men would divest themselves of prejudice, no argument could be brought against it; but your Majesty, who shows an equal regard for all branches of your service, and who stands high above all prejudice, will best judge.

I have the honour to be,

Your Majesty's most dutiful subject and servant,

R. Y.

*.* There cannot be a question of the deficiency represented by "R. Y.," or of the propriety of remedying it. Without, however, pledging ourselves to the peculiar mode by which our correspondent proposes to obviate the alleged defect, we will add a suggestion it has been for some time our purpose to bring forward at more length-we mean the propriety of making the regular Works and Harbour of Portsmouth, uniting, as that place so eminently does, facilities of illustrating by practice the combined or hostile operations both of the sea and land forces, a SCHOOL OF INSTRUCTION for our Troops and Shipping. Instead of the trite and mechanical details usually prosecuted, with little profit to the individual, in the barrack or upon the deck, why should not the corps, forming in succession the garrison of Portsmouth, be instructed, both officers and men, in the names, nature, and uses of the various Works which form the enceinte of that solitary British fortress, and in the qualities and classes of its Ordnance? The officers of Engineers and Artillery stationed there would, we should think, be too happy to be invested with so useful and honourable an occupation. How many officers and soldiers occupy and quit the Garrison of Portsmouth, without knowing the denominations and purposes of its elaborate fortifications, or bestowing a thought upon the acquisition of an elementary knowledge of the first importance to a soldier in the field!

The whole Army and Fleet in Commission might be successively passed through a course of practical instruction and manœuvres at this station, each arm of the service gaining an insight into the movements and materiel of the other; while the details of professional knowledge might be fixed in their attention by sham sieges and fights, landings, repulses, and various manoeuvres, in which the services might be combined or opposed; the effect of which would be to invest theory with the value and identity of experience,-to expand the views, profitably employ the time, and excite the emulation of the services,-results which would unquestionably tend to maintain our seamen and soldiers in a fitter state to meet the exigencies of sudden war.

The NAVAL AND MILITARY LIBRARY AND MUSEUM, the definitive establishment of which we have the pleasure to record in our present Number, will, we have no doubt, offer important and extensive facilities to the acquisition of that reciprocal knowledge indispensable to the concert and efficiency of the United Services. As a repository of all mechanical contrivances and details of construction, employed in their various and respective operations, of plans, improvements, and suggestions too numerous for actual adoption, but tending to the grand object of perfecting each system as it were by insensible links of practical ingenuity, this long-desired Institution, exclusive of other equally important advantages, will, we are convinced, prove of the highest utility.

We shall take another opportunity of recurring to this subject.-En.

ACTIONS OF THE BRITISH CAVALRY.

THERE appeared a few years ago in one of the Numbers of the Quarterly Review, a paper in which the merits of the British Cavalry were discussed, as compared with that of foreign nations, and the light dragoons were freely censured for inefficiency at the battle of Waterloo. Such sweeping criticisms, even in the pages of that able periodical, are seldom very correct, and their impression is not of a permanent character; but when in so admirable a professional work as that of Colonel Napier, the same sentiments are upheld, the case becomes different, and it is but fair that such a sentence as the following in the work alluded to, should be duly investigated and put to the sure test of positive evidence and correct detail of facts.

Colonel Napier in his Third Volume states,

"The result of one hundred battles and the united testimony of impartial writers of different nations, have given the first place among the European infantry to the British, but, in a comparison between the troops of France and England, it would be unjust not to admit that the cavalry of the former stands higher in the estimation of the world."

No one will certainly dispute the justice of the first part of this sentence, but it remains to be seen by reference to facts, how far the latter part is correct. The cavalry of England have, it is true, had far fewer opportunities of distinction than the infantry, but it may be confidently asserted, that in nine cases out of ten, where opportunities have been afforded them, from the year 1793 to the battle of Waterloo, they have been successful. Let us proceed to the proof of this assertion by an inquiry into the results of most of the cavalry actions during the late war. To begin with the campaigns of Holland in 1793 and 4, what was the result of the attack of the French on the British camp at Cisoing? The Enniskillens and 16th light dragoons took so active and useful a part in the repulse of the enemy, that they were especially mentioned in the dispatch on that occasion, as having contributed greatly by the spirit of their attack to the success of the day.

A short time afterwards we find a squadron of the Bays under Major Crauford attacking a picket of 150 infantry, of whom they made prisoners 104, leaving the remainder dead upon the spot.

Again at Lannoy, we hear of Lieut.-Colonel Churchill with two squadrons charging a large body of the enemy, and killing, wounding, or making prisoners 150 of their number.

At Villiers en Couchies, two squadrons of the 15th light dragoons in conjunction with two Austrian squadrons, overthrew more than double their force of French cavalry, and driving them back upon a line of infantry, also broke them, and pursued the whole to the gates of Cambrai, where they found refuge from their victors with a loss of 1200 men and three pieces of cannon: and, indeed, had it not been for a mistake by which the British supports were not sufficiently at hand, the success would have been even more signal and extraordinary. Such were the principal cavalry affairs of these campaigns, but in several more partial encounters the success of the British was equally remarkable. The next occasion, on which the British cavalry were employed upon the Continent, was the expedition to the Helder, where the peculiar nature of that country prevented much use being made

of their services. One instance was, however, even there afforded them of displaying their superiority, when Lord Paget and Colonel Erskine, at the head of a detachment of the 15th light dragoons, recaptured two guns that had been seized by a much more numerous force of the French cavalry, which had advanced along the sea-side, and which they completely overthrew with considerable loss. We next come to the Peninsular war, and, in referring to the details of the various cavalry actions, it will be the fairest way of proceeding, to quote as frequently as possible from Colonel Napier himself, and placing him in the witness-box, prove from his own evidence, the injustice of the comparison he has so deliberately drawn between the French and British cavalry.

At the battle of Vimiero, Colonel Napier thus narrates the part taken by the small body of cavalry who were present at that victory. "Colonel Taylor with the very few horsemen he commanded, (a squadron of 20th light dragoons,) rode fiercely among the confused and retreating troops, and scattered them with great execution." To this just tribute to the memory of that gallant officer, may be added the testimony of all who beheld his attack, that nothing could be more welltimed and daring: unfortunately, however, the ground was ill calculated for cavalry, and this small body, led away by the ardour of pursuit, became entangled in difficulties, and being under those trying circumstances, hemmed in and charged by a very superior force under Gen. Margaron, their gallant leader was killed, and the greater part of them destroyed, but not till they had produced an effect upon the enemy greater than could have been expected from twice their numbers.

In the campaign in the north of Spain under Sir J. Moore, the conduct of the cavalry whenever they were engaged, was marked by an energy and spirit which has deservedly obtained the praise of all writers who have recorded that period of the war. The brilliant successes at Sahagun, Mayorga, and Benevente, are too well known to require much comment. On each of those occasions, the light cavalry, under Lord Paget, eminently distinguished themselves by the overthrow of superior numbers of a cavalry which had hitherto in the continental wars been accustomed to a tide of unvaried success. After narrating the affair at Mayorga, Colonel Napier observes, "This was a bold and hardy action, but the English cavalry had been engaged more or less for twelve successive days, and with such fortune and bravery that above 500 prisoners had fallen into their hands, and their leaders being excellent, their confidence was unbounded."

We now proceed to those campaigns which took place under that great chief, who raised the fame of the British soldier to a point far beyond what it had ever attained in the proudest days of our military glory.

The first time in these campaigns that we find much notice of the cavalry is at the passage of the Douro, when Colonel Napier tells us, that

"Gen. C. Stewart and Major Hervey, impatient of the inactivity of Gen. Murray, charged with two squadrons, and rode over the enemy's rear-guard, as it was pushing through a narrow road, to gain an open space beyond. Laborde was unhorsed, Foy badly wounded; and on the English side Major Hervey lost an arm; and his gallant horsemen, receiving no support from Murray, were obliged to fight their way back with loss."

At the battle of Talavera, the celebrated charge of the 23rd Light Dragoons, has been frequently quoted as an instance of the over impetuosity of the British cavalry; an impetuosity which no doubt led that regiment to almost total destruction; but, before we hastily condemn the charge of the 23rd, let us appeal to Colonel Napier's own account, and the explanatory letter of Sir F. Ponsonby, published in the appendix of the 3rd volume, for the effect upon the general features of the action produced by the rashness of the 23rd; and, if any farther proof be necessary, let us see what is said by Lord Wellington in his Dispatch. After stating that the enemy was collecting large masses for an attack upon the right, he mentions the charge of the 23rd, and observes" Although the 23rd Light Dragoons suffered considerable loss, their charge had the effect of preventing the execution of that part of the enemy's plan." Now, surely this is a plain and strong testimony; and it is but fair to weigh the advantage obtained, against the losses by which it was purchased. Had the enemy been allowed time for organizing his meditated advance, and had his attack been repulsed by the British infantry on the left, though with far greater loss than what was experienced by the 23rd Light Dragoons, it would still have been considered a successful and glorious result. The 23rd are, therefore, fairly entitled to some degree of praise, for having completely disconcerted this most important attack, upon which no small consequences were evidently dependent. It is perfectly true, that cavalry should as much as possible be husbanded on service, because of the great difficulty of keeping up its efficiency, but no feeling of this sort should ever prevent its being employed, when there are fair grounds for expecting consequences so influential as those which resulted from the charge of the 23rd at Talavera. The attack of formed bodies of infantry is a desperate and hazardous service, but to lay down as a general rule that cavalry should never make such attempts, would be any thing but advisable. The least disorder on the part of the infantry at once renders their array vulnerable, and whether produced by any moral circumstance, by the nature of the ground, or by the artillery belonging to their assailants, the advantage of the cavalry instantly predominates, and the timely blow is certain

and decided in its effect.

In retiring upon Leiria, during the retreat upon the lines of Torres Vedras in 1810, the enemy having suddenly pushed on so as to create some confusion, their advanced troops were vigorously attacked by Capt. Cocks, who took very judicious advantage of the ground, and completely held them in check until Gen. Anson's brigade of cavalry, and Capt. Ball's troop of artillery, arrived to his support. Colonel Napier continues the relation of the affair thus

"The French then forming three columns endeavoured to bear down the British with their centre, while the others turned their flanks. The ravines were, however, difficult to pass; Ball's artillery played well into the principal body, and Anson charging it, as it emerged from every defile, slew a great number; the British lost three officers and about fifty men, the enemy considerably more, and in five hours he did not gain as many yards of ground, although he had thirty-six squadrons opposed to ten."

Surely, Colonel Napier's own evidence is, in this instance, very decisive against his comparisons of the French and British cavalry. A

large body of cavalry was engaged on both sides, though with a numerical superiority of more than three to one on the part of the French, not to mention the acknowledged advantage possessed by those who follow, over those who retreat before them. The next mention of the success of our cavalry, by Colonel Napier, relates to such a small force, that we merely allude to it in justice to the gallant but humble individual concerned. "Serjeant Baxter," Col. N. tells us," at the head of five troopers of the 16th Light Dragoons, surprised and attacked fifty French infantry, making forty-two of them prisoners with the loss of only one of his own men.'

A similar instance of courage and conduct at a later period of the war, may be cited in the capture of a field-officer and thirty dragoons of King Joseph's rear-guard, when he retreated from Madrid, by Corporal Hanley, of the 14th Light Dragoons, with a patrol of only eight men of the 14th and Germans. This man is now a serjeant-major in the 14th; and it was not the only feat of the sort that he performed during the war. But to return from this pardonable digression. The first time we find Colonel Napier making any direct reflections upon the cavalry, during the progress of his history, is in his admirable description of Massena's retreat from before the lines of Torres Vedras. He states, that" The cavalry and artillery had been launched against Regnier in his retreat from Belmonte, at daylight, on the morning of March the 30th;" but that Regnier recovered his communications with the loss of 300 prisoners, adding, that "much more might have been done, if the cavalry had been pushed forward with the celerity and vigour the occasion required." Here then, we find the cavalry incurring censure, not for their precipitate rashness, but for over caution. Possibly there may be some justice in the blame imputed to them; but to any man acquainted with the nature of the country in which these transactions took place, it must be evident that no little circumspection was necessary in attempting to push forward cavalry and guns, without the immediate support of their own infantry, into passes and defiles where that of the enemy might with little danger to themselves, have inflicted such severe losses upon their mounted pursuers. After all, the fact of 300 prisoners having been captured, proves the pursuit not to have been so extremely slack as is represented.

It is not very difficult after the occurrence to pronounce where boldness should have ended, or at what point it assumes the character of temerity, but at the moment of action, it requires no small judgment to form such decided opinions. Colonel Napier thus relates an instance at the combat of Sabugal, of unwarrantable rashness on the part of the enemy.

"A squadron of French cavalry surmounted the ascent, and with incredible desperation, riding up to a wall, behind which some of our infantry were posted, were in the act of firing their pistols over it, when a rolling volley laid nearly the whole of them lifeless on the ground."

Α very similar instance of reckless audacity occurred at the battle of Orthez, where a French squadron, riding furiously up a lane, were exterminated to a man by the fire of our infantry posted upon an overhanging bank above them. Here are strong cases then, as regards the French cavalry, of the fatal effects of rash attacks; and it must further be observed, that, if we weigh these two cases in the proper scale, it will be found that the advantage would not have at all counter