contend. || One and all, they wanted to know whether we were going to help them, and, if so, how? || Some immediate arrangement was absolutely necessary to separate the tribes, and get the Aidagalla, Samanter Abdillah, and Ahmed Abdillah on to the nearer grazing-grounds to the south of this. At the present moment there is not a soul south of a line drawn from Odweina to Hargaisa, and thence along the Hargaisa River. I decided to issue a limited number of old Snider rifles which I had obtained from Berbera, with a small amount of ammunition, as a temporary measure to protect the nearer grazing-grounds. Ten rifles, with twenty rounds of ammunition, were made over to the Akils of the Habr Yunis, Samanter Abdillah, and Ahmed Abdillah, to be given to selected men whose names have been recorded, and the Akils of each tribe are made personally responsible for the safe custody of the ten weapons given to each tribe, and that no improper use is made of them. The Aidagalla, the most important tribe to get to move a bit south, I was unable to trust with the arms in their hands, both on account of internal feuds and dissensions, and because the attitude of Sultan Deira is very doubtful. He is known to have been in communication with the Mullah; and the Abdi Bari section of the Aidagalla, who were the chief sufferers by the raid, have received letters from the Mullah offering to restore them their property if they will join him. I decided in the case of the Aidagalla to entertain twenty Baladiyahs, and distribute them among the different sections to protect their herds. They will be required for one or two months, according to whether the autumnal rains fall or not. The cost will be between 300 and 600 rupees, for which, under the extreme urgency of the case, I would solicit your Lordship's sanction. || This measure had the effect of partly allaying the excitement, and I am hopeful the tribes will now move south again for a short distance sufficient to get grazing. There were, of course, many more demands for arms which I was unable to meet. || But it would be idle to imagine that this temporary expedient in any way satisfied the tribes as to the general position. They wanted to know whether we would make a general issue of arms for the protection of the grazing-grounds, or whether we would at once lead them against the Mullah, saying that the state of affairs had now become unbearable, and that they were all ready to follow us, or go by themselves if we would arm them. That the Mullah is a long way outside our territory, and that it is the business of the Abyssinians to deal with him in the country he now occupies, are facts which they would not comprehend. They look upon the Mullah as being practically master of the situation, allowed to do as he pleases, and they do not understand our hesitation in taking steps to suppress him. || Your Lordship will have seen from my telegram of this day that I consider the position to be serious. The tribes are losing confidence in our ability to protect them, and unless that confidence is maintained we shall not be able to count on their allegiance, and they will be driven to make the best terms they can with the Mullah for the safety of their herds and flocks, on which their very life depends. || If we cannot soon cooperate with the Abyssinians to put an end to the Mullah's movement, I have proposed to punish the Ali Gheri, who are the Mullah's chief supporters in the Protectorate, and who will probably be found between Ber and Bohotele. In such a move we could count on the support of all our Ishak tribes, and it would have the effect of drawing off from the Mullah his Dolhahanta contingent, by whose aid he is overawing the Ogaden. I am proceeding as soon as I can to Odweina, and thence to Burao, where the tribes have been awaiting my arrival for some time. past. I will report by telegram from Burao what steps I propose to take against the Ali Gheri should they still prove refractory. || The fact of my being expected at Burao has had the effect of keeping that part of the country quiet, and when I am there I hope to be able to make such arrangements as will result in the Dolbahanta trade resuming its normal course. For some months past that part of the country has been so unsafe that the Dolbahanta tribes have been unable to secure the safety of their own caravans, and this is the reason I prohibited our tribes nearer Berbera from trading with them, insisting that their Headmen should come in themselves, as until they do so no satisfactory settlement is possible. If a scare occurs on the eastern side of the Protectorate, such as there has been here, we shall at once have a backward rush of the tribes, and a recurrence of a good deal of the trouble we had last year. I have said in my despatch of 24th July that the Aidagalla have themselves to blame for this raid from the Ogaden. This is true to a great extent, but it is impossible to get the tribe to see the matter in this light, especially the Abdi Bari, who are the principal sufferers. They had little to do with previous raids by the Aidagalla on the Ogaden, and they were the one section of the Aidagalla who complied with my instructions to return the animals they looted. I have, acccordingly, handed them over the Aidagalla share of the animals returned by the Abyssinians. The real cause of the panic here is the danger which the Hadr Gerhajis and Habr Awal tribes, consequent on the recent raid, see their summer grazing-grounds to be in from organized attacks by the Mullah's followers; and in this connection, as well as the Mullah's movement in general, I have had to assure the tribes that we are not unmindful of their interests, and that we would consider what is best to be done, but that what action is taken, and when, must be left for the decision of the Government. || The question is a difficult one. If the Mullah's movement does not collapse of itself, or he is not suppressed by the Abyssinians, with or without our help, it will arise in an aggravated form next April, when the summer rains draw the tribes to the Haud. If the present position then still continues, we shall have to seriously consider the question of issuing some 200 or 300 Sniders to the tribes for the protection of their herds. There will be risk in this both of some of the arms reaching the Mullah, and of improper use being made of them by our people. But if we do not succeed in suppressing the Mullah before the spring, I do not at present see that we have any other alternative, as the Abyssinians, so long as the Mullah's movement continues, can afford our tribes no protection on the border, and we could not establish a cordon of posts in these waterless tracts. || It is absolutely necessary, if our position in the Protectorate is to be tenable, that our tribes be reinstated in their southern grazing-grounds, at least, in the nearer portions within our border. || For the present I am hopeful that the measures which have been taken will suffice to protect our tribes in the nearer grazing-grounds; it is late in the season, and they will not now venture far south. || Sheikh Mattar, the Chief of Hargaisa, has expressed himself as most grateful for the assistance rendered him by the presence here of the company of the 2nd Central Africa Regiment, and has begged that when it is withdrawn it may be replaced by a post of our police. Owing to the 2nd Central Africa Regiment being under strength, and to the companies which proceeded to Ashantee being made up to full strength, and leaving unfits, the half batallion remaining in the Protectorate now consists of 6 officers (including the medical officer), 7 Sikhs, and 4 weak companies of 84 Africans each, with a large proportion of sick. || Their present location is as follows: || Berbera, 1 officer, 1 Sikh, and 42 Africans. || Sheikh, 1 Sikh, and 30 Africans. || Adadleh, 2 officers, 1 Sikh, and 83 Africans. || Odweina, 2 officers, 2 Sikhs, and 111 Africans, with Maxim. || Hargaisa, 1 officer, 1 Sikh, and 100 Africans. || As soon as I can safely do so I propose to withdraw the companies from Hargaisa and Odweina, leave a police post at the former place, and concentrate our strength on the Sheikh-Burao line to anticipate any move by the Mullah on the eastern side of the Protectorate. || When the water fails in the Haud he must either move west to the Abyssinian frontier, Staatsarchiv LXVI. 3 east of Walwal and Wardair or Bohotele, or south to the Webbe Schebele. A move west would bring him within the reach of the Abyssinians; with the exception of the Ali Gheri tribe, he has now but little hold over the Dolbahanta, and it seems doubtful if he will venture back to Bohotele, though it is quite possible he may do so. There is always water at Walwal and Wardair, in the centre of the Ogaden, and the probability seems to be that he will make his winter quarters there as he did last year. || A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer and to Her Majesty's Agent at Addis Abbaba. (Signed) I have, &c. Nr. 12521. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Derselbe an Denselben. Bericht über die Expedition nach Burao. Camp, Dubbur, September 12, 1900. (October 1.) My Lord, | On the 18th ultimo I proceeded to Odweina. The presence of the company of the 2nd Central Africa Regiment had restored confidence in that direction so far as bringing the tribes back, and the Habr Yunis were on their grazing-grounds in the Toyo Plain. || As Odweina is quite destitute of grass and my animals had suffered from want of forage in a two days' march through a parched-up country, I decided to move on the same afternoon towards Burao, the company of the 2nd Central Africa Regiment following me as soon as transport could be collected. Major Plunkett at the same time returning to head-quarters at Adadleh. || At Gubatto, the first day's march towards Burao, I found an oasis of grass with some rain-water collected in ditch-like depressions in the ground. Here numerous deputations of the Habr Yunis came in, and I halted for three days. At one time there must have been between 400 and 500 tribesmen collected, of whom many were horsemen. Here, as at Hargaisa, the great cry was for arms for the protection of the grazing-grounds. There had been no serious scare since the tribes had returned to Toyo, but the Elders were very uneasy and feared a raid at any moment; and both Haji Musa of Hahia and the leading tribesmen urged that the company be left at Odweina till the situation was a bit clearer. || There were many matters for settlement between the various sections of the Habr Yunis who came in to meet us, and my time and that of the Vice-Consul were fully occupied in adjusting long-standing differences which both parties were anxious should be settled through our mediation. || Amongst other questions that of the Sultanship of the Habr Yunis came up, all sections present admitting their allegiance to Nur's old rival Madr Hirsi in place of Nur, who is hopelessly committed with the Mullah's movement. || Before leaving Gubatto I issued four rifles to Haji Musa for the protection of the Hahia Tarikha, and ten to Madr Hirsi for the protection of the grazing-grounds. These were given out on the same conditions as those issued at Hargaisa, and complete the number I intend to issue at present. || In all forty-four old Sniders were issued at Hargaisa and Gubatto. They are all in the hands of Elders who can fairly well be trusted. The number is small considering the vast area the tribes frequent, but the effect of this measure, certainly for the time, will be out of proportion to the number of arms given out. Exaggerated accounts of the arming of our people are certain to reach the Ogaden, and a certain measure of confidence has been assured to our people, who look to us for assistance. | A guard was placed over the rain water at Gubatto to keep it for the company of the 2nd Central Africa Regiment, none being found till Burao is reached. This was just as well, for this water came in very handy, and after the Africans had replenished their barrels the water was rapidly exhausted by herds of camels and flocks brought in on the news circulated by the tribesmen who came in to us to their karias that water was to be found at Gubatto. || At Burao I found the country as burnt up as at Odweina, and every animal in my camp had to be sent 6 miles off to the edge of the Arori Plain to get grazing. || On the arrival of the company of the 2nd Central Africa Regiment, it took up a position on high ground on the right bank of the river commanding the permanent wells. These wells are not as is usually the case in Somaliland dug in the bed of the river, but are sunk through slightly elevated ground on the left bank of the river. Water is found through out the year at a depth of about 60 feet. || The Habr Yunis, Musa Ismaïl, came in, and a few representatives of the Rer Yusuf, the principal section of the Dahir Farih, one of the two large sub-divisions of the Habr Toljaala. A few of their karias were in the neighbourhood in the Arori Plain with the Habr Yunis, but owing to the drought the tribe was much scattered. | Leaving the detachment at Burao I proceeded with the Vice-Consul 20 miles to the south to Ber, the principal watering-place of the Habr Toljaala tribes after Burao. Here the Tug Der had changed its channel, rendering the old wells useless, and owing to the drought no karias were to be found. Several deputations of the Adan Madoba. came in a day's journey distance to meet us, and a settlement regarding the return of looted property was effected between this tribe and a deputation of the Mahomed Aysa, who had joined us at Burao from |