cers,

I fancy, give themselves much trouble on that score. All that can be said therefore on both sides is, the more is the pity.

Your correspondent W. is undoubtedly aware, that during the whole of the war in the Peninsula, the light division had a front seat in the play; and, that we were so frequently at the elbows of those inimitable regiments of light cavalry, the 1st German hussars, the 14th and 16th light dragoons, (more particularly with the two former) and so constantly intermixed with them on pickets, and a multiplicity of duties which fell to our lot as light troops, that a man with common observation could not shut his eyes to the glaring fact, that the firearms of the French chasseur, and his capability of acting on foot in cases of emergency, gave him vast advantages over our light dragoons at the out-posts. In this school, then, did I catch that smattering of the duties of cavalry in the field, for which your correspondent has been pleased to give me credit. It is satisfactory to me to find that the view which I have taken of the lance, from the first moment of its introduction in the British army, coincides not only with the opinion of many experienced officers in our own army, but moreover with that of the highest authorities in the French. I think it the duty of every soldier to communicate any plans which may suggest themselves to him as likely to prove beneficial to the service; although it must be confessed, that nineteen times in twenty it is a most thankless undertaking. Having premised thus much, I beg leave to offer a few hints, picked up here and there during a tolerably long apprenticeship in the army.

It was very generally the custom in the last war, although I am aware that there were exceptions to the contrary, to brigade the heavy cavalry together, and, in like manner, the light.

It has, however, frequently occurred to me, that brigades consisting each of two regiments of heavy dragoons and one of light, would be an arrangement worth the consideration of our cavalry chiefs, in the event of the British army again taking the field in sufficient numbers to admit of the formation of several separate brigades.

A brigade thus constituted, would, I conceive, be of the most efficient description, and be enabled to penetrate a difficult country when at a distance from the infantry of the army; the light dragoons forming the advance-guard, and clearing the front when an intersected tract of country presented itself, by dismounting a part of that force and using them as tirailleurs, if so opposed, whilst the heavy dragoons would be at hand to support them. In the French army it was likewise much the custom to form brigades of heavy cavalry, and also of hussars and chasseurs. Gen. Franceschi, for instance, commanded a division composed entirely of light cavalry in 1809, under Marshal Soult, in the north of Portugal, or I am greatly mistaken. Milhaud's division at Waterloo, on the other hand, consisted of cuirassiers and horse-grenadiers. I shall therefore most undoubtedly be accused of the height of presumption, if I question the policy of invariably keeping the light and heavy cavalry separately brigaded; more particularly as I have always served with the infantry. Franceschi's light cavalry were admirably suited to the description of warfare likely to be encountered in the rough and mountainous regions of the north of Portugal (if ALL his regiments had been chasseurs, the

Gen.

more easily and effectually could they have been applied); and Gen. Milhaud's heavy cavalry again were much better adapted than any other for trampling down squares of infantry on the plains of Waterloo. Although it was a perfect failure with the latter force, in spite of the most determined and enthusiastic bravery of the French cuirassiers, who were slaughtered in heaps, in their reiterated attempts to annihilate the immoveable British squares of infantry; yet I cannot but think, that taking the whole year round, from the 1st of January to the 31st of December, and one description of country with another, the plan which I have suggested of giving one regiment of light dragoons or hussars to every brigade, may, by possibility, prove worthy of being taken into consideration.

I have a similar proposal relative to the formation of divisions and brigades of infantry, which, I beg leave to observe, is one borrowed from our French neighbours.

After the cessation of hostilities between the armies of the Duke of Wellington and Marshal Soult in 1814, near Toulouse, I made many excursions across the Tara, (that river being the line of demarkation between the two armies,) and had frequent communication with French officers. I attended their company and regimental parades; and I was present when a considerable part of Soult's army, and one or more divisions of Marshal Suchet's, passed in review before the Duke D'Angoulême at Montauban; and highly gratified I was at being enabled to make so minute an inspection of those veterans with whom we had been scuffling and fighting from the Guadiana to the Garonne. I ascertained that every division, and in many instances each brigade of infantry, had one light infantry battalion belonging to it, independent of the light companies of each battalion of the line; and that this was a rule from which Napoleon allowed no deviation, if it could be pos‐ sibly avoided. The policy of this system must be so apparent to every military man who has served in the field, as to render any comment on it unnecessary.

Every division of our army in the Peninsula had one or more regiments of Portuguese light infantry, (Caçadores,) who soon became very respectable troops; so that they, together with the British light companies of each brigade, furnished a force of light infantry sufficiently numerous and efficient in most cases for the operations of their respective divisions. But it should not be forgotten, that if the British army is again called into the field, the chances are fifty to one against its divisions of infantry being mixed up and chequered with foreign troops in the same manner as was the case with its Portuguese Allies; and it must therefore necessarily rely on its own resources for a due proportion of light troops; which, the practical soldier will not deny, are of the first importance in every situation in which an army can possibly find itself placed.

As we ought not to be too proud to borrow the opinions of an enlightened and experienced antagonist, nor fail to oppose him with his own weapons if we find them formidable, I trust that our light infantry battalions will, in future campaigns, be equally distributed amongst the different brigades and divisions. Should this appear a strange doctrine to emanate from the pen of a light-division-man, let it be borne in mind, that during the six latter campaigns in the

Peninsula, no less than six British battalions of light infantry and rifle men-viz. 43rd, 52nd, (at one period the 52nd had two battalions in Spain,) and the three battalions of the 95th rifle corps-were together and, although particularly calculated, from their composition and organization, for the arduous duties of the out-posts, advance, and rear-guards, &c. &c. and however laudable the pride which men naturally felt at belonging to a division which, as a matter of course, always held a prominent station in the army; it may be questioned, whether to have given each of the eight divisions an equal proportion of British light troops would not have been desirable.

The Duke of Wellington has since said, or it has possibly been said for him, that in the event of another war on a large scale, he would not form a whole division of light troops, as he considered them too valuable to be kept together. If I am accused of trumpeting the fame of my old division, I flatly deny the charge; yet I will say, that its very name warms the blood, and recalls to mind a thousand scenes not likely to be forgotten. Your correspondent W. gives some useful hints as to the necessity of obliging each troop of cavalry to take its turn in performing the duty of skirmishing, instead of selecting a few smart fellows as standing dishes, who are invariably called on at drills and field-days to gallop furiously out to the front, to fire, and to resume their original positions in the line afterwards.

The same observation is applicable to the drill of infantry, where it is too common a custom to cover the advance of a battalion, or its retreat, invariably with one or other of the flank companies. This may do very well for battalions of the line, but it is a grievous mistake when adopted by light infantry, or rifle battalions, where each company is equally liable, when in front of the enemy, to be called on to perform that duty.

Having taken the liberty of giving an opinion on the comparative merits of the arms of light cavalry, I would offer, in conclusion, a remark or two on the weapons of our light infantry.

Some men have not hesitated to object to the rifle, to pronounce it an imperfect arm, and to propose that it should be entirely abolished in the British army; assigning as a reason, that it requires more time for the rifleman to load after firing, than the light-infantry-man with his smooth-bored musket. Admitting that a very trifling time longer is required for the rifleman to re-load than the light infantry soldier, still, in ninety-nine cases out of an hundred, two rifle shots shall cause more death and destruction than three or four discharges from a musket, allowing both the rifleman and light bob to be tolerably fair artists in their way. Perhaps the following fact, to which I was an eye-witness, may have a tendency to convince those who are sceptical on that point. A short time before the commencement of the war in the Peninsula, when stationed in Kent with some battalions of the 43rd, 52nd, and 95th rifle corps, notes were compared, and the targets of a rifle company and one of the light infantry were examined on their return to barracks from practice at the target.

The strength of the two companies was equal, being about eighty men each. Six rounds had been fired by every man of both parties; the rifle company having its target placed at two hundred yards, (the usual distance) and the light infantry company at between eighty and

THE VETERAN TO HIS SWORD.

ninety yards. The contingent allowance of the rifle captain suffered severely on that occasion, as the target was sc riddled and cut to pieces, that it was with difficulty brought home; whilst the target of the light infantry was, comparatively, in a good state of repair. I have given time and place; and, if necessary, I could name the captains of the two companies.

In covering a retreat, I am of opinion that the rifleman should by no means attempt to keep up the same random, and too often, ineffectual fire, which I have often witnessed by light companies; but that if, on the contrary, he takes proper advantage of the weapon he bears, and expends few shots without either actually hitting or going very near his pursuers, nothing will so much tend to make them keep at a respectful distance, or to cool their ardour. I know of nothing that makes skirmishers mind their business more than being actually opposed to a scattered line of good marksmen.

Before the commencement of the Peninsular war, the commandant of one of the battalions of the 95th rifle corps had moveable targets constructed, at which the men practised when adepts at the standing mark. The idea was a capital one; but the ropes affixed to the targets, by which they were pulled and tugged along the sea-beach near Hythe barracks, were continually cut in two by the bullets. The whole corps shortly afterwards found itself in the Peninsula, where moveable targets of another description were found in great abundance, ready made to their hands, at which they had unremitting practice from 1808 to VANGUARD. the close of the war in 1815 at Waterloo.

THE VETERAN TO HIS SWORD.
DEAR art thou still, my trusty sword,
Though dimm'd is now thy shine;
Thou art my soul's last cherish'd hoard,
My deeds are blent with thine.
There's rust upon thy gleaming blade;
The stain will not depart ;

And I have felt the same dark shade:
But mine is on my heart!

We've fought in many a goodly field
Amid the combat's yell;

And proud was I a blade to wield
Which wrought its part so well.
Now-thou art but a harmless thing,
Which women dare to touch,
And smile, amid their marvelling,
That men are slain with such!

Back to thy sheath-the day may come,
That I shall grasp thee yet

To strike for my own hearth and home,
Where armed hosts are met.

What! though our brightest years are o'er,

Let but the trumpet peal,

We'll blithely to the fight once more,
My old, my trusty steel!

U. S. JOURN. No. 31. JUNE 1831.

P.

P

YEOMANRY CAVALRY.

WITH REMARKS ON THE REVISED CAVALRY MOVEMENTS.

THE importance of making this description of force thoroughly available and effective, must be evident to all persons, whether civil or military, who reflect that yeomanry are in fact almost the last resource of the magistracy, after all ordinary methods for restoring tranquillity in times of disturbance have failed and been found insufficient, and when, unless yeomanry are at hand, the awful responsibility must be incurred of calling out troops to act against their countrymen. In the U. S. Journal for April, there appeared a letter signed by a field officer of yeomanry, concerning the merits of the revised system of movement which has been on trial for the last two years in the regular cavalry, and expressing his fears lest that system should be adopted also in the yeomanry.

Now, if the experience of an old troop officer of a regiment which has invariably been remarked both abroad and at home for its steadiness and good instruction in the field, may be allowed to weigh in the scale against the twenty years' experience announced by the field officer of yeomanry, it will not be thought presumption to offer a few remarks in reply, particularly as he not only makes some unmeaning criticisms upon the revised system which has been practised for these two last years by the regulars, but also ventures some sneering comments on the efficiency of the commissioned officers of the cavalry, as compared with that of their serjeants and corporals, a subject upon which he is evidently as much in the dark as in his attempts as a field critic.

Whatever may be the decision of the Board, which is shortly expected to assemble and investigate the system alluded to, my brother officers of the cavalry of the line who have practised its principles, have, as far as I have been able to learn, but one voice on the subject. They have found the movements easy to acquire and easy to execute, every point of instruction being laid down in plain language, divested of tactical pedantry, and yet mathematically as well as practically correct, so that it is an officer's own fault if he ever finds himself at a loss at a field-day. Silence and order are of course the necessary consequences, and both young officers and recruits are fit for squadron in half the time they used to be. But to come to a few details, and to show how frivolous and ill-founded are the objections of our yeoman critic, I would in the first place inquire where he obtained his information, that "The officers of regular cavalry, when placed in front, have nothing to do but to dress themselves, and can have no influence upon the ranks behind them, who must be therefore dressed by the non-commissioned officers upon the flanks." Does he then forget, or is he altogether ignorant of the fact, that whether troop officers are in front or on the flank, still, according to all regulations, whether old or revised, the dressing of the squadron when ordered to advance has invariably been to its centre; and for an officer upon the flank of a squadron to call to the men to dress towards him, or by his direction, would be a flagrant violation of the principles of Dundas, who so frequently urges the necessity of all dressing proceeding from that point