that purpose; but before the same shall become binding on the County of Carter it shall be approved by the Carter County Court, constituted as county levy courts are required by law to be constituted. Said court may execute to the holders of said bonds and coupons of interest, severally, the obligations of the County of Carter and those parts of the Counties of Boyd and Elliott taken from Carter County in their formation, which shall be signed by the county judge of Carter County, and attested by the clerk of said court. Said obligations shall contain such stipulations as to interest as may be agreed upon by the court and holders of said bonds and coupons of interest, or either of them, but not at a greater rate than 6 per cent per annum, payable semi-annually. Said obligations shall be due and payable at such times, and be for such amounts, as may be agreed for by the court and holder or holders of said bonds and coupons.

"

The next three sections of the Act contain provisions for the levy and collection of taxes, to pay the interest and principal of the compromise bonds, upon persons and property within the limits of Carter County, as it was when the debt was originally created. The fifth and last section is as follows:

"Sec. 5. This Act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage; but nothing in this Act shall be so construed as to affect or make more valid the bonds and coupons of interest given by Carter County in its subscription to the capital stock of the Lexington and Big Sandy Railroad Company than they were before the passage of this Act."

Under the authority of this statute a compromise was made with the holders of the original bonds, by which the County Court of Carter County issued one hundred and nineteen new bonds of the County of Carter and those parts of the Counties of Elliott and Boyd taken from Carter County, each for the sum of $1,000, payable to Henry Peachey and Richard O. Butler, executors of Joseph C. Butler, or bearer, with semi-annual interest warrants at the rate of 6 per cent per annum attached. The principal of the bonds was made payable at different dates.

David Sinton, the defendant in error, purchased nine of these bonds for value before maturity, and five hundred and forty of the coupons, and this suit was brought to recover the amount due thereon. Originally the suit included other bonds and coupons; but as it was discontinued so far as they were concerned, before judgment, no questions arise in this court as to them.

To a petition setting forth the foregoing facts the County demurred: 1, because the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; and 2, because the petition shows a defect of parties, plaintiff and defendant. This demurrer was overruled. Sinton v. County of Carter, 23 Fed. Rep. 535. The defendant then filed an answer, some paragraphs of which were stricken out on motion, and others demurred to, and the demurrer sustained. As no point is made on this branch of the case, a further statement of it is not necessary.

The court gave judgment against the County for $29,121.54, and to reverse that judgment this writ of error was brought.

The principal points presented by the argument of the plaintiff arise on the demurrer to the petition, and they may be stated thus:

1. The Act of January 30, 1878, is void by the Constitution of Kentucky, because the subject to which it relates is not clearly expressed in its title.

2. The Act is also unconstitutional and void because it vests in the County Court of Carter County the power to bind the parts of Elliott and Boyd Counties which had been set off from Carter.

3. The Act gave no authority to the County Court of Carter County to issue negotiable securities which pass by delivery and in the hands of innocent holders are free from defenses which would be good as between the original parties.

4. There is a defect of parties defendant, because Carter County is sued alone without joining "those parts of Boyd and Elliott Counties taken from Carter."

1. As to the title of the Act.

The provision of the Constitution of Kentucky relied on is article II, section 37, as follows:

No law enacted by the General Assembly shall relate to more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title."

[522]

Undoubtedly the design of this provision was, as is said in Pennington v. Woolfolk, 79 Ky. 20, "to prevent the use of deceptive titles as a cover for vicious legislation, by enabling members of the General Assembly to form such opinion of the nature of a bill by merely hearing it read by its title;" but as early as 1859 the court of appeals said in Phillips v. Covington & Cin. Bridge Co. 2 Met. (Ky.) 221: "This prohibition should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction; and looking to the evil intended to be remedied, it should be applied to such Acts of the Legislature alone as are obviously within its spirit and meaning. None of the provisions of a statute should be regarded as unconstitutional when they all relate directly or indirectly to the same subject, have a natural connection, and are not foreign to the subject expressed in its title." This is in accord with the decisions of this court in Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147 [27: 431], where we followed the rulings of the Supreme Court of New Jer sey upon a similar provision in the Constitution of that State; in Jonesboro City v. Cairo & St. [523] L. R. R. Co. 110 U. S. 192 [28: 116], and Mahomet v. Quackenbush, 117 U. S. 509 [29: 982], where the Constitution of Illinois and the decis ions of the Supreme Court of that State were considered; and in Otoe County v. Baldwin, 111 U. S. 1 [28: 331], which had reference to the Constitution of Nebraska and the settled rule of decision in that State, and in Ackley School Dist. v. Hall, 113 U. S. 135 [28: 954], which arose in Iowa. It is enough if the law has but one general object and that object is fairly expressed in its title. Cooley, Const. Lim. 1st ed. 144, § 2; 4th ed. 175.

Here the title is "An Act Authorizing the County of Carter, and Those Parts of the Coun ties of Boyd and Elliott Taken from Carter County, to Compromise and Settle with the Holders of the Bonds and Coupons of Interest Executed by Carter County in Its Subscription to the Capital Stock of the Lexington and Big

Sandy Railroad Company, and to Levy and Collect a Tax for That Purpose." This clearly and distinctly expresses the whole object of the legislation, and there is nothing in the body of the Act itself which is not in every way germane to what is there expressed. No one interested in the subject matter of the law could be put off his guard by hearing the bill read by its title. True, it does not state that the County Court of Carter County is to act as the representative of the parts of Boyd and Elliott Counties, as well as the County of Carter, in making the compromise, or that bonds are to be issued for the purpose of carrying it out; but all this is matter of detail, suitable to the single purpose the Legislature had in view; namely, a settlement and compromise with the holders of bonds issued by Carter County before its division, and for which the present Carter County and those parts of Boyd and Elliott which were taken from the old county were liable. It is difficult to see how the subject of the legislation could be stated more clearly without making the title of the Act "a detailed statement, or an index or abstract of its contents," which all agree is not necessary. Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 155 [27: 433].

2. The authority of the County Court of Carter County to bind "those parts of the Counties of Boyd and Elliott taken from Carter County." If we understand correctly the position of the County as to this branch of the case, it is that the Legislature had no power to authorize the County Court of Carter County to act for these parts of counties in compromising the old debt for which they were held, because they were no longer parts of that County, and no opportunity was given them to participate in the arrangement. These parts of counties have no separate organization of their own, corporate or otherwise. For all county purposes, except this debt contracted by Carter County when they were included within its boundaries, they are subject to the government of the counties to which they now respectively belong; but for the debt, they still remain a part of Carter. Such is clearly the effect of that provision in the Acts establishing the new counties which declared that the liability of citizens and property in the territory set off from Carter for taxation on account of the bonds and interest should continue the same "" as though this Act had never been passed." Had the Acts never been passed, no one would doubt the power of the Legislature to give the County Court of Carter the authority to make the settlement in the same way now provided for, even though these parts of the County did not have a justice of the peace in commission to take part in the deliberations. And this because the county court was made the agent of the County, and of those whose property was subject to taxation, for the transaction of this business. The Legislature might have appointed a commission for the same purpose, or it might have selected any other suitable agency. In order to bind the county or the taxpayers, it was not necessary that the taxpayers should vote on the subject, or that they should participate in an election of the body that was to act in the matter. All that was properly within the discretion of the Legislature. No new debt was to be created, and no new subscription to the stock of a railroad

company was to be made. All that had to be done was to compromise and settle an existing debt, and to substitute new liabilities on terms to be agreed on for an old one. Certainly it was within the power of the Legislature to designate a suitable agency for that purpose, and what could be more suitable than that department of the governing body of Carter County which was entrusted with the management of its financial affairs? The cases of Allison v. Louisville & H. C. & W. R. Co. 9 Bush, 253; S. C. 10 Bush, 1; Scuffletown Fence Co. v. McAllister, 12 Bush, 312; Cypress Pond Draining Co. v. Hooper, 2 Met. (Ky.) 350; and Mercer Co. Court v. Kentucky River Nav. Co. 8 Bush, 300, referred to in the argument of counsel, all relate to the creation of new liabilities, not to the settlement of old ones.

"

3. The right to issue negotiable securities. It is no doubt true that, without sufficient legislative authority, a municipality cannot issue commercial paper which will be free from equitable defenses in the hands of innocent holders; Claiborne Co. v. Brooks, 111 U. S. 400 [28: 470]; but, in our opinion, that authority was given here. The County of Carter was authorized to borrow money and to issue its bonds therefor to pay its subscription to the stock of the railroad company. This, all agree, was sufficient authority to issue bonds which were negotiable, and the averments in the declaration are that the bonds which were in fact issued had that character. The debt to be compromised, therefore, under the Act of 1878, was a debt which had been created by the issue of such bonds, and the authority was to execute to the "holders of said bonds and coupons of interest' "the obligations of said County of Carter and those parts of the Counties of Boyd and Elliott taken from Carter County in their formation, which shall be signed by the county judge of Carter County and attested by the clerk of said court." They were to contain such stipulations as to interest, not exceeding 6 per cent per annum, and to be made due and payable at such times as might be agreed on. Ås the new obligations were to be executed to take up and cancel old negotiable securities to a large amount, and were to be made payable at a future time, there cannot be a doubt of the intention of the Legislature to authorize the execution of "obligations" negotiable in form and in law, if necessary to secure a settlement. The authority to include in the obligations such stipulations as to interest as might be agreed on clearly implies authority to attach interest coupons, and everything indicates a purpose to invest the court with all the powers as to the form of the obligations that were necessary to enable it to meet the requirements of the holders of the outstanding bonds and coupons in this particular.

4. The want of parties.

As we have already said the parts of Boyd and Elliott Counties which are interested in this matter have no separate organization of their own, and they remain for all the purposes of this debt a part of Carter County. A suit against Carter County on the bonds is therefore a suit against them, and a judgment against that County will be payable out of taxes collected within the boundaries of the original county under the provisions of the Act of 1878

A suggestion was made in the argument for the County of a variance between the bond described in the declaration and that which was actually issued; but this is a matter which we cannot consider, as there is no copy of the bond as issued in the record.

Another objection is made to the form of the declaration in that it does not meet the requirements of section 113 of the Civil Code of Kentucky, and set out distinctly in separate paragraphs each one of the sixty separate causes of action sued on. That objection cannot be taken by general demurrer, and besides it does not seem to have been made below.

The objection to the action of the court in respect to the answer is so little relied on that it is only necessary to say we see no error in what was done.

The judgment is affirmed. True copy. Test:

drawing and delivery of the check; and his assignee took the bank account as well as all other property of the assignor in its exact condition at the time of the assignment, subject to all legal and equitable claims.

The drawing of the check to Schuler operated in equity to transfer so much of the funds of J. N. Israel in the Laclede Bank as would pay the check.

Walker v. Siegel, 2 Cent. L. J. 108; German Sav. Inst. v. Adae, 8 Fed. Rep. 106; First Nat. Bank v. Coates, 8 Fed. Rep. 540.

As between the assignor and assignee, the claim of the assignee cannot rise higher than the right transferred to him by the assignor. He stands in the shoes of the assignor as to all property conveyed by the assignment, subject to the legal and equitable rights of all other

persons.

738, 739 (25: 818).

LACLEDE BANK AND J. T. CRAIG, Assignee, etc.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 511-517.)

Banking-check as equitable assignment-notice to bank, necessary to bind fund.

1. Without deciding the mooted question whether a check or draft of a person on a bank in which he has deposits operates as an equitable assignment of the fund, so on deposit, to the holder of the check to the amount of it, it is clear that such check or draft does not bind the fund in the hands of the bank until it has notice of the draft or check by presentation for payment, or otherwise.

2. Until then, other checks drawn afterward may be paid, or other assignments of the fund, or part of it, may secure priority by giving prior notice.

[Nos. 995, 1017.] Submitted Jan. 7, 1887. Decided Mar. 7, 1887.

APPEAL and cross appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri. Reported below, 27 Fed. Rep. 424. Reversed.

The history and facts of the case appear in the opinion of the court. See also the follow. ing case of Schuler v. Israel.

Mr. David P. Dyer, for Schuler. Drawing and delivery of the check set out in the bill was an appropriation of so much money of J. N. Israel in the custody of the Laclede Bank as was called for by the check. Chouteau v. Rowse, 56 Mo. 65; Union Bank V. Oceana Co. Bank, 80 Ill. 212; Merchants Bank v. State Bank, 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 647 (19: 1019); Morrison v. McCartney, 30 Mo. 187.

J. N. Israel, prior to this assignment, had already surrendered control of the deposit by *Head notes by Mr. Justice MILLER.

to the time of drawing the check by Israel. The right of set-off on the part of the Laclede Bank was defeated by the giving of the check. Myers v. Davis, 22 N. Y. 489; Xenia Bank v. Stewart, 114 U. S. 224 (29: 101); McGrade v. German Sav. Inst. 4 Mo. 330.

The law will make application of the money in the hands of the Laclede Bank, according to its own notion of justice.

Nat. Bank v. Mechanics Nat. Bank, 94 U. S. 439 (24: 178).

The assignment of Israel to Craig is void under the laws of Texas.

Muller v. Norton, 19 Fed. Rep. 719; Brown v. Knox, 6 Mo. 302; Keevil v. Donaldson, 20 Kan. 168.

The assignment of Israel to Craig, even if valid under the laws of Texas, would not be enforced in Missouri, because in conflict with the laws of Missouri.

Askew v. La Cygne, 83 Mo. 366; Green v. Van Buskirk, 72 U. S., 5 Wall. 307 (18: 599); Hervey v. R. I. Locomotive Works, 93 U. S. 671 (23: 1004); Brown v. Knox, 6 Mo. 802.

Mr. J. E. McKeighan, for the Laclede Bank and Craig:

The drawing of the Schuler check did not

operate to transfer to Schuler any portion of the debt of the Laclede Bank to Israel, or to give him any lien thereon. There was no privity between Schuler and the drawee Bank. A single cause of action cannot be split up without the assent of the debtor.

Mandeville v. Welch, 18 U. S. 5 Wheat. 277 (5: 87); Bank of the Republic v. Millard, 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 152 (19: 897); Dickenson v. Coates, 79 Mo. 250; Rosenthal v. Mastin Bank, 17 Blatchf. 318.

There is no assignment either at law or in equity where there is any power of revocation in the assignor, or where the holder of the fund cannot be compelled to pay although forbidden by the assignor. An order or check is not an equitable assignment, unless it is to pay out of a specified fund specified in the order.

Christmas v. Russell, 81 U. S. 14 Wall. 69 (20: 762).

A check is simply the written order of the

tablished doctrine of this court in regard to the rights of the parties at law, and is probably the prevailing doctrine in nearly all the courts, it is urged in this case, and several respectable courts have so decided, that such a check is an appropriation of the amount for which it is drawn of the funds of the drawer in the hands of the bank. Roberts v. Austin, Corbin & Co. 26 Iowa, 315; Forgarties v. State Bank, 12 Rich. L. R. (S. C.)518; Munn v. Burch, 25 Ill. 35; German Sao. Inst. v. Adae, 1 McCrary, C. C. 501.

But however this doctrine may operate to secure an equitable interest in the fund deposited in the bank to the credit of the drawer after notice to the bank of the check, or presentation to it for payment-a question which we do not here decide-we are of opinion that, as to the bank itself, the holder of the fund, and its duties and obligations in regard to it, the bank remains unaffected by the execution of such a check until notice has been given to it or demand made upon it for its payment.

In the case before us it is a conceded fact that before the Bank had any knowledge or notice whatever of the check on which the plaintiff brings this suit, it had received a distinct notification from the drawer of that check that he had made a general assignment for the benefit of his creditors, with an express direction to hold the funds subject to the order of the assignee. Therefore, even if the check could be considered as an attempt on the part of C. W. Israel & Co. to assign or appropriate this amount in the hands of the Bank to Schuler, the general assignment for the benefit of all their creditors of all their assets, including those in the hands of the Bank, was made and brought to the attention of the Bank with directions to turn them over to this assignee, before it had any notice of the check in favor of Schuler.

The learned judge who decided the case on the circuit rested his judgment, in an opinion which is found in the record, on the proposition that, as be ween these two equities,-namely, the equities of the general creditors under the assignment to Davidson, and this implied as signment in equity by the drawing of the check, -the latter was superior. In this it would seem that he was somewhat influenced by the fact that he was enabled to trace the sources of some of the deposits to the credit of C. W. Israel & Co., in the Laclede Bank, to money which in a roundabout way had been collected for the payment of a debt to Schuler, and had finally been deposited to the credit of C. W. Israel & Co. in the Laclede Bank. But there is no allegation in the bill, nor any evidence in the testimony, nor any reason to believe that the Bank knew anything of this connection between the sums received from several of the banks with which Israel was connected at different times and the debt of Schuler. This is expressly denied, and we can see no reason why the Bank should be held in any way to regard the deposit made by C. W. Israel & Co. as, in law or in equity, funds in which Schuler had an interest. It must therefore be left entirely out of the argument in the contest between the Bank and Schuler.

Apart from this matter, it is not easy to see any valid reason why the assignment of an insolvent debtor, for the equal benefit of all his

creditors, of all his property, does not confer on those creditors an equity equal to that of the holder of an unpaid check upon his banker. The holder of this check comes into the distri bution of the funds in the hands of the assignee for his share of those funds with other creditors. The mere fact that he had received a check, a few days before the making of the assignment, on the Bank, which had not been presented until after the general assignment was made and notified to the Bank, does not seem, in and of itself, to give any such superiority of right. The assignment was complete and perfect, and vested in the assignee the right to all the property of the assignor immediately upon its execution and delivery, with due formalities, to the assignee, and the check of this assignee, like the check of Israel & Co., could have been paid by the Bank with safety, if first presented. The check given by the same assignor a few days before was only an acknowledgment of a debt by that assignor, and became no valid claim upon the funds against which it was drawn until the holder of those funds was notified of its existence. This, we think, is the fair result of the authorities on that subject.

In the case of Spain v. Hamilton's Admr. 68 U. S. 1 Wall. 624 [17: 625], this court says: "Any order, writing, or act which makes an appropriation of a fund amounts to an equitable assignment of the fund. The reason is that the fund being a matter not assignable at law, nor capable of manual possession, an appropriation of it is all that the nature of the case admits of, and therefore it is held good in a court of equity. As the assignee is generally entitled to all the remedies of the assignor, so he is subject to all the equities between the assignor and his debtor. But in order to perfect his title against the debtor it is indispensable that the assignee should immediately give notice of the assignment to the debtor, for otherwise a priority of right may be obtained by a subsequent assignee, or the debt may be discharged by a payment to the assignee before such notice.'

The same principle is also laid down in Christmas v. Russell, 81 U. S. 14 Wall. 69 [20: 762]; Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 1047, 1057, 1035 a. See especially the authorities cited in note 1 to this latter section. See also Ward v. Morrison, 25 Vt. 599, and Loomis v. Loomis, 26 Vt. 198.

For these reasons we are of opinion that at the time of the presentation of the check to the Bank, the Bank held no funds subject to its payment, whether we consider the delivery of it by C. W. Israel & Co. to Schuler as intended to create an equitable assignment or not. An earnest effort is made in the argument of counsel in this court to impeach the general assignment as being void under the laws of Texas where it was made, and also the State of Missouri where this fund was. As there is nothing in the Statute of Missouri which would make this assignment absolutely void, and there is nothing brought to our attention to prove that it was void by the laws of Texas, and as the assignment, though mentioned in the original bill of complainant, is not assailed, nor any ground set forth to show its invalidity, we do not think there is any reason why it should not be held in this proceeding to be a valid assignment. As