agent, and a property remaining unimpaired by the fall. What ground then remains for the objection? But should you now still urge that the dependence of the creature destroys his criminality, I would turn your objection upon you, and ask, why the creature's dependence does not equally destroy the praise-worthiness of virtue? That good men are absolutely dependent for their goodness-that, their virtues are not self originated but derived from God, and their holy exercises the fruits of his Spirit, influencing their hearts to that which is good, working in them both to will and to do, of his own good pleasure; is an acknowledged doctrine of the Bible-professed and embraced by Christians of all sects. Now, I ask, why the same consequences do not follow in this case as in the other? Why the dependence of the saints for their holy exercises does not equally operate against their moral agency, and destroy the praise worthiness of their virtues? It certainly must have this effect in both -if it destroys moral agency in either.-Until this difficulty is fairly removed, I must conclude, that the reverse of the objection is true;-that a self determining power is inconsistent with freedom and moral agency; and if made the foundation of accountability, tends to confound the distinction between moral good

cases-

and evil.

But stress, I find, is laid on the terms "native state," as a circumstance rendering the inconsistency between dependence and accountability the more glaring. "If the mind in its native state, be not equally free to choose holiness as sin," &c. You must have argued thus in your own mind, and set it down for proof—If sin be natural to us, it is necessary—and if it be necessary, it is no sin. This is truly a short, but a dangerous mode of reasoning. If it proves any thing, it proves every thing. It is a sword with two edges and wounds both ways. By the same arrangement, it is equally easy to prove that the angels in heaven are destitute of holiness and are not moral agents. ThusIf holiness be natural to them, it is necessary; and if necessary, it is no holiness. You surely, my friend, must have been unapprized of the immeasurable

lengths to which this reasoning would carry you-for if to be equally free to choose good as evil, be a necessary foundation of the sinner's guilt--then on the other hand, it would be just as necessary as a foundation of moral virtue in a perfectly holy being, that he should be naturally and equally free to choose evil as good. But this hypothesis cannot bear its own weight. It is too gross to be received by any reflecting and discerning mind. It will be sufficient to apply it in a single instance. The holiness of God is natural to himis essential to his nature-therefore it is necessaryand therefore it is no holiness.

Again. God is free to choose only good-it is infinitely and forever impossible that he should make an evil choice-therefore he cannot be a free agent, or a holy being-he is "bound down to the choice of good only, without an alternative."

Such consequences inevitably follow the idea of a self determining power being the foundation of moral agency, are destructive of all virtue or vice, praise or blame. Only set moral necessity and natural liberty at variance, and you strike all holiness out of the universe, and land in the darkness and horrors of atheism.

Yours &c.

ARISTARCHUS.

LETTER VII.

DEAR SIR,

"He that is first in his own cause seemeth just; but his neighbour cometh and searcheth him." Your next objection to the exclusive agency of divine grace in

regeneration, it seems to me you could not have brought forward, had you duly weighed the arguments offered in my two former letters. But as it embraces some cardinal points in your system, I will give it a candid and thorough examination: and in compliance with your request, make an honest and faithful effort to set you right. You say,

"I must object to your utterly excluding the agen cy of the creature in regeneration, as irrational, unscriptural and dangerous. Irrational, because it does not accord with the character of a free moral agent, or with the nature of conversion, which consists as you have justly stated, in the act of the creature—his voluntary turning to God. It is unscriptural, because, uncomformable to the terms of the gospel-the free offers of salvation-backed as they are with the positive command of God, enjoining the immediate and effective act of the sinner, "Make to yourselves a new heart and a new spirit, for why will ye die O house of Israel." And now shall we reply against God, and say that the sinner cannot change his own heart-that in regeneration he is merely an inactive recipient of divine grace? It is a dangerous sentiment, because it is directly calculated to cut off every motive to exertion and fortify the sinner in his stupidity and neglect of salvation. He will at once reply, "You tell me I can repent and I cannot--I must be converted, and I cannot convert myself-that I am so wholly dependent ; that I can do nothing: I will not, therefore attempt any thing; for, there is nothing for me to do. I will wait, till God is pleased to change my heart." Is it not the natural, necessary and known effect of this predestinarian doctrine, to harden the heart, and stupify the conscience?

I believe, that God deals with mankind, not as inert matter, susceptible only of physical power; but as being what they are, rational creatures--free moral agents-susceptible of motives, and capable of choosing for themselves ;-and that the sinner's conversion is effected by motives addressed to his reason and his love of happiness-by the moral means of persuasion, without any physical power. To elucidate and en

force this sentiment, look at the case of king Aggrippa, (Acts xxvi. 28,) and the effects of Paul's preaching upon his mind--almost thou persuadest me to be a Christian." Now what physical power was exerted in his case? Were not his feelings affected, and his conscience convicted by persuasion--by the moral power of truth, enforced by a divine influence? And who has any reason or right to say, that this same influence, if continued, and sufficienily increased, would not have issued in Agrippa's complete conversion-his being altogether persuaded to be a Christian?

A change of heart is no other than a change of purpose. Whenever a sinner becomes persuaded, that religion is preferable to sin-that the Christian hope will be more conducive to his happiness, than the objects of this world, and thence resolves to be a Christian--he is converted, he is a Christian. And if I have persuaded him to become a Christian, it is correct to say that I have changed his heart, and it is certain that he has changed his own heart. This no man can deny. And what matter is it, what were the operating motive; whether it were love or hatred, fear or hope, or whether accompanied with divine influence or not, if the important change be accomplished? If I am wrong in my views upon this subject, be so kind as to set me right."

The scheme of regeneration which you have here presented is plausible to the superficial thinker, and too congenial to the natural feelings of men, not to be imposing and popular. It is gratifying to the pride and self sufficiency of fallen creatures, to believe, that they are not utterly lost and helpless-that they can and do change their own hearts; or at least so cooperate with the Holy Spirit, as to lend much necessary assistance to the divine agency, in order to accomplish this object. And this seems rational and right to them, because they are free agents, capable of choice, and conversion is the sinner's own free act. But, Sir, the foundation on which you build, is radically defective and unsound; and upon examination it will be found, that the criminating terms, irrational, unscriptural and dangerous, which, with so much assurance, you

apply to the sentiment you oppose, do, in sober reality belong to that which you defend. Your reasonings are a departure from established first principles-opposed to the analogy of scriptural instruction, the consistency of moral character, and the true philosophy of the human mind.

Reason is indeed of important use in our researches for divine truth; but unless subjected to the wisdom of God's word, it is a dangerous guide, which "leads to bewilder and dazzles to blind." Give Scripture its rightful authority as the only standard of truth ;-let it be permitted to interpret itself-and to occupy the whole ground of discussion; and we shall be led to a safe result; and enabled correctly to determine, what is rational to believe or reject.

You object to the intire exclusion of the sinner's agency in his regeneration, and call it irrational, unscriptural and dangerous. I will credit your sincerity in the objection, though I cannot your correctness. The objection is unfounded, and all your reasonings, professedly drawn from Scripture and reason, are sophistical and absurd. It really amounts to a denial of total depravity; and to be consistent you must renounce this cardinal doctrine of Christianity; and when you have done this, there is no occasion of talking at all about regeneration;-for there would be no need or possibility of a change of heart.

In producing regeneration according to your views, there appears to be a continuation of moral influence, all cooperating to the same end,--viz. the force of truth-the agency of the sinner, and the persuasive energy of the Holy Spirit. Now, look at it intelligently, with a candid and unprejudiced mind, and fairly tell me how all this can be?-Let me know what part or degree of this agency is performed by the fallen and totally depraved creature? What is the act of the sinner dead in trespasses and sins, to effect his own resurrection to spiritual life, and possess himself of the image of God? His heart is totally alienatedhis mind is enmity against God Is he then a fit or capable agent to cooperate with the divine Spirit in changing his own heart? Will the carnal mind per