cavalry are usually held in reserve, to charge lines, columns, or squares of infantry, or bodies of cavalry, as opportunities for their acting may offer. It must be apparent enough to every man who has served in the field, that the cavalry, especially the hussars and light dragoons, are always on the qui vive, and that they are much harassed in guarding from surprise thousands of their comrades who repose in camp or bivouac, relying on the activity and alertness of those in their front. The duties of light infantry are much on a par with those of the light cavalry, the former being at hand, (although it often happens otherwise,) to support the latter, and generally intermixed with them in outpost duties of all kinds, advance and rear-guards, &c. &c. &c. It would consequently be absurd to deny, that on the light cavalry and light infantry devolve the most arduous, active, and trying parts of campaigning, when two armies are put in motion, when they commence manœuvring, and when they approach each other with a view of giving battle. The particular nature of the duties allotted to the light troops, bringing on an infinity of skirmishes that count for nothing in the Gazette, but in which many a good fellow gets a broken head, and is never mentioned or thought of after, because affairs of posts, (as they are styled by those rearward,) do not come under the head of general actions. Let it not be forgotten that in general engagements also the light troops take a very prominent part; and those who fancy, (as I have known some theorists declare,) that as soon as an army has concentrated, taken up its position, and offered battle to its antagonist, the business of the light troops has principally ceased, betray a woeful ignorance of the actual state of affairs in such cases. Infantry of the line on many occasions during a campaign, are obliged to take a proportion of outpost duty, and they must unavoidably do so when an army occupies an extended line of position, and when each division is pushed forward near its enemy, as was the case with most of ours in the Pyrenees in 1813. The same observation is applicable to heavy cavalry, which is very commonly necessitated also to take a share of outpost duty. That by far the greater portion of hammering, milling, and downright hard fighting, has fallen on the shoulders of the infantry in every action fought by the British army for the last thirty years, the following battles will fully attest:-Alexandria, Maida, Roliça, Vimiera, Corunna, the passage of the Douro, Talavera, Gen. Crawford's action on the Coa in 1810, Busacco, the various actions during Massena's retreat out of Portugal, terminating with that at Sabugal, Barossa, Fuentes d'Onore, Albuera, the surprise of Gen. Gerard's division by Lord Hill, Salamanca, Vittoria, the various battles in the Pyrenees, the passage of the Bidassoa, and the storming of the entrenched position in the pass of Vera in October 1813, Nivelle, Nive, Orthes, Tarbes, Toulouse, Quatre Bras, and Waterloo. I must not omit to mention the thousands of infantry that perished at the sieges of Rodrigo, of Badajoz, at the fortified convent in Salamanca, a short time previous to that memorable battle, at the assault of the forts of Almarez, at the defence of Tarifa, at Burgos, at San Sebastian, and at the blockade of and sortie from Bayonne. If those are not conclusive, I have no farther proofs to adduce in support of my creed. Let me not be misunderstood as wishing to insinuate that the cavalry, artillery, and engineers, did not take an extremely active part in many of those operations; but the best proof, perhaps, to those who may be disposed to doubt the accuracy of my statement, will be a reference to the returns of killed and wounded in all the above-mentioned engagements, and the numerical strength of each arm in the field at the time. The hardships, privations, and dangers of campaigning, must not be considered as consisting only in fighting one, two, or more battles in a year, but in the unceasing nightly watching, and the consequent want of rest, which falls so particularly on the cavalry and infantry; I repeat that those harassing duties devolve exclusively on them, because neither artillery nor engineer, strictly speaking, ever take any share of the very advanced posts. Indeed, from the nature of their service they cannot possibly be supposed to do So. At the conclusion of a march, the guns are parked, the horses picketed, and the gunners encamped for the night; the whole well guarded by posts of cavalry and infantry far advanced in their front. I served many years with a part of the army to which a troop of horse artillery was attached, and had, therefore, innumerable opportunities of knowing, that even horse artillery belonging to an advanced corps, have comparatively an easy time of it. Sometimes a couple of guns are sent forward with a squadron or two of cavalry, or with some companies of infantry, when it is intended that the picquets should make a stand at a bridge, ford, or defile; but even in such cases, the guns are necessarily covered and protected by parties of cavalry or infantry in front, and the artillery man can, therefore, repose for the night, whilst the light troops keep a sharp look-out for their safety. If this is the case with light artillery, how much more so must it be with brigades of heavy guns in the rear! any Let me ask my old horse artillery friends with whom I served in the last war, if of them are still in the land of the living, whether (independent of being exempt from the multiplicity of pickets and other outpost duties, and from the eternal skirmishing which, either in advancing or in retreat, occupied the time and attention of the cavalry and infantry from year's end to year's end,) they had not at all times and in every situation in which it was possible for the army to be placed, the advantage of transporting with them, inside or outside the carriages belonging to the guns, certain little comforts and conveniences for man and horse which the cavalry and infantry very frequently indeed wanted for days together, when the proximity of the hostile armies rendered it necessary to send away the baggage to the rear, whereby the officers, of infantry in particular, having nothing with them, except what they stood upright in, were, not unfrequently, prevented from having access to razor, comb, clean linen, &c. &c. for a week at a time; nor did they know the taste, during that period, of any thing but a short allowance of mouldy ship biscuit, or half rations of tough lean beef, grilled on the lid of a soldier's tin kettle? I am not ignorant of the fact, that it is contrary to the strict letter of the law to affix one iota of private baggage to the gun-carriages; yet I am inclined to believe that many crimes and offences of a far more heinous nature go every day unpunished than that of transporting with the field-pieces a small portmanteau, a bell-tent, a few feeds of corn for a horse, a loaf or two of bread, wine, spirits, cigars, a bullock's heart or the kidneys of the said animal, and other odds and ends, such as were occasionally to be picked up in a bivouac. To the unsophisticated and inexperienced soldier, these may appear "trifles light as air;" but he may take my word for it, that in cold, dreary, wet, comfortless bivouacs, during a succession of severe campaigns, such "trifles" are of incredible value, and are the very best preventives against agues, fevers, and other devilments of the kind. I believe the British artillery to be unrivalled; and, if I add, that no man holds it in higher admiration and respect than myself, I state my real, genuine and unfeigned sentiments. I have served with it in the Colonies, in the field, and at sieges, and I ought therefore to be able to appreciate its excellence. Some apology is due, perhaps, to the members of that distinguished corps, in common with those of the engineers, cavalry and infantry, for the unceremonious manner in which I have discussed the particular nature of their respective services. As long as the present system of European warfare continues in fashion, I feel thoroughly convinced that the drudgery of all armies during campaigns, must inevitably fall on the cavalry and infantry; and more especially on the latter, inasmuch as they take a prominent part in sieges as well as in all other field operations. That the British infantry also has no sinecure in colonial duties, I think I have proved beyond a doubt. Like the artillery, the engineer department is exempt from pickets, guards, foraging parties, skirmishes, advance and rear-guards, and a hundred other trying and wearisome duties which fall on the cavalry and infantry. True it is, that in sieges the engineer has enough to do. If a pontoon bridge is to be established, if field-works are to be thrown up to strengthen a position, if bridges are to be broken down to secure the retreat of an army, or if they are to be repaired in pursuit of a beaten enemy, the engineer takes an active part. Let it nevertheless not be forgotten that all and every part of such duties are actually carried into effect by the infantry, under the fire of the enemy or not, as it may happen. The officers of engineers are distributed to the different divisions of an army, and some of them remain at head-quarters. Whether attached to one or the other, even the engineer subaltern rides a good horse, he frequently partakes of the good cheer at the table of his division general, and, in nineteen cases out of twenty, he turns into some sort of habitation with a roof on it, and enjoys a good night's repose, at a time when the cavalry and infantry are employed far in front carefully watching an experienced and enterprising enemy. Finally, in most cases, (sieges always excepted,) the engineer accompanies the staff of the army, on which department, the whole military world well knows, the loaves and fishes have always been poured forth in the greatest possible abundance. I have endeavoured to compare with impartiality the general calling (if I may use the term) of all branches, from the first moment a youth leaves his mother's apron-strings, and becomes a soldier of cavalry, infantry, or of the two ordnance corps. I have ever been of opinion, that the infantry, which is the main stay, the bulwark of armies, should UNITED SERVICE RECREATIONS AT PORTSMOUTH. 349 at least enjoy the same advantages as their brother soldiers of the cavalry, artillery, and engineers; nor can I conceive that any unprejudiced person will think my notions on the subject outrageous, unreasonable, or unjust. It has been argued, that the price of commissions in the cavalry is higher than that of the infantry; and that, therefore, the pay ought to be better. Be it so; but the knife will cut both ways. The officers of the two Ordnance corps obtain their commissions without paying a fraction for them; yet, their pay is likewise higher than the infantry. Perhaps we shall be told that being scientific corps is a sufficient reason for it. I should, nevertheless, be glad to know, whether the expense of educating cadets at Woolwich is defrayed from their own pockets? If not, the argument is futile. Frederick the Great of Prussia, if certain authors have not belied him, not only paid his infantry quite as high as any other branch, but they, moreover, took precedence of all other arms. Now, I will confess, that old Frederick's opinion on such matters weighs quite as forcibly with me as that of any human being who ever commanded an army. I will now conclude, Mr. Editor, by assuring you and your readers, lest I should be accused of being actuated by self-interested motives, that whether the British infantry remains until doomsday on the same footing as at present, it cannot affect me directly or indirectly. I have passed the rank of major many, many long years; and, whether the pay of the infantry be increased or whether it remain in statu quo, my income will neither be diminished nor increased. AN OLD Soldier. UNITED SERVICE RECREATIONS AT PORTSMOUTH. THE Naval and Military Officers stationed at Portsmouth, have commenced their cricket meetings with great spirit. We find that the ladies residing in that neighbourhood have subscribed for a bat to be presented to the Member of the Garrison Cricket Club who can make the greatest number of runs during the next three months; and many are the speculations as to who will be the successful candidate. The following epigram from the pen of Miss L. H. Sheridan, was made on the occasion. BAT, OR BALL. I'm told the Portsmouth "ladies fair" intend As 'tis a game for gentlemen to play, THOUGHTS ON THE SYSTEMATIC PRACTICE OF NAVAL MANOEUVRES. A WARM feeling of interest for the welfare of the Navy, has led the writer to view with satisfaction the introduction of many changes tending to that end, but a long absence from active service, and a residence at a distance from the naval arsenals, has deprived him of that minute acquaintance with its actual state, with respect to some particulars, that is enjoyed by those who are placed in opposite circumstances: hence it would afford him gratification to learn that the assumption on which the following remarks are founded is erroneous. It has occurred to him, that of the various branches of naval science that are likely to be neglected during a long peace, one of the most important is that which teaches the art of conducting and manœuvring fleets ; and his fear that it does not at present receive proper notice, arises chiefly from recollecting, that it was not practised to the extent that in his humble opinion it ought to have been in the two fleets he served in during the last war, and they were principal ones. This averment affords fair grounds for the inference, that it is not now cultivated so much as the actual circumstances of the service will permit; thus forming an exception to the praiseworthy ardour with which most other kinds of nautical knowledge are pursued. Although it was mostly his good fortune to serve under captains who were not regardless of the instruction of the midshipmen, he does not remember a solitary instance of the attention of the latter having been particularly directed, either to the theory of manoeuvring as contained in the now exploded Signal Book, (the only official authority of that period ;) or to its practice, which never extended beyond the ordinary evolutions, that were required to preserve the bearing of Cape Sicie, north-west. Nevertheless, a practical knowledge of this art can be acquired only by service in fleets, and even there the chance of the young and too often thoughtless midshipmen being led to its study, has been shown to be extremely doubtful. To past neglect, therefore, of remedial measures, is to be attributed the fact, that it is not uncommon to hear officers of respectable professional attainments freely acknowledge their ignorance of this department of their calling. With reference to the probability of disasters arising therefrom, it were of small account perhaps, if this ignorance was confined to the junior grades of the service: as one proof, however, among several that could be cited, that this is not the case, the writer has been informed by an officer who was present upon the occasion, that within a few years, the subject having been incidentally started at a commander-in-chief's table, a captain of many years standing declared his ignorance of it; without, however, seeming to esteem it lightly, as a cloak for what he might, under other circumstances, have felt ashamed of, but rather in a tone of regret that he had never served in a fleet: the blunt candour which induced such a confession may be taken as a gage of its sincerity. Had the death of the Admiral devolved the command of the station upon this officer, there is ample reason to suppose that the honour of the flag would have been in safe keeping, so far as the defence and seamanlike handling of his ship were concerned, (main points, it is readily admitted); but |