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The Works of Thomas Reid, D.D.: Now Fully Collected, with ..., Volumen1
Vista completa - 1863
The Works of Thomas Reid, D. D. Now Fully Collected, with Selections from ...
Sin vista previa disponible - 2018
according action active affection animal appears applied apprehend argument Aristotle belief body called cause cognition common conceive conception condition conduct consciousness consequence considered constitution contrary desire determined distinction distinguished doctrine duty employed equal evident existence expression extension external fact faculty feeling figure force former give given human idea immediate intellect intention judge judgment justice kind knowledge known language less liberty limited logic matter meaning ment mind mode moral motive nature necessary necessity never notion object observed opinion organ original particular passion perceive perception philosophers possible present primary principles produce proper proposition qualities question quod reason reference regard Reid relation requires rules seems sensation sense species suppose term things thought tion true truth understanding universal virtue whole
Página 679 - ... is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it...
Página 679 - I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible ; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation...
Página 678 - Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.
Página 989 - ... grammatic flats and shallows, where they stuck unreasonably to learn a few words with lamentable construction, and now on the sudden transported under another climate, to be tossed and turmoiled with their unballasted wits in fathomless and unquiet deeps of controversy, do for the most part grow into hatred and contempt of learning, mocked and deluded all this while with ragged notions and^babblements, while they expected worthy and delightful knowledge...
Página 751 - I do not pretend to be a setter-up of new notions. My endeavours tend only to unite and place in a clearer light that truth, which was before shared between the vulgar and the philosophers: the former being of opinion, that those things they immediately perceive are the real things : and the latter, that the things immediately perceived are ideas which exist only in the mind.
Página 582 - God forbid that I should justify you: till I die I will not remove mine integrity from me. My righteousness I hold fast, and will not let it go: my heart shall not reproach me so long as I live.
Página 795 - We ascribe to reason two offices, or two degrees. The first is to judge of things self-evident ; the second to draw conclusions that are not self-evident from those that are. The first of these is the province, and the sole province, of common sense ; and therefore it coincides with reason in its whole extent, and is only another name for one branch or one degree of reason.
Página 579 - And when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat, and gave also unto her husband with her and he did eat.
Página 679 - ... others which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers ; and am persuaded that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality and let us see that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason.