individual whom they perpetually torment, but in league and union with kindred powers in many other hearts to agitate the whole frame of society, and lay its fairest scenes desolate! Knowledge may and does work directly towards the restoration of the will. But from that to reason generally about the importance of knowledge, is to deceive ourselves, and to expect effects from an inadequate cause. The kind of knowledge that can effectually and permanently clear and enlighten the will is soon circumscribed and defined-moral and religious. You may say, that the will cannot give religion, because religion is doctrine, and facts and truths, out of the acquisition of the faculties, and which must be deelared. True-God has done his part, and given us revelation. These truths are couched in few words, and soon conveyed. Where lies the great difficulty of this knowledge but in the will, which is unrecipient-not always by direct purposed opposition, but by earth and desires of earth clinging to it, and in a way it cannot understand; palsying, as it were, the very spirit, when most eager to aspire to heaven? Is there any instance of a soul perfectly spiritual, and withal perfectly meek, that ever found insuperable difficulty in embracing the highest and greatest doctrines? So it is said "they that will to do the will of my Father shall know of the doctrine;" that is, by the very act of willing, steadily maintained, shall acquire the knowledge. Undoubtedly the best effects of secular instruction are also of a moral kind, but indirectly, and not in the very highest degree. Many of the habits and tempers of such instruction are excellently good. It induces domesticity-it is tranquil,

sedate, thoughtful, orderly-it mixes with a father's love to his children in divers ways-partly in teaching them, as he will be by his secular instruction better able to be a religious or moral teacher to them. He who studies astronomy or natural history may find in them just grounds of adoration and gratitude. But not necessarily so-for according to the will is the feeding of the soul on its knowledge; it is poison or immortal fruits. The will hallows the knowledge, or makes it wicked. Observe, too, and we ask you to do so from no wish to undervalue Science, that the adoration drawn from speculative knowledge is much weaker than that proceeding from the personal incidents of common life. A poor man, receiving his daily meal, as he believes, from the hand that feeds the young ravens when they cry, has a stronger and more efficient sort of gratitude, than he who derives it from contemplation. Yet it is re

quisite, too, that the spirit which does put forth the eagle-wings of thought, should, in Intellect and Imagination, still find religion, that its great powers may be good to it, and not its bane. But we are not to begin to seek God above the stars. He is not far from every one of

us."

Thus, then, there is an effect of secular instruction which works back into the higher order of effects-but not necessarily-although, when it does, most momentous. For, supposing a truly moral people, well taught for the next world, it may easily be conceived that a general diffusion of knowledge, making them an intellectually, as well as morally instructed people, would raise their whole character, as well as their whole power greatly, and be really of prodigious importance. The error, and it is one into which many philanthropists have fallen, is to think of founding on intellect, to build thereon will; the right course being to found in will, and to build thereon intellect-the right course, if there be truth in the words of the Most High.

It is not possible, therefore, for any person, holding the opinion which we have now expressed, to speak in perfect consent with the present zeal for Education. We must suppose it, in this mistaken, that it too often

overlooks, disregards, or misunderstands moral effects. Neither intellect, nor its tuition, are necessarily moral. This many of the most zeal ous educationists seem not to know They seem to think that intellectis virtue and happiness. What is the truth? If you try to conceive a human being in his perfection, you, no doubt, conceive him walking in the light of intellect. But there are two kinds of knowledge, objective and subjective. Knowledge objective is knowledge of objects in and among themselves. Knowledge subjective is knowledge of objects in their relation to, and as they affect the mind knowing-the mind or person being called, somewhat perplexingly, perhaps, by logicians, the subject. Now he who is strong in either kind commands reve rence, and seems to be achieving the duty of his being; but we would say, that he who knows objectively seems rather to walk in power-he who knows subjectively to walk in light. Galileo and Newton appear to us triumphing spirits. The sovereign and sole power of intellect swallowing up their life, appears to have something consecrating, in our estimation. We do not ask about the will of such men-perhaps we fear to do so, lest we should find a flaw, some evil lurking there that might bring down the starry Galileo from his throne in the skies, and shew him, like ourselves, a child of dust. Here, however, the intellect was purely contemplative, and the subject solemnizes the faculties. Take, then, Lycurgus, Solon, or Numa, who were practical men, and busied themselves with the concerns of this world and this life. Observe, that in them we always suppose great subjective, as well as great objective knowledge, or rather that they have treated subjective knowledge objectively, and that they well knew themselves, and regulated their own minds by noble laws. Besides, they legislated for the public good, and thereby they proved their virtue, and we believe them to have been virtuous. Take, then, knowledge, practical, objective, and limited in its objects, such as that of the illustrious Watt. We know that he was a man of virtue; but we have little or no reason for believing that, from his merely having improved on the steam engine. He might

have been the most scientific man of his age, and yet not a man of great virtue-nor would our minds have been greatly surprised or shocked, had such knowledge and such talents been found disunited from great virtue. They command reverence, by the power, both producing and produced; but surely a moderated and inferior reverence, not one to take place of a moral estimate. Finally, take knowledge, practical, and detached from or opposed to will, as in many great conquerors, and we then feel that knowledge is something altogether different from virtue. Any mental power, at its height, dazzles us, absorbs our contemplating faculty, but may give little light on its general moral effect. The moral effect of knowledge merely objective, which is that of education on common men, seems to be this-that it amends and raises them by drawing force of will from common_passions into a spiritual power. Besides, it raises, and in some degree amends, as it guides them in their actions relative to things external and objective. The injury is, or may be, that it destroys simplicity of faith. The character of the understanding of children and of the common people, is, that feeling their own knowledge to be extremely limited, they readily suppose, and are ever prone to believe, existences and powers out of their own knowledge, and that to any extent. This is a true state of mind, for it is a disposition representing their real power. Instructed men have this not, but the reverse, a persuasion that their present knowledge contains reality, possibility, every thing, which is a state in the utmost degree false. This is the reason of all incredulity-a prevalent temper of the last half century, coming with knowledge, and not yet extinguished. Undoubtedly, by the diffusion of instruction, as it is contemplated, we shall in some produce this temper, perhaps in great numbers. The highest philosophy returns to the pristine humility of ignorance-only an enlightened, instead of a dark humility. It has measured finiteness in the presence of infinitude. No man, if

you ask him, "Do you know every thing?" will answer Yes, I do;" but, nevertheless, that is his virtual belief. For his understanding is shut